Hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States
The Stratagems of the Warring States records the history of the Warring States.1 Most academics have denied that the book contains any philosophy as such. One scholar who believes that the book lacks any philosophy says, “The riches of The Stratagems of the Warring States from the literary point of view cannot conceal its poverty from a philosophical point of view.”2 As a historical record The Stratagems of the Warring States clearly cannot have a complete philosophical system, but if we read it carefully we can discover many illuminating points of philosophical interest nonetheless. Contending for hegemony was a key theme of interstate politics during the Warring States Period; hence, this book has many passages that discuss issues of hegemony. The book was compiled at least 1,900 years ago, yet its understanding of hegemonic issues can still be used to explain the phenomenon of great power hegemonic struggles today. This indicates that some of its views may reflect the essence and laws of international relations. This essay looks at three topics: the power base of hegemony, the role that norms play in hegemony, and the principles of the strategies used to gain hegemony. It then draws together the lessons about hegemony of the book and looks at their relevance for developing contemporary international relations theory.
There are basically three kinds of research related to The Stratagems of the Warring States: (1) language and literary studies, (2) textual criticism, and (3) philosophical study. The first area, language and literature, is not particularly related to the topic discussed here. Textual criticism falls into two kinds—textual criticism as such and historical criticism—both of which provide historical and literary background for understanding the interstate political philosophy of The Stratagems of the Warring States, but they lack philosophical considerations. Although the philosophical studies lack any input on interstate political philosophy, some scholars have analyzed the thought of the horizontalists and verticalists3 (or the strategists of alliances) of the Warring States Period in four areas: political philosophy, principles for the employment of personnel, philosophy of life, and policies for managing affairs. Some scholars think that The Stratagems of the Warring States suggests that in strategy the strategists’ aims are the deciding factor and that the book stresses thought about diplomacy.4 There are scholars who analyze the way of thinking of the horizontalists and verticalists from the point of view of their dialectic and who note that the configuration of the world in the twentieth century had points in common with the Warring States Period of more than two thousand years ago.5 The focal point of these studies, however, is not the interstate political philosophy of The Stratagems of the Warring States and, furthermore, they lack any study of the theme of hegemony.
This essay thus focuses on an analysis of the interstate political philosophy of The Stratagems of the Warring States. Hence, it looks at the ideas expressed in The Stratagems of the Warring States. Given that ideas are mainly expressed through language, this essay analyzes the ideas expressed by the discourses of the personalities in the book. Many of these discourses are aimed at canvassing support and, hence, what is said is not necessarily in conformity with facts, displaying tendencies to exaggeration or understatement. The purpose of this essay’s analysis, however, is to examine how people in the past thought about the question of hegemony as expressed by the masters discussed in this book; it does not matter for our analysis whether the facts recorded actually took place or what the speakers’ aims were. Since this essay focuses on what The Stratagems of the Warring States has to say about hegemony, the review of literature will focus on what scholars have said that is directly relevant to the three themes of hegemonic power, norms, and strategy.
Although there are no studies that analyze The Stratagems of the Warring States from the point of view of hegemonic power, in their studies of the book many scholars have noticed that competition for talented personnel and actions to gain hegemony are very closely related in the Warring States Period. For instance, some scholars think that “the idea of talent in The Stratagems of the Warring States would not seem to be particularly manifest, yet once it is considered in relation to planning for military strategy, then it assumes special significance.”6 This kind of analysis highlights the importance of talented personnel in the struggle for hegemony but it overlooks the fact that The Stratagems of the Warring States sees talented personnel as important to the survival of a state. In other words, talented persons are important to the struggle for hegemony and are equally important to a state that does not struggle for hegemony but simply seeks to survive. Some scholars think that The Stratagems of the Warring States is of the view that state competition is competition for personnel, but hold that soliciting talent is a stratagem of power politics.7 This opinion acknowledges the significance of talent for raising the status of a state’s power, but viewing the recruitment of talent as a stratagem of power politics implies that the author does not realize that The Stratagems of the Warring States sees talent as the core of the state’s political power. One scholar with a much more thoughtful view thinks that in The Stratagems of the Warring States, “Rulers who are politically wise generally see the competition for talent as more important than the struggle for towns and often make the possession of talent the primary decisive condition for the possession of towns and the seizing of wealth.”8 This analysis sees political talent as the basis for strengthening material power in all states, but its inadequacy is that it overlooks what is said in the book about the role talent plays in deciding the nature of hegemony. Political talent can not only increase a state’s material power but also determine the nature of its hegemony.
Many scholars think that the transition from the Spring and Autumn era to the Warring States Period was one in which the role of moral norms in foreign policy went into decline.9 For instance some scholars say, “in The Stratagems of the Warring States, the authors advocate a philosophy of life that pursues advantages by any means, completely disregarding rites, justice, sincerity and faithfulness, loyalty and filial piety, restraint and shame. There would seem to be no standards for normative human conduct.” And again, “the strategists of the Warring States deny rites and justice; they disparage traditional values and standards of conduct. What they respect is power play and insouciance with regard to breaking faith and discarding justice.”10 There are scholars who point out, “in the Spring and Autumn Period, the way of the hegemons ‘aped justice as its claim and relied on correctness for its successes.’ In the Warring States Period the feudal lords of the states did not even lay claim to the appearances of justice or correctness to cloak over the way of hegemony.”11 This point of view holds that the struggles for hegemony described by The Stratagems of the Warring States lack restraining norms between states and that hegemony itself does not need to follow interstate norms and does not need a basis of legitimacy. If we read The Stratagems of the Warring States carefully, however, we discover that the discourses of many strategists stress the importance of respect for interstate norms in attaining or maintaining hegemony. Some scholars have noticed this point but they think that the strategists of the Warring States Period stress benevolence and justice and morality simply as a cloak for their struggle for hegemony. For instance, one scholar says, “The benevolence and justice on the lips of Su Qin and Zhang Yi is quite different from the concept of benevolence and justice in the Confucian tradition. Its roots can be traced to a service in favor of gain and power politics. What is said is one thing; what is meant is another. In fact, they reject and criticize the benevolence and justice, morality and grades of respect that flourished in the Spring and Autumn Period.”12 This analysis affirms the positive role played by the practice of interstate norms in The Stratagems of the Warring States as a means of realizing hegemony, but it fails to fully understand the reason why the strategists stress norms. If we examine the question from the point of view of international relations theory then norms are an important component of a hegemonic system, the source of the legitimacy of a hegemonic state, and the basis for upholding the hegemonic order. Without the support of norms and relying only on power, the strategists of the Warring States Period could not have attained hegemony; hence, their emphasis on interstate norms is genuine and not primarily intended as a cloak for a profit motive.
