2.7 Constructive Technology Assessment
2.7.1 Introduction
Technology assessment (TA) aims to support the designing and shaping of technology in society. TA is supposed “to reduce the human costs of trial and error learning in society's handling of new technologies, and to do so by anticipating potential impacts and feeding these insights back into decision making, and into actors' strategies” (Schot and Rip, 1997, p. 251). TA practices are intended to create, communicate, and apply knowledge about and reflection on the potential and actual interaction of (new) technology and societal actors and forces.1 An overarching definition is offered by the TAMI project, a joint effort of European TA agents, to summarize the state of the art of TA: “Technology assessment is a scientific, interactive and communicative process which aims to contribute to the formation of public and political opinion on societal aspects of science and technology” (TAMI project, 2003, p. 4).
The first concepts of TA were developed in the United States at the end of the 1960s. At that time a need to assess the potential, normally unexpected negative effects of new technologies was perceived that led in 1972 to the creation of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) as a research-based service and early warning mechanism of the US Congress; OTA worked for more than 20 years with quite some success, but in it was closed down by a Republican majority in Congress (Smits et al., 2010; Smits and Leyten, 1991). The OTA served as a model for various forms of parliamentary TA services established in European countries, directly or indirectly linked to parliamentarian decision making (such as in the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland).
Since the late 1990s, TA concepts have increasingly adopted a dedicated design ambition. In the meantime, there is a considerable variety of TA approaches such as expert TA, participatory TA, interactive TA, rational TA, real-time TA, and constructive TA (CTA).
In particular, CTA aims to understand social issues arising from new technologies and to influence design practices. This development has been driven by three independent but interrelated forces:
On such grounds, a “realistic,” (i.e., modest though dedicated) design ambition toward technologies can emerge: If in today's polyvalent society literally “everything goes,” why shouldn't it be possible to design and shape technology in an explicit and at the same time reflexive way?
The present chapter2 will sketch a dynamic concept of TA – with a focus on CTA – and its contribution to the governance of technological innovation. A constructivist and reflexive TA concept will be suggested: Informed by heuristics-based analyses, CTA will be presented as modulating ferment in the social process of technological innovation and as a building brick of its emerging de facto governance. Finally we will suggest the metaphor of TA as a dance of three elements:3 The “practice” of technological innovation; the “theory” of science, technology, and innovation studies; and the “policy,” that is, public and private governance ambitions.
2.7.2 New Attention for the Design and Governance of Science, Technology, and Innovation
Increasingly politicians, industrial actors, societal groups, and technology experts are concerned about inappropriate attempts at steering technological development and thus hampering the realization of desired innovation effects. In the past, all too often development followed the model of the “economics of technoscientific promise” (Felt et al., 2007): Promises to industry and society, often far reaching, are a general feature of technological change and innovation, and are particularly visible in the mode of governance of emerging technosciences (biotechnologies and genomics, nanotechnologies, neurosciences, or ambient intelligence), all with typical characteristics. They require the creation of a fictitious, uncertain future in order to attract resources: financial, human, political, and so on. They come along with a diagnosis that we are in a world competition and that we (Europe, the United States, etc.) will not be able to afford our social model if we don't participate in the race and become leaders in understanding, fueling, and exploiting the potential of technosciences. The model
works with a specific governance assumption: a division of labor between technology promoters and enactors, and civil society. Let us (= promoters) work on the promises without too much interference from civil society, so that you can be happy customers as well as citizens profiting from the European social model. (Felt et al., 2007, p. 25)
Under this model of techno-economic promises politics, science and industry take the lead, while the innovation needs and expectations represented in the society appear to remain in a rather passive consumer role.
Felt et al. (2007) suggest as an alternative model the “economics and socio-politics of collective experimentation,” which are characterized by emerging or created situations that allow people to try out things and learn from them. The main difference with the other model is that “experimentation does not derive from promoting a particular technological promise, but from goals constructed around matters of concerns and that may be achieved at the collective level. Such goals will often be further articulated in the course of the experimentation” (Felt et al., 2007, p. 26f). This model requires a specific division of labor in terms of participation of a variety of actors, who are investing because they are concerned about a specific issue (see also Callon, 2005). “Users matter” in innovation – that has been shown not in the least by our UT colleague Nelly Oudshoorn and her team (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003). Examples of such demand- and user-driven innovation regimes include the information and communication sector (where the distinction between developers and users is not sharp), sports (e.g., von Lüthje, Herstatt, and von Hippel, 2005), or the involvement of patient associations in health research (e.g., Rabeharisoa and Callon, 2004) and pharmacogenomics (e.g., Boon et al., 2008). The concept of “open innovation” debated around the user-driven development of nonpatented open-source software, and more generally in Hank Chesbrough's influential book (2003) is largely overlapping with the collective experimentation concept. The governance of such regimes is precarious since they require the long-term commitment of actors who are not always equipped with strong organizational and other relevant means, and there is always some room for opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, the promise is innovation with sustainable effects.