Most that is written about the struggle for hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States focuses on the level of strategy and fails to analyze the logic and principles of the strategies of hegemonic struggle. Some scholars focus on what The Stratagems of the Warring States says about “stratagems,” and summarize the stratagems in the book as
political stratagems: strategies for reform and strengthening, strategies for employing the worthy and rejecting flatterers; strategies for reinforcing territory and uniting the people, strategies for internal struggle amongst the ruling group; foreign policy stratagems: strategies for a united front, strategies for division and disintegration, strategies for psychological deterrence, strategies for calculated concessions, strategies for overcoming others by eloquence; military stratagems: strategies for “wait and see,” strategies for military cooperation, strategies for first weakening and then destroying, strategies for seizing the opportunity, strategies for making the enemy his own enemy, strategies for getting spies to act as double agents. Plans by which the strong may advance, schemes by which the weak may survive; strategies also for alliances of two strong states to create a win-win situation or for their falling out with each other and attacking each other. Victors have ways of being victors and losers ways to lose; spectators have schemes of “a third party steals the spoils,” while those who incite others have their ideas of “pouncing on the unsuspecting from behind.”13
This summary enables us to see the great variety of strategies in The Stratagems of the Warring States, but it does not help us to understand what the main factors in the overriding strategy of gaining hegemony are, or what the basic principles of the strategy to gain hegemony are. There are even scholars who think that the horizontal and vertical policies of Su Qin, Zhang Yi, and others like them are simply to satisfy the short-term needs of the princes. They are “short-term schemes.”14 This view would not seem to fit the real political goal by which large states struggled for hegemony in the Warring States Period. Moreover, it will lead people to overlook the relevance of what The Stratagems of the Warring States has to say to about the strategies in the struggle for hegemony, and about research into the strategy for the rise of a major power today.
THE POWER BASE OF HEGEMONY
There is much discussion in The Stratagems of the Warring States of the power base of hegemony. The discussions touch on the factors leading to the formation of comprehensive national power; the relationship between the factors of political and other forms of power; political leadership; and geographical conditions. Although the views presented in the book reflect the context of an agricultural economy with “cold” weapons as opposed to firearms, the message transcends its time.
Comprehensive National Power Is the Power Base of Hegemony
In their discussion of hegemonic power, the strategists of The Stratagems of the Warring States mostly analyze the components of comprehensive national power. Moreover, the factors of national power they analyze are of different kinds. Unlike some scholars today, they do not see comprehensive national power as composed only of economic aspects. Among the factors of national power, they frequently mention four: political, military, economic, and geographic. For instance, in analyzing the power base that enabled Chu to attain hegemony, Su Qin tells King Wei of Chu that there are only these four factors. He thinks that the reason Chu was able to attain hegemony was that it relied on the wisdom of its leader, the advantages of its terrain, the strength of its army, and the resources of its economy. He says,
Chu is a great state under heaven. Great King, you are a wise king under heaven. In the west of Chu are Qianzhong [Northwest Hunan, East Guizhou] and Wuqun [East Sichuan], to the east Xiazhou [Hanyang] and Haiyang [Southeast Chu, formerly Wu and Yue], to the south are Dongting [Hunan: Lake Dongting] and Cangwu [Guangxi: Cangwu County], to the north Fen [Fenqiu], Xing [Henan: Xingshan], and Xunyang [Shaanxi], an area of five thousand square kilometers. There are a million troops in armor, a thousand four-horse chariots, ten thousand horses, and ten years’ supply of grain. These are the resources of a hegemon.15
The personages in the book have many arguments supporting the idea that comprehensive national power is the basis for hegemony. Some think that there are different ways to strengthen different factors of power. Although this understanding cannot be equated with the principle that factors of power are not interchangeable, as proposed by contemporary international relations theory, it implies that different factors of national power realize different ends for the state. Sima Cuo tells King Hui of Qin, “Someone who wants to enrich a state must enlarge its territory; someone who wants to strengthen the army must enrich the people; someone who wants to be a sage king must extend his virtue. With these three resources in place, humane authority will follow.”16 Sima Cuo’s summary of the contribution of the three factors of national power to comprehensive power includes three levels of awareness. The first is that strengthening economic, military, and political power must rely on expanding land, improving the livelihood of the people, and implementing virtuous government. The second is that only states that expand these three factors of power can attain world leadership. The third is that political power is a necessary condition for attaining world leadership and that it is more important than military or economic power.
Although the strategists in the book generally think that a struggle for hegemony requires comprehensive national power, they fail to measure comprehensive national power by a common standard. Reflecting their own political needs, they continually stress the great qualities of one state and portray the flaws in the power of opposing states as extremely serious. Today we are still hampered by this lack of a common standard by which to measure state power. Contemporary international relations theorists have not yet resolved it. Although the personages in the book frequently resort to arbitrary assessments of a state’s comprehensive power, their analysis of hegemonic power from the angle of many factors of power shows that they realize that a state of single-factor power cannot attain hegemony.
Political Power Is the Core Factor in Hegemonic Power
The politicians of The Stratagems of the Warring States all agree that political, military, economic, and geographical factors together comprise the comprehensive state power of a hegemon, but they differ on which of the four is most important. Normally people say that The Stratagems of the Warring States stresses the importance of military power. For instance, although Su Qin and Zhang Yi differ in their political views, in talking separately to King Hui of Qin they both say that to become a hegemon one must rely on military power. Su Qin draws on the experience of becoming a king or a hegemon in history to come to the conclusion that it is necessary to use armed force to attain hegemony. He tells King Hui of Qin,
In ancient times, the Divine Farmer punished Busui; the Yellow Emperor fought at Zhuolu and captured Chi You; Yao punished Huandou; Shun punished the Three Miao tribes; Yü punished Gong Gong; Tang punished the Xia King; King Wen punished the state of Chong [Shaanxi: Huxian]; King Wu punished Zhòu; Huan of Qi fought wars and became chief lord under heaven. From this it can be seen, when was there no war? … If today you want to annex all under heaven, defeat states of ten thousand four-horse chariots, make enemy states submit, rule all within the seas, love the ordinary people, and make feudal lords subordinate, it cannot be done without the military.17
Zhang Yi tells the king that the state of Qi fought five wars to gain hegemony and so if Qin is to become a hegemon it must fight and use war to overcome Chu. He says, “Qi is a state that fought five wars. It would not have survived had it lost any one of the five. From this it can be seen that war decides the survival or demise of a state of ten thousand four-horse chariots. … In the east you should fight Qi and Yan; in the center you should battle the three Jin states [Zhao, Wei, and Han]. And then with one move you will win the title of sage king of sage kings, and the feudal lords of all four sides will come to pay you homage.”18
In The Stratagems of the Warring States there are also many discussions that stress that political power is decisive. The term political power is modern; its corresponding terms in the ancient period are virtue, benevolence, the Way, justice, law, worthies, and sages. For instance, although Su Qin thinks that it is necessary to wage war to become a hegemon, he also says that, compared to population, territory, and military power, politics is even more decisive for attaining hegemony. He takes the examples of Yao having few people, Shun having a territory that was not large, Yü coming from a small village, and Tang of the Shang and Wu of the Zhou having armies that were not powerful to show that, even with these disadvantages, one can still become a sage king or hegemon, and thereby he illustrates that politics is indeed the key to becoming a hegemon. He says to King Huiwen of Zhao: “I, your minister, have heard that Yao did not even have three acres of land, Shun did not have even a yard of land, and yet they acquired all under heaven. Yü did not have a village of even a hundred people to become a sage king over the feudal lords. The armies of Tang and Wu did not exceed three thousand men and their chariots were not more than three hundred four-horsers, yet they were established as Son of Heaven. Reliability won them their Way.”19 These words of Su Qin do not deny the importance of other forms of power for becoming a hegemon. Rather they show that to realize the concrete goal of becoming a hegemon, the political power of an ability to marshal and manipulate resources is the primary factor. The strategist of the prince of Chun Shen in Chu holds a similar view. He too thinks that if the ruler is worthy and intelligent he may become a hegemon even if he is somewhat weak in resources. The strategist takes the example of the kings Tang of the Shang and Wu of the Zhou having small territories and yet attaining hegemony over all under heaven to prove this point. The strategist says to the prince of Chun Shen, “Tang had Bo [Henan: Nan Qiu] and King Wu had Hao [Shaanxi: Xi’an], which were neither a hundred square kilometers and yet they acquired all under heaven.”20
The book seems not to include discussion of the relative importance of political and economic power but there are discussions of the relative importance of political and geographical factors. In these debates, those who argue in favor of political power have greater plausibility. For instance, Wang Zhong thinks that Jin’s great strength lies in its geographical advantages, and by improving these it can attain hegemony. When Prince Wu of Wei points out the significance of strategic places, Wang replies, “This is that whereby Jin is strong. If you maintain them well then you have all you need for attaining hegemony or humane authority.”21 Wu Qi thinks that geographical advantages are not the foundation for restoring hegemony, however. He takes the examples of the three Miao tribes, Jie of the Xia, and Zhòu of the Yin [Shang], who all had advantages of terrain but, owing to political mistakes, were destroyed, to prove that surefooted politics is the key to attaining hegemony. Moreover, a state that makes political mistakes, even if it has geographical advantages, will nonetheless go to ruin. He says,
To trust in the strategic value of rivers and mountains does not guarantee your holding on to them. The business of the chief king does not take this path.
Of old, the territory of the three Miao had Pengli [Lake Poyang] on the east, Lake Dongting on the west, to the south Mount Wen [Sichuan Mount Min], to the north Mount Heng [in Hunan]. Since they relied on these strategic areas, yet governed badly, Yü sent them into exile.
The state of King Jie of the Xia had the yin of the Gate of Heaven on the east [Tianjing Pass in Shanxi: Jincheng County], the Valley of Heaven on the west [Hangu Pass], Mount Lu and Mount Gu to the north, and the Yi and Luo rivers to the south [Henan]. Since he relied on these strategic areas yet governed badly, Tang punished him.
The state of King Zhòu of the Yin [Shang] had Meng Gate [Mount Taihang Pass] on the east, and on the west the Zhang and Fu rivers. On the south it was surrounded by the Yellow River and on the north it rested against Mount Taihang. Since he relied on these strategic areas yet governed badly, King Wu punished him.
Meanwhile, you, O Prince, personally joined me, your minister, in overcoming and defeating our enemy’s city. It is not that the city wall was not high or that the population was not large, yet you could annex and possess them. Rather it was a result of government. Seen from this angle, how can the strategic advantages of terrain suffice to attain hegemonic or humane authority?22
He points out that it is dangerous to think one can rely on geographical advantages to attain hegemony and criticizes Prince Wu of Wei for overvaluing them: “My prince’s words are the path of a state at risk.”23
The Core of Hegemonic Political Power Is the Employment of Worthy and Able Ministers
Contemporary scholars think that political power comprises the character of the state, political system, political organization, the leader of the state, and organizational and policymaking ability.24 In The Stratagems of the Warring States nothing is said about the factors that comprise political power, yet in this book the merits and leadership of the ruler and the chief ministers are frequently seen as the core factors in hegemonic political power—as the well-known saying puts it, “an intelligent king and worthy prime minister.” The notion of the intelligent prince stresses the importance of the leadership of the ruler, whereas that of the worthy prime minister stresses the importance of the collective leadership of the policy makers. Many personages in The Stratagems of the Warring States take the employment of worthy and capable persons as the standard by which to assess the intelligence of the ruler. They think that there are many worthy and capable persons in the world; the key lies in whether the ruler employs them. They attribute the attainment of hegemony by Duke Huan of Qi to his employment of worthy and capable people. For instance, when Wang Dou is discussing with King Xuan of Qi why the king cannot become a hegemon and why Duke Huan of Qi was able to do so, he explains that Duke Huan was good at employing worthy and capable persons, whereas King Xuan is incapable of doing so. He says, “The former prince valued his ministers; but you, O King, do not value your ministers.”25 Lu Zhong goes on to say that Duke Huan of Qi not only valued worthy and capable persons, he was even able in his choice of talent to overlook small failings. He explains this point with the example of Duke Huan’s not dwelling on Guan Zhong’s three mistakes but still entrusting great responsibilities to him, which enabled the duke to become the hegemon of all under heaven. He says, “Guanzi made three mistakes but was still put in charge of the government of Qi. He corrected all under heaven and gathered together the feudal lords so that the duke became the foremost of the Five Hegemons. His fame spread through all under heaven and his light illumined the neighboring states.”26 Su Dai thinks that Duke Huan’s intelligent leadership shows in his trust in the ministers who form his policies. When King Hui of Yan asks Su Dai why he thinks that King Xuan of Qi will not become hegemon, he says it is because King Xuan “does not trust his ministers.”27 Even though Su Dai’s purpose here is to persuade King Hui to reemploy Zi Zhi as his chief minister, afterward people understood what he said to have general significance and therefore believed what he said.
The strategists of the Warring States Period thought that the leadership of the rulers could be graded as high or low based on their employment of the worthy and capable, and this distinction not only decided whether a state could establish hegemony, it even affected the type of hegemony that was established. In ancient China, people distinguished four grades of hegemon: sovereign, emperor, king, and hegemon. For instance, the Guanzi speaks of “understanding the One is the sovereign; inspecting the Way is the emperor; penetrating virtue is the king; planning for military victories is the hegemon.”28 Guo Wei of Yan thinks that a ruler who employs a worthy and capable person as his teacher can establish an empire, one who makes him his friend can establish humane authority, one who treats him as his minister can establish a hegemony, whereas one who treats him as a servant will find that his state falls. He says to King Zhao of Yan, “An emperor deals with a teacher; a sage king deals with a friend; a hegemon deals with a minister; a falling state deals with a servant.”29
There are also personages in the book who think that a worthy minister and an intelligent ruler are both equally important to the political power of a hegemon. This way of seeing things always leads to treating the importance of the role of prime minister as equal to that of the ruler. For instance, a strategist of Chu thinks that if a key worthy leaves, then a ruler who once had all under heaven will lose it. The strategist proves his point with the examples of the Xia Dynasty, which lost Yi Yin, and the state of Lu, which lost Guan Zhong, and then both fell into decline. He tells the prince of Chun Shen, “Of old, Yi Yin left the state of Xia to go to the state of Yin; Yin attained humane authority and the Xia perished. Guan Zhong left the state of Lu and went to the state of Qi; Lu became weak and Qi became strong. Regarding the presence of a worthy, should his prince not respect him, then the state will not attain glory.”30 The assessment of The Stratagems of the Warring States is that Su Qin himself is the decisive person in determining hegemony in the Warring States Period. By employing Su Qin alone one can bring all under heaven to submit to one. The book declares, “At that time, all under heaven was huge and the peoples many, the sway of the kings and princes, the power of the politicking ministers all sought to decide according to the strategies of Su Qin. Without spending a bushel of grain, without bothering one soldier, without fighting a single battle, without breaking a single bowstring, without shooting a single arrow, the feudal lords loved one another even more than they loved their own brothers.”31
Some personages do not concentrate on just one particular worthy minister as important to attaining hegemony but rather think that the whole group of ministers is the key factor. For instance, Zhang Yi thinks that if conditions for the resources of power hold, then the loyalty of all ministers is of decisive significance for attaining hegemony. He thinks that Qin has not yet been able to attain hegemony despite its supreme geographical, military, and economic advantages because the politicking ministers of Qin are not loyal to the state. He tells King Hui of Qin, “The feudal lords on all four sides do not submit, and the title of king of kings is not attained, and this is for no other reason than that the politicking ministers do not exert themselves to loyalty.”32 There are also those who think that to acquire hegemony requires may officials who are skilled in debate and able to think up many strategies. For instance, Shixing Qin thinks that if you can find people like the skilled debaters and schemers of the Western and Eastern Zhou then you can attain hegemony. He tells the da ling zhao (a high-ranking official) of Qin, “If you want the title of hegemon or sage king, then there is nothing better than to obtain the clever officials of the two Zhou kingdoms.”33