2.7.3 Constructive Technology Assessment
So we are in need of a governance of technological innovation that builds on exchange, debate, negotiations, and cooperation between companies, science, civil society, and political systems. Which role can TA adopt in this setting?
Which TA? Smits et al. (2010; see also Smits and Leyten, 1991) differentiate “Watchdog TA” and “Tracker TA.” Watchdog TA is supposed to fulfill an early-warning function for political decision makers. Related projects are often conducted by centralized (parliamentary) TA agencies. Actors in the innovation process do not play an active role in Watchdog TA. In contrast, Tracker TA, or CTA, aims to proactively and constructively interfere in the process of technology development and design.
CTA as a constructive design process starts from the assumption that actors involved in technology development can find themselves in two basically different positions: as insiders or outsiders to the development process. Garud and Ahlstrom (1997) suggested differentiating the positions of enactors and comparative selectors: Enactors are technology developers and promoters aiming to enact new technology; they “construct scenarios of progress, and identify obstacles to be overcome. They thus work and think in ‘enactment cycles’ which emphasize positive aspects” (Te Kulve, 2011, p. 31). Comparative selectors, in contrast, observe technological development process from the outside and may be in a situation to compare the enactors' offers and performance with other, parallel developments. There are professional comparative selectors (such as regulatory bodies like the US Food and Drug Administration) using professional tools for their assessments, and amateur comparative selectors (such as critical consumers and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the latter increasingly turning professional) (Te Kulve, 2011, p. 32). Enactment cycles and comparative selection cycles come together in bridging events (Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997), with insiders and outsiders interacting. Such interaction may lead to variations in the technological design process and can have an impact on the direction of selection decisions. Such bridging events “can be constructed on purpose, by actors from enactor or selector positions, and by more disinterested actors such as Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) agents” (Te Kulve, 2011, p. 33).
CTA agents start from the assumption that enactors and selectors of new technology make assessments all the time, so rather than making assessments (by TA agents) CTA aims to create and orchestrate bridging events as dedicated “spaces” for interaction, learning, and reflection (Rip and te Kulve, 2008). Both enactors and selectors can undergo first-order or second-order learning processes: According to Argyris and Schön (1978), first-order learning links outcomes of action to organizational strategies and assumptions that are modified so as to keep organizational performance within the range set by accepted organizational norms. The norms themselves remain unchanged. Second-order learning concerns inquiries that resolve incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities and relevance of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with associated strategies and assumptions, hence escaping tunnel vision and crossing borders.
CTA agents, in order to create dedicated spaces for first- and second-order learning, organize interactive workshops, often enriched by the elaboration of alternative sociotechnical scenarios, stimulating the debate of participants (see the “TA Methods” in this section). Such scenarios “capture ongoing dynamics and develop assessments of future developments. They show the effects of interactions between enactors and selectors which provides more substance to interactions in workshops as actors can draw upon the scenarios for inspiration” (Te Kulve, 2011, p. 34).
The interfering character of CTA requires an explicit understanding of the room for maneuver of the involved actors – up to now, still a weak point of CTA concepts. To which extent can the participants effectively manage or steer the development, variation, and selection processes? The governance context of CTA-supported design processes needs to be explored and understood. Governance means the coordination and control of autonomous but interdependent actors either by external authority or by internal mechanisms of self-regulation or self-control (Benz, 2007, p. 3). This is of particular relevance when it comes to the development and design of new and emerging technology: The potential areas of application, markets, concerned actors and audiences, and dimensions of potential effects are still in flux; and political arenas, decision criteria, and policy means are not yet determined.
2.7.4 Governance: CTA and Design in an Institutional Context
CTA and technological design are taking place in “inherited” economic and institutional environments. Any realistic attempt to shape technological development effectively has to understand the driving forces and hampering factors of governing this institutional context.