The Right Geographical Conditions Are Essential for Attaining Hegemony
The strategists of The Stratagems of the Warring States already have the idea of geopolitics and lay great stress on the role of geographical advantages in attaining hegemony; they see geography as a necessary condition for attaining hegemony. In their analysis of the conditions of hegemony, the personages in the book frequently begin by referring to the geographical environment of a given state. For instance, when Su Qin analyzes the foundations of power that will enable Qin to gain hegemony for King Hui of Qin, he says,
Your state, great King, in the west has the agricultural advantages of Ba [West Hubei and East Sichuan], Shu [West Sichuan] and Central Han [South Shaanxi and Northwest Hubei]; in the north you have the war service of the Hu and Mo nomads and of Dai and Ma; in the south there are the limits of Mount Wu and the Qian Plain [formerly the state of Chu]; in the east there are the protections of Mount Xiao and the Han Pass [Henan]. Your fields and pastures are outstanding; your people numerous and rich; your war chariots number ten thousand; your fertile borderlands a thousand square kilometers; your flocks and grain abundant; the lie of your land strategic. This is what is called the palace of heaven and yours is a powerful state under heaven. By relying on your worthiness, Great King, on the multitude of your officials and people, on the use of your chariots and horsemen, on the learning of military methods you can gather the feudal lords and annex all under heaven, become emperor, and rule.34
When Fan Sui analyzes the power base of hegemony for King Zhao of Qin, he too begins by mentioning the geography of Qin. He says,
Your state, great King, in the north has Mount Sweet Springs [in Shaanxi] and the Valley Mouth Pass [in Shaanxi], in the south the Jing and Wei rivers [both in Shaanxi], to the east Mount Long and Shu [both in Sichuan], to the west the Han Pass and Mount Ban [Mount Xiao]. Your war-chariots number a thousand, your special forces a million. If with the courage of the Qin army and the huge number of chariots and riders you attack the feudal lords, then it will be like hunting with swift hounds of the state of Han and catching rabbits. The business of a hegemonic king can be attained.35
The strategists of those times had already realized the dual role of geographical advantages in the struggle for hegemony, namely, that they could serve as a power resource for the state aspiring to hegemony and could serve as an obstacle to other states pursuing hegemony. For instance, a planner for the state of Zhao, in analyzing for Prime Minister Zhang why Zhao had successfully controlled the strong power of Qi and stopped the forty-year expansion of Qin, says that the reason was Zhao’s geographical conditions and military might. He says, “Today Zhao is a strong state of ten thousand four-horse chariots; to the south there are the Zhang and Fu Rivers [Hebei: Handan], to the west Mount Chang [Heng Shan in Shanxi], to the east there is the area between the rivers [Hutuo and Zhang in Hebei], to the north there is the County of Dai [Hebei Weixian and Northeast Shanxi]. It has a million armored troops and once crushed the strength of Qi. For the past forty years, Qin has not been able to expand as it would wish.”36
In the book, in addition to the personages who analyze the role of natural geographical conditions in the struggle for hegemony, there are also some who notice the role of geopolitical conditions. Zhang Yi starts from the inferiority of the natural geography and geopolitics of Wei and explains to King Xiang of Wei the necessity of making an alliance with Qin. He points out that Wei’s territorial size is small and it has no natural defenses. To the east of Wei lies Qi, to the south Chu, to the west Han, and to the north Zhao, and if it has poor relationships with any of them, that state will attack Wei from one direction and Wei will become a battlefield on which the states will fight for hegemony. He tells King Xiang of Wei,
The territory of Wei is not over a thousand square kilometers and its army has no more than three hundred thousand men. Its land is flat in all directions and the feudal lords can communicate across it from all four directions like the spokes of a wheel. It has no obstacles such as a famous mountain or great river. From Zheng [capital of Han] to Liang [capital of Wei] is not more than a hundred kilometers; from Chen [capital of Chu] to Liang, two hundred kilometers. If horses race and men run without tiring they will come to Liang. In the south it borders Chu, in the west Han, in the north Zhao, in the east Qi, and its only defenses are to have its armies posted on all four sides. Its observation posts and border garrisons are sparsely dotted. Its grain, waterways for transporting it, and open silos are not less than one hundred thousand. The lay of the land of Wei is such that it is a battlefield. If in the south Wei sides with Chu and not with Qi, then Qi will attack it in the east. If in the east it sides with Qi and not with Zhao, then Zhao will attack it in the north. If it does not join with Han, then Han will attack it in the west; if it is not friendly to Chu, then Chu will attack it in the south. This is what is called “a splitting road.”37
Zhang Yi’s geopolitical analysis succeeded in convincing King Xiang to form an alliance with Qin.
THE ROLE OF NORMS IN HEGEMONY
The history of the wars in the Warring States Period and the history of how Qin unified the states by annexing them both lead us to think that the strategists of the Warring States Period were not concerned with the political role of interstate norms. From the dialogues of the personages in The Stratagems of the Warring States, however, we find that in fact there are many instances of interstate norms being proposed as the basis for the legitimacy of hegemony. This essay’s analysis of the philosophy of the norms in The Stratagems of the Warring States is not based on whether these understandings are the real beliefs of the speakers or whether the norms are effective or not, but rather emphasizes the content of these ideas. Hegemony is not only a form of international status; it is also a form of international order. Hence, acquiring and maintaining hegemony are both related to the norms of the international order. In The Stratagems of the Warring States, the discussions about social norms and their relation to hegemony are apparent in many places, among which three areas are particularly discussed: the relationship of norms to the legitimacy of hegemony, the relationship between respecting norms and using military force, and the relationship between the establishment of new norms and the preservation of old norms. The focal point of the discussions of international norms by contemporary theorists is the effect of norms and the principles of their evolution, whereas the personages of The Stratagems of the Warring States tend rather to discuss the political consequences of obeying or flouting interstate norms.
Respect for Norms Is a Basis for the Legitimacy of Hegemony
In The Stratagems of the Warring States two aspects of legitimacy in regard to hegemony are discussed: the form and the substance of legitimacy. In the Warring States Period, acknowledgment by the Zhou Son of Heaven was the formal norm of legitimacy for a hegemon, whereas recognition from most of the feudal states was the substantive norm of its legitimacy. Different people had differing understandings of the importance of both its formal and substantive legitimacy. Zhang Yi was more inclined to stress formal legitimacy and thought that if Qin could send an army to surround the Zhou royal capital, seize the set of nine tripods (the symbol of the king from the Xia Dynasty until it was seized by Qin in 255 BCE) and the map and household register, and control the Son of Heaven, then he could attain legitimacy for his hegemony. He said to King Hui of Qin, “Seize the set of nine tripods, lay hold of the map and household register, force the Son of Heaven to let you lead all under heaven, and then no one under heaven would dare to disobey. This is the king’s affair.”38 Sima Cuo prefers to stress substantive legitimacy, however, and thinks that if the way for Qin to acquire the nine tripods, the map, and the registry is to attack Han and seize the Son of Heaven, then not only will this lead to Qin not acquiring legitimacy for its hegemony but it will also be exceedingly dangerous. He rejects Zhang Yi’s view, saying, “If today you attack Han and kidnap the Son of Heaven, well, kidnapping the Son of Heaven will give you a bad reputation and it will not necessarily bring you any good. You will also have a reputation for being without justice and you will attack a state—which is something all under heaven does not want. Both actions are dangerous!”39
Some of the strategists in the book think that to win over the majority of states to recognition of one’s hegemony, military force is not sufficient. The hegemonic state must also respect interstate norms. One Qin strategist thinks that the way the state victorious in war treats other states and honors treaties it has signed will affect whether other feudal states willingly accept its hegemony. He thinks that someone who wins and is not arrogant may attain humane authority. One who signs agreements and is not angry or resentful may attain hegemony. The former will bring it about that all states submit, whereas the latter will lead neighboring states to join in an alliance. He tells King Wu of Qin, “The troops of a king are victorious and not arrogant; the chief lord heeds agreements and is not resentful. Thus, being victorious but not arrogant, you can get the world to serve you. Making agreements and not being resentful, you can get the neighbors to follow you.”40 From this passage we can see that in the Warring States Period people had already realized that whether a hegemonic state could lead, or even whether it was conscious of respecting interstate norms, has great influence on its hegemonic status. The unilateralist foreign policy of President George W. Bush weakened the international political mobilizing capacity of the United States, which is an example of the failure to recognize this aspect of legitimacy.
Norms Provide a Hegemon with the Legitimacy to Use Military Force
The strategists of The Stratagems of the Warring States are very much concerned with the question of a hegemon’s legitimacy to engage in armed conflict. Many of them think that a failure to use troops legitimately will harm the hegemon’s legitimacy. For instance, when King Hui of Wei attacks Zhao, Ji Liang thinks that, although the king’s purpose is to attain hegemony and to win the trust of all the states, his strategy of using troops to attack the Zhao capital of Handan, expand his territory, and increase his renown is counterproductive. He tells King Hui the story of driving south to get to a northern destination and warns him that the more he relies on strong troops to attack other states, the more he will lose legitimacy to lead other states. He says, “Today the king moves troops to become a hegemonic king and attacks to gain the trust of all under heaven. You rely on the size of the kingdom and the might of your troops and attack Handan so as to expand your territory and win honor for your name. The more numerous your military actions, O King, the further you are far from attaining humane authority.”41
There are many possible sources of legitimacy for the military actions of a hegemonic state, but the personages in the book refer most often to three. The first is the justness of the war’s purpose. For example, in analyzing under what conditions Qin should deploy troops, the great Qin general Bai Qi says that the purpose a state that aspires to hegemony has in deploying troops is to console states that are fearful, to put down arrogant states, or to punish and annihilate states that have lost the Way. Only then may a state give orders to the feudal lords and then bring peace to all under heaven. He says to King Zhao of Qin, “Console those that are fearful; punish those that are arrogant; punish and destroy those without the Way. Thus you can order the feudal lords and all under heaven can be put in order.”42
The second source of legitimacy is that the state to be punished with military force is evil. For instance, Su Qin thinks that a hegemonic state worthy of the name will certainly want to use military force to destroy violent states, to restructure chaotic states, to obliterate evil states, and to attack states with violent rulers. He says to King Min of Qi, “Today the sage king who takes military action must punish violent states and correct the disordered, intervene in those without the Way, and attack the unjust.”43 Although Su Qin says this in the hope of influencing the king of Qi’s foreign policy with a view to helping Yan, his view wins King Min’s approval. Zhang Yi also thinks that starting a war against a just state is illegitimate. Of any two states at war, logic dictates that only one can be just and so he holds that for a violent, evil, or rebellious state to attack a benevolent, just, or peaceful state is to sow the seeds of its own defeat. He tells King Hui of Qin, “The disordered state that attacks the ordered will perish; the evil state that attacks the just will perish; the rebellious state that attacks the obedient will perish.”44
The third source of legitimacy for the use of force is found when one’s adversary is of a lower level of civilization. It is legitimate for a state that judges itself culturally superior to use military force against a barbarian state. For instance, in the Warring States Period, Shu did not belong to the civilization of the central states and was seen as a barbarian state. Hence, when Sima Cuo tells King Hui of Qin why an attack on Shu is more legitimate than one on Han, he points out that Shu is the leading power among states led by minority peoples in the west, and it has exhibited brutal administration like that of Jie and Zhòu. He says, “Shu is a state in the remote west and is head of the Rong and Di barbarians and it also has exhibited the disorder of Jie and Zhòu.”45
The Necessity of, and Risk in, Establishing New Norms for Hegemony
The politicians in The Stratagems of the Warring States have already realized that for a hegemon to establish a new hegemonic system, it is necessary to change the current interstate norms to adapt to changes in society. For instance, when the chief ministers of Zhao, Zhao Wenjin, and Zhao Zao urge King Wuling of Zhao not to adopt nomadic dress and cavalry archers, the king replies that the three kings Yao, Shun, and Yü as well as dukes Xiang of Song and Mu of Qin, and King Zhuang of Chu all established their hegemony by inaugurating different social and political norms, and he uses this to prove the necessity for a newly established hegemon to change existing norms. The king thinks that it is not necessary to imitate previous hegemonic norms too closely since present and past norms differ and the difference is not one of right or wrong. He says, “The three dynasties had different dress and yet all reigned as sage kings; the five hegemons adopted different political regulations and yet all ruled. … A sage’s emergence is such that he does not fit into the past and yet he reigns. The Xia and the Yin collapsed because they did not change their rites and so they perished. Hence, imitating the past is not necessarily wrong nor is following rites necessarily worthy of praise.”46 Even though it is not possible to judge from King Wuling’s words whether dress, regulations, and rites refer to domestic or interstate norms, from his use of the example of the three kings and five hegemons we can postulate that the norms he refers to must at least include interstate norms.