A useful heuristic for this purpose is offered by the school of evolutionary-economic analyses of technology dynamics. It is built on the findings of “innovation studies,” in particular on the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982): In their “search of a useful theory of innovation” and convinced of the stochastic, evolutionary, and organizationally complex and diverse character of innovation, the authors observed different technological “regimes” characterized by longstanding specific “search strategies” of engineers, determining to some extent the development trajectory of a given regime. Drawing on this basic observation, other authors have defined technological regimes as “the complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, user practices, skills and procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make up the totality of a technology” (Van den Ende and Kemp, 1999, 835). Rip and Kemp (1998) explicitly added to the “grammar” of a regime the public and private strategies and policies of relevant actors: Technology is conceptually and as an artifact socially constructed, including the governance of a regime.
Finally, these conceptual elements were combined in the heuristic of a multilevel perspective on sociotechnical transitions (e.g., Geels and Schot, 2007), characterized by niche innovations on a micro level (developing in emerging or created and protected incubation spaces), sociotechnical regimes on the meso level, and wider sociotechnical landscapes on the macro level (macroeconomic, cultural, and macropolitical developments). Studied with the help of this heuristic, one can see regime transitions, sometimes incremental and sometimes radical, sometimes driven by basic changes in the overarching landscape or stimulated through niche innovations undermining dominant regimes (see Figure 2.7.1).
Figure 2.7.1 Schematic presentation of reconfiguration of a technological regime (Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 412)
Such transition processes are fueled by promises and expectations about technological options and innovation (Van Lente, 1993). Actors anticipate and assess their options vis-à-vis changing regimes and create de facto new patterns (Rip, 2001) that can trigger “irreversibilities” (Callon, 1991) resulting in “endogeneous futures” (Rip, 2001). In other words, the analysis of the transition of sociotechnical regimes offers a heuristic help to open up the allegedly fatal transition point of the Collingridge dilemma for empirical research. This holds also for the governance of technological developments in a regime context: We can better understand the options and limitations for dedicated shaping.
Here it is useful to clarify the underlying concept of governance: The concept is used here as a heuristic, borrowed from political science, denoting the dynamic interrelation of involved (mostly organized) actors; their resources, interests, and power; the fora for debate and arenas for negotiation between actors; the rules of the game; and the policy instruments applied (e.g., Benz, 2007; Kuhlmann, 2001). Governance profiles and their quality and direction are reflected not a small amount in the character of public debates between stakeholders, policy makers, and experts. Think of the debates on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), or – still more in status nascendi – debates on the governance of an emerging, cross-cutting science, technology, and innovation (STI) field like nanotechnology (e.g., Joly and Rip, 2007).
How much leeway do actors in a given regime actually have? One has to understand the de facto governance of a given social context. Conceptually we can draw here upon the “actor-centered institutionalism” of Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) and Scharpf (2000). The de facto governance of sociotechnical regimes can be analyzed as a web of cognitive, normative, and regulatory rules. Actors have to cope with these rules; while inevitably reproducing them, they are also incrementally changing them through deviating behavior. In the context of emerging sociotechnical regimes, actors cannot achieve more (but also cannot achieve less) than to shape what will happen anyway, while at the same time rules are being transformed (Rip, 2008).
Against this background TA, in particular CTA, can be understood as a modulating factor of the de facto governance and of the co-evolutionary development of a regime. The better we understand the de facto governance in a given regime, the more CTA can in a realistic and constructive manner modulate technological development and design. CTA as a means of reflexive governance is aware of the limits of dedicated governance; this awareness is even a strategic underpinning of its ambition (Rip, 2006; Voss et al., 2006).
2.7.5 CTA as a Dance: Strategic Intelligence
CTA as a means of reflexive governance aims to make the diverging perspectives and interests of relevant actors visible and debatable aiming to increase the learning capacity. Here we suggest the metaphor of a dance of “practice,” “policy,” and “theory” (see Figure 2.7.2); they can be seen as partners on a dancing floor, moving to varying music and exposing different configurations.
Figure 2.7.2 Dance of “practice,” “policy,” and “theory” (Kuhlmann, 2007)
“Theory” is represented by the arsenal of dedicated and methodologically rich STIS.4 The multilevel analysis of regime transitions sketched out in this section is of particular value for the application of CTA as a means of reflexive governance (e.g., Konrad, Truffer, and Voss, 2008; Markard and Truffer, 2008). As a dancing partner, STIS (theory) would move about in the worlds of technology designers in a constructivist and reflexive manner (Robinson, 2010), analyzing the perspectives and interests of the other dance partners and reflecting on its own position (sometimes even changing its own beliefs): in other words, CTA becomes a means of reflexive governance.