Some strategists in the book realize that altering interstate norms is necessary for establishing a new hegemony but it is also risky, especially when it means changing the norms that regulate the hierarchical relationship of the feudal lords to the Zhou court. In the Warring States Period there were many kinds of hierarchical norms, the most distinctive being the appellation of the rulers. The Zhou king was called the Son of Heaven and the rulers of the feudal states were called either king or duke. All states that wished to establish a new hegemony faced the choice of calling their rulers either by their old title or by emperor instead of king. The use of emperor indicated equality with the Zhou Son of Heaven. The change in the norm for naming the ruler was one part of establishing a new hegemonic system. To do so entailed violating current interstate norms and ran the risk of provoking opposition from other states. Prudent strategists thought that the establishment of new norms required a trial period before they could be implemented. When Qin sent a letter to King Min of Qi stamped “emperor,” Su Qin thought that on the premise that it was not clear if the other feudal lords would accept the king of Qi calling himself emperor, the practice was dangerous. Hence, he suggested that King Min should first see how the states reacted to Qin’s calling its king “emperor” and only then come to a decision. If nobody was opposed to Qin adopting the imperial title, then the king of Qi could also call himself “emperor” and he would then win the support of everyone in the world. Su Qin said to King Min of Qi, “If Qin uses the title and everyone accepts it, then the king may also use the title. … If Qin uses the title and everyone rejects it, then the king may not use the title for this reason, and you will have won the support of everyone. This is good for you.”47
THE BASIC STRATEGY FOR ATTAINING HEGEMONY
Many politicians in The Stratagems of the Warring States believe that the rightness of a strategy plays a decisive role in determining success in attaining hegemony. For instance, the prime minister of Wei, Hui Shi, thinks that whereas acquiring humane authority requires reliance on law, attaining hegemony requires strategy. He says, “I, your minister, heard that to become a sage king demands knowing rules, whereas to become a hegemon requires knowing strategies.”48 Chen Zhen, a strategist of Chu, sees strategy as the root whereby a state can be called a hegemon. He says, “Strategy is the root of affairs; following it is the key to survival or failure.”49 Chen Zhen’s idea that strategy is the decisive factor is very similar to that held by people today. For instance, the Program of International Strategic Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences says, “The determination and implementation of international strategy is concerned with the future and fate of the nation.”50
The discussions of the strategies for attaining hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States do not distinguish between grand strategy and military strategy. The two are always intimately linked. From the point of view of gaining hegemony, the main strategies in The Stratagems of the Warring States are those of annexation and alliance.
The Strategy of Annexation
Many events recorded in The Stratagems of the Warring States are cases of large states annexing small ones, or of strong states taking over weak ones. These events reflect that the politicians of the time not only generally understood that the strategy of annexation is an effective way to attain hegemony but also advocated strategies of annexation. In an agricultural society, the combination of land and people formed economic power, and a large population could support a large, strong army; hence, annexing the territory of other states would weaken their economic and military power while increasing one’s own economic and military power, thus leading to attainment of hegemony. A Qin strategist told King Wu of Qin that he could achieve what the three kings and five hegemons had done before if he could continue to annex other states one by one, so that no state would dare to oppose his invading the states of the feudal lords and putting pressure on the borders of the Zhou court to deter all the princes from going beyond their borders. Han and Chu would also not dare to deploy their armies against him. He said,
If now, O King, you took over Yiyang [in Henan], occupied the three rivers area [Yellow River, Luo and Yi], and brought it about that no person of intelligence dared to say a word; if you owned the states of all under heaven and walked along the boundaries of the two Zhou [Eastern and Western Zhou], prevented the lords of the world daring to join their troops at mountain passes, and held Huang Ji [in Henan], then the armies of Han and Chu would not dare to invade. If the king is able to carry this through to the end, then the three kings will not lack a fourth, and the five lords not lack a sixth.51
To become a hegemon by annexing territory demands forming relationships with distant states and attacking those nearby, a principle that the strategists in the book realize above all else. For instance, when Fan Sui analyzes for King Zhao of Qin why Chu was able to defeat Qi but was still unable to annex a large area of land, he says that it was not because Qi did not want to occupy that land but rather because between Qi and Chu lay other states, so Qi’s annexation of the land would be ineffective. Fan Sui says, “Of old, the people of Qi punished Chu and won in battle, destroying their army and killing their general, and opened up 500 square kilometers of land, but they were not able to retain even a tiny piece, not because Qi did not want land, but because the circumstances did not allow it.”52 According to the same principle, Fan Sui recommends that King Zhao adopt the strategy of establishing good relations with those far off and annexing those nearby. Hence, launching an attack on the distant Chu is unreasonable. He notes that Han and Qin share a common border and this is disadvantageous to Qin, so Qin should first annex Han. He tells King Zhao,
There is nothing better for the king than to form alliances with those far off and annex those nearby. An inch gained will become the king’s inch and a foot gained the king’s foot. Now, to neglect this and attack a distant place, is that not foolish? … The terrain of Qin and Han is woven together like silk cloth of many colored threads. For Qin to have Han [as a neighbor] is like a tree having a worm eating it from within or a man having a faulty heart. Of all the challenges under heaven, none is more harmful to Qin than that posed by Han. Far better for the king to take over Han.53
When Su Qin analyzes for Lord Wen of Yan whether it is better for Yan to form an alliance with Qin or Zhao, he refers to the principle of establishing relations with the distant and attacking the near. He points out that Qin is far from Yan, and Zhao is between them. Qin cannot attack Yan, nor could it hold it if it did so, whereas Yan and Zhao are neighbors; it would be easy for Zhao to attack and hold Yan. For Yan to be concerned about its relationship with the distant Qin and to ignore the neighboring Zhao would be a big mistake. Yan should be allied with Zhao if there is a security guarantee. Su Qin tells Lord Wen of Yan,
If Qin attacks Yan, it must overrun Yunzhong [in Inner Mongolia] and Jiuyuan, cross Dai [in Hebei and Northeast Shanxi] and Shanggu [West and Central Hebei], covering a distance of more than a thousand kilometers. Even if it captures the capital of Yan, its concern will be that it cannot hold on to it. From this it is clear that Qin cannot harm Yan! Now, if Zhao should attack Yan, it would issue its command and within ten days some hundred thousand troops would be encamped around Dong Yuan [in Hebei]. They would cross the Hutuo River and the Yi River and within four or five days would reach your capital city. Thus I say, “If Qin attacks Yan, it will fight at a distance of more than a thousand kilometers; if Zhao attacks Yan, it will fight at a range within a hundred kilometers. There is no more mistaken plan than to fail to be concerned with the threat within a hundred kilometers while concentrating on one more than a thousand kilometers away. Therefore, may you, O King, form an alliance of friendship with Zhao and all under heaven will be united and the state will certainly have nothing to fear!”54
Since the result of annexation is the swallowing up of another state, the strategists in the book also address the thoroughness of annexation. Some people think that the ultimate success or failure of annexation is determined by whether the population, not simply the land, is annexed. They think that annexation of a state involves both population and territory and to annex only the land while not annihilating the inhabitants of the state runs the risk that the survivors will seek to restore their state and annex you in turn. The annihilation of a state includes both material and conceptual aspects and the latter is the key. Changing the occupied people’s sense of belonging is decisive to the success of the annexation. A visiting official from Qin named Zao uses the historical examples of Wu and Yue, and Qi and Yan, to tell Lord Xiang, the prime minister of Qin, that annexation must be thorough. He says, “Wu did not annihilate Yue and so Yue annihilated Wu; Qi did not annihilate Yan and so Yan annihilated Qi. Qi perished under Yan; Wu perished under Yue. This is because the malady was not thoroughly rooted out.”55
The Strategy of Alliance Formation
The strategies of annexation and alliance formation to attain hegemony are ancient, and both have equally great significance in history. After World War II, the United Nations charter established the norm of respect for the territorial integrity of the sovereign state. Since then, the strategy of annexation has become increasingly unsuited to the times, and therefore alliance formation has become the main strategy used in international politics in seeking to attain hegemony. The principle of forming alliances is that within an international system of mutual alliances, when one strong state uses the construction of alliances to form a powerful bloc and that state also serves as the leader of the bloc, then that state has won hegemonic status within the system. If this bloc is the strongest bloc within the world system, then the head of the bloc is the biggest hegemonic power. If that state heads the only bloc, then it is the only hegemonic power within the system. In analyzing the foundations of Wei’s hegemony for Duke Xiao of Qin, Wei Yang says, “The achievements of Wei are great and its commands run throughout all under heaven and twelve feudal lords follow it to pay court to the Son of Heaven and so its allies are certainly many.”56
The Stratagems of the Warring States records the formation of many alliances, the most famous being the Vertical Union proposed by Su Qin and the Horizontal Link espoused by Zhang Yi. The Vertical Union was an alliance of six states—Qi, Chu, Zhao, Wei, Yan, and Han—against Qin. It was described as “uniting the weak vertically against the one strong state.” The Horizontal Link was designed to destroy the Vertical Union and allow Qin to become a hegemon. It worked by turning one weak state against another and was referred to as “serving one strong state and attacking many weak ones.”
Su Qin had a deep understanding of how to form alliances in order to gain hegemony. He thought that the key to this strategy lay in mutual trust and solidarity among the partners. The main obstacle to collective action arose from one partner repudiating the alliance. Hence, Su Qin suggested that King Huiwen of Zhao should use the method of the union of the princes of Shandong and decree that when an ally was attacked by a third party, they all should provide military support and exchange hostages among themselves as a guarantee that each state would fulfill its pledges, and in this way he could attain hegemony. Su Qin said,
Thus, in my humble opinion there is no better plan for the king than to unite the six states of Han, Wei, Qi, Yan, Chu, Yan, and Zhao in a vertical alliance to oppose Qin. Give an order to the generals of all under heaven to meet together above the Huan Shui River [in Henan], exchange hostages, and make a covenant in the blood of a white horse.
The oath will read:
“If Qin attacks Chu, Qi and Wei will each send armed troops to assist Chu; Han will cut off [Qin’s] supply lines; Zhao will ford the Yellow River and the Zhang; and Yan will defend to the north of Mount Heng.
“If Qin attacks Han or Wei, then Chu will cut it off from the rear; Qi will send armed troops to assist Chu; Zhao will ford the Yellow River and the Zhang; and Yan will defend Yunzhong [in Inner Mongolia].
“If Qin attacks Qi, then Chu will cut it off from the rear; Han will defend Cheng Gao [in Henan]; Wei will block Wu Dao; Zhao will ford the Yellow River and the Zhang as far as Bo Pass [in Shandong]; and Yan will send armed troops to assist Qi.
“If Qin attacks Yan, then Zhao will defend Mount Heng; Chu will camp at Wu Pass [on the Shaanxi/Henan border]; Qi will cross the Bohai Sea; and Han and Wei will send armed troops to assist Yan.
“If Qin attacks Zhao, then Han will camp at Yiyang; Chu will camp at Wu Pass; Wei will camp beyond the Yellow River [south of the river]; Qi will ford the Bohai Sea; and Yan will send armed troops to assist Zhao.
“If any one of the feudal lords should renounce the alliance, the other five states will jointly attack that one.
“If the six states maintain their alliance against Qin, then Qin will certainly not dare to send its army to Hangu Pass so as to threaten what lies east of the mountain! In this way the business of the chief lord will be accomplished!”57
To enable Qin to attain hegemony, Zhang Yi proposed the strategy of a Horizontal Link. The purpose of this strategy was to undermine the alliance of the six states, and its principle was that small states would break faith in their own interest and attach themselves to Qin. King Hui of Qin adopted Zhang Yi’s strategy because he believed that the interests of the six states in the alliance were all different and they would find it difficult to cooperate. He told Han Quanzi, “That the feudal lords cannot be united is as obvious as a flock of chickens cannot sit still in the same direction on the same perch.”58
The principle of the Horizontal Link propounded by Zhang Yi was confirmed in practice. The reasoning Shen Buhai uses to explain to Prince Zhaoxi of Han why Han should conclude an alliance with Qin is an example of opportunist thought on the part of a weak state. He thinks that if Han and Qin made an alliance, Qin could attain humane authority and Han attain hegemony. Han would thus escape the risk of being threatened by Qin should Qin fail. He says,
The first point is that it is beneficial to join an alliance with a strong state. If the strong state can attain humane authority, then we will certainly attain hegemony. Even if the strong state cannot become a humane authority at least we can avoid its armies and it will not attack us. Hence, the goals of the strong state will be accomplished and we will rely on the emperor and be a hegemon. If the goals of the strong state are not accomplished, then it may treat us generously. Hence, if we now join the strong state and the goals of the strong state are accomplished, then there is good fortune, and if they are not accomplished, at least there is no disaster. To first join the strong state is the plan of a wise person.59
The logic of this strategy of forming an alliance with a strong state is rather like that of the strategy of following the strong in contemporary international relations theory.60
The twin strategies of annexation and alliance formation discussed in The Stratagems of the Warring States are not mutually exclusive but rather are mutually supportive and can be used together. The book discusses the question of which strategy should be the main one and which should be secondary. In the history of strategies, Qi attained hegemony by making alliance formation its main strategy and annexation secondary, whereas Qin made annexation its main one and alliance formation secondary. In the book, even the planners who forcefully insist on annexation as the way to hegemony do not reject the strategy of making alliances. For the most part, they adopt annexation as the main and alliance formation as the secondary strategy. Moreover, the choice of partners for alliances is often geared to the needs of annexation. For instance, Zhang Yi recommends that the grand strategy King Hui of Qin should adopt to become a hegemon is to make annexation the main strategy and alliance formation the secondary one. He suggests that King Hui should destroy the Vertical Union by attacking and occupying Zhao and annexing Han, so that Jing and Wei both become subordinate, but he should make alliances with Qi and Yan and thus establish hegemony. Zhang Yi says, “The method by which to attack and destroy the Vertical Union under heaven is to attack Zhao, annihilate Han, make Jing and Wei vassals, be friendly with Qi and Yan, and thus gain the title of sage king of sage kings and the skill of getting the princely states around you to come to your court.”61
Both annexation and alliance formation rely on military expeditions; hence, The Stratagems of the Warring States also discusses the issue of when it is good to go to war, and especially the choice of whether to attack first or wait to be attacked before replying. Many strategists in The Stratagems of the Warring States think that the one who waits before acting has more advantages in winning hegemony. For instance, Su Qin uses a syllogism to present to King Min of Qin the advantages of waiting. Su Qin thinks that the first aggressor will run into many problems later, whereas one who responds later can rely on more allies, and the more allies one has the greater one’s strength. A greater number of men and more power can put down one who has little assistance and can lead to victory in war. Doing things in such a way as to win people’s minds is necessarily advantageous. For a large state to adopt the strategy of waiting to be attacked means that it can become the hegemonic lord without wasting its force. Su Qin says, “I, your minister, have heard that using troops and happily doing so before everyone else is disastrous. … The one who mobilizes later should react to the moment.”62 He also says, “The one who mobilizes later in response has many allies and strong armies. Hence, to gather all your strength and respond to the weak and small will certainly bring you victory in battle. This will not go against everyone’s feelings and so gains will certainly follow. If a great state acts thus, then its fame and honor will be won without a struggle and the title of the king of sage kings established without your having done anything.”63
The strategy of mobilizing later led to the development of the idea of “sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight.” When Qi and Chu were contending for hegemony, Chen Zhen sought to prevent Qin from helping Qi in its attack on Chu, and so he told King Hui of Qin the story of sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight and showed how this would help Qin in gaining hegemony. He first related how Guan Yu urged Guan Zhuangzi to wait for the two tigers to wound each other before stepping in to catch them both, and then recommended that King Hui should wait for Qi to be defeated in its war with Chu before moving to save Qi. In that way everything will go well for him. He said, “Now Qi and Chu are at war. War entails defeat. Your Majesty should call up troops to help the defeated party. You will have the gain of saving Qi and avoid the evil of attacking Chu.”64 Even though Chen Zhen’s purpose in telling the story of the tigers is to prevent Qin from attacking Chu, yet in fact this strategy is advantageous to Qin, and hence King Hui accepted Chen Zhen’s proposed strategy.