The “dance floor” for CTA can be conceptualized as a “forum,” defined as institutionalized space specifically designed for deliberation or other interaction between heterogeneous actors with the purpose of informing and conditioning the form and direction of strategic social choices in the design and governance of science and technology (see Figure 2.7.3; Edler et al., 2006). The debates on a forum can be supported with insights from strategic intelligence (SI). SI has been defined as a set of sources of information and explorative as well as analytical (theoretical, heuristic, and methodological) tools – often distributed across organizations and countries – employed to produce useful insight in the actual or potential costs and effects of public or private policy and management (Kuhlmann et al., 1999). Strategic intelligence is “injected” and “digested” in fora, with the potential of enlightening the debate. SI can draw on semipublic intelligence services (such as TA agencies or statistical offices), on “folk” intelligence provided by practitioners or NGOs, and in particular on research-based statistical STIS.
Figure 2.7.3 Forum for the deliberation of sociotechnical themes (Kuhlmann, 2007)
2.7.6 Limits to CTA and Reflexive Governance of Technology Design
Today constructive TA is using a broad spectrum of scientific, interactive, and communicative methodologies and SI instruments in order to modulate on various fora, the de facto governance of technological development and design, aiming to increase the learning capacity and reflexivity of involved actors (enactors and comparative selectors). Examples include the targeted mobilization of users and the creation of niches as protected space for experimentation (e.g., Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma, 1998), using inter alia consultation processes and scenario workshops (Elzen et al., 2004; Robinson, 2010; Stemerding and Swierstra, 2006; Te Kulve, 2011).
Still, one can question the practical relevance of CTA, understood as a dance of practice, policy, and theory in the daily life of industrial design practices. Is this in the end more than just a dream of concerned idealists? After all, CTA is just one among many factors driving actual sociotechnical development, and finally TA may play just a symbolic role in the games of interested parties. There is still no final answer to such questions; but without the dedicated political will of leading actors in science, technology, industry, politics, and society, there will be no reflexive TA as constructive design practice and governance.
2.7.7 Application of CTA
Researchers executed a constructive TA for the introduction and use of a new type of asphalt comprising phase change materials that would reduce the freezing of road surfaces and hence the use of salt in winter. Goals of the CTA were to obtain information about the acceptance of the new product by society, which will be done by looking into political, social, environmental, economic, and cultural effects, starting with mapping the actors that play a role. These actors are shown in Figure 2.7.4. In the rest of this subsection, the roles of the actors will be explained by the students.
Figure 2.7.4 Scheme representing the interfaces between various actors and a new type of asphalt
Road-Building Companies
Road-building companies play a big role in the implementation of new road surface material, because they have to build the new roads with it. If production requires new techniques and perhaps also higher costs, the companies might not be pleased. However, the use of advanced and sustainable techniques could also work to their advantage if it fits with an image the company would like to depict. New supplier contracting is probably necessary, because the needed phase change materials are produced by specialized companies.
Government
The government has an important voice in the implementation of a new highway product, because a lot of planning is involved. When can the new roads be built? How much will it cost? How long will it take, and what kind of impact will it have on traffic flow? How much maintenance will be needed in the future? What is the product lifetime of the new material? These are just a few of the questions that can be asked about the long- and short-term influence of new highways.
Vehicle Drivers
This group consists of car owners as well as motorcyclists, bus drivers, and lorry drivers. Their interests have to do with costs and safety. If the new highways come with higher road taxes, they will not be happy about it. But perhaps if safety can be improved and is in balance with the higher costs, they might be willing to concede.
Neighborhood Inhabitants
Though this group is called inhabitants, it can also be people who work in the area of a highway or schools in the area. The way in which a new highway product may affect them is, for example, sound generation of the new material or pollution effects.
Environment Activists
Environmental groups want the world to be more sustainable. This includes using fewer resources. If the sustainable asphalt has noticeable advantages for the environment, environmental activists will promote is use.
Research Institutes
These groups will probably encourage a more sustainable highway, but first and foremost they will be critical and question the actual sustainability of a new product. They will carefully consider the pros and cons of the product. Companies that do quality control can also be part of this group.