Su Dai urged King Hui of Yan not to fight Zhao to avoid giving Qin the opportunity to “sit and watch like the fisherman.” He used the story of the old fisherman getting the advantage when the snipe and the clam fight to persuade King Hui, “If now Zhao launches a war against Yan, then Zhao and Yan will be locked in battle for a long time and this will paralyze everyone … strong Qin will be like the fisherman.”65 This example is to prevent the other state getting the opportunity to sit on the mountain and catch both tigers.
We have already noted that the book discusses the strategy of sitting on the mountain to catch both tigers. The condition for the success of this strategy is that the two parties engaged in conflict are of roughly equal strength. The purpose of the strategy is to let other contenders for hegemony expend their strength. If the result of the strategy is that the victor ends up being much stronger, then it will be a case of rearing a tiger to court calamity (appeasement) and the sitting on the mountain to catch both tigers strategy will have failed. For instance, when Wei encircled the Zhao capital of Handan, Zhao Xixu suggested to King Xuan of Chu that he should not rescue Zhao but rather wait and watch Zhao and Wei destroy each other. Jing She proposed helping Zhao, however. He thought that if Chu did not help Zhao, then Zhao might be annihilated and this would amount to Chu helping Wei to destroy Zhao. This possibility could result in forcing Zhao to reconcile with Wei so as to avoid disaster and both would then attack Chu. Jing She suggested that King Xuan should send a small number of troops to assist Zhao and hope that both Zhao and Wei would be defeated in the battle and this would be advantageous to Chu in enlarging its sphere of influence. He said to King Xuan,
If Wei attacks Zhao, then I fear that later it will attack Chu. If now you do not save Zhao, then Zhao will court defeat and Wei will not fear Chu. Thus this amounts to Chu and Wei attacking Zhao together. The danger will be great indeed! How can this be a case of “both defeated”? Wei’s whole army will cut deeply into Zhao. Zhao will see that it courts disaster and that Chu is not helping it and so will make up with Wei and both together will attack Chu. Thus, the king has no better course than to send a few troops to give assistance to Zhao. Zhao will rely on Chu’s strength and hence carry on the fight against Wei. Wei will be furious at Zhao’s strength and will see that Chu’s assistance is not worth fearing and therefore will not let go of Zhao. Zhao and Wei will defeat each other and Qi and Qin will, in turn, work with Chu; then Wei can be destroyed.66
According to The Stratagems of the Warring States, “Since Chu mobilized troops to help Zhao as Jing She advised, Handan fell; Chu took the area between the rivers Sui and Cen [in Henan].”67
CONCLUSION AND MESSAGE FOR TODAY
The philosophy of contending for hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States was subject to criticism from Confucian scholars for a long time, yet in fact the history of states’ contention for hegemony has gone on for thousands of years. Right up to the present globalized information era, struggle for hegemony is still the core of international politics. Understanding what The Stratagems of the Warring States says on this issue not only aids a deeper understanding of the real state of international politics today but it also can bring together and enlighten studies of comprehensive national power, international systems, international strategy, and China’s rise.
A Message for Research into National Power
Political power is the basis for drawing together comprehensive national power. In the discussions about hegemonic power in The Stratagems of the Warring States, political power is the foundation, but this is different from the analysis of the foundation of hegemonic power propounded by contemporary international relations theory. The contemporary theories see material power (territorial area, population, the economy, military affairs) as the foundation of hegemonic power. Even if in recent years the scholarly world has begun to pay attention to the importance of states’ soft power, the mainstream point of view is still that hard power is the basis of soft power. Even scholars who do pay more attention to soft power mainly stress the power of cultural resources rather than the power of political manipulation. Furthermore, if we observe the present world of politics from the viewpoint of a philosophy that takes political power as the basis for comprehensive power, then we will find that its explanatory power is not inferior—and may even be superior—to that of the theory that the economy is decisive. The understanding of the comprehensive power of hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States is one that sees political power as the basis of comprehensive power. The theoretical question this raises is how to use scientific methods to test which of the two, economic or political power, is the foundation of comprehensive national power. Given that we have as yet no effective proof, we must ask what the difference in the degree of reliability is between the present assumption that economic power is the foundation of comprehensive national power and the historical assumption that military power was the foundation of national power.
Leadership is the core of a national political power. This belief is the same today as it was in the past. But when the theories positing system as the decisive factor arose in the 1970s, research on leadership shifted its focus from policy makers and the policymaking body to the system of policymaking. In the early twenty-first century, research on policy makers and the policymaking body has again become a focus of attention. International political psychology represents this trend.68 Discussions of state leadership in The Stratagems of the Warring States mainly focus on the morality of the leader and his employment of policy. The message for us is that, from the beliefs of the leader, the structure of the leadership, and the state bureaucracy, we should study the relationships between leadership and national political power, between leadership and foreign policymaking, and between leadership and international mobilization capability.
The employment of worthy and competent people is an indicator of the leadership’s strength or weakness. What The Stratagems of the Warring States says about the relationship between employment of competent persons and hegemony differs from today’s ideas in two respects. The first is that the standard for assessing the moral level of the leader is whether he employs competent persons; the second is that the type of person employed determines whether hegemony can be attained and the class of that hegemony. It may be that this way of assessing national leadership by the capacity of the high-ranking officials is not perfect, but it is still an advance on the current lack of any standard to assess national political power in contemporary international relations theory. If we look at the method for assessing state leadership presented in The Stratagems of the Warring States, we may take the movement of talented persons among nations as an indicator to assess national political power. People naturally head for the top places just as water naturally flows downhill; hence, the movement of talented people from politically weak to politically strong states is a universal phenomenon globally. To take the direction and volume of this movement as an indicator for assessing national political power, even soft power, is perhaps reasonable.
Message for International Systems Research
Shifts in the center of the world are the result of human activity and effort, not a purely natural change. The explanations of the rise and fall of hegemonies in The Stratagems of the Warring States may be simply ascribed to correct human strategy and effort or lack thereof. It is not a natural succession. Su Qin thought that the rise of the three kings and the succession of the five hegemons were all due to the leaders not being content with the way things stood and hence making an effort to change things. He tells King Yi of Yan, “The rise in turn of each of the three kings and the success of the five hegemons were none of them automatic events.”69 This understanding is very different from how contemporary international relations theory seeks to find the objective causes of shifts in global hegemony. By combining what The Stratagems of the Warring States says about shifts in hegemony being due to human strategy and effort and contemporary theory, which holds that there are objective laws governing shifts in hegemony, we can begin by looking for the objective factors that cause the strength of leadership to increase or decline and go on to study the law of shifts in hegemony.
Hierarchical norms are the basis of international order, but they differ in different eras. In The Stratagems of the Warring States the understanding of social norms and social order is that social order is based on hierarchical norms. This idea is similar to that in contemporary international relations theory, which ascribes international conflict to anarchy in the international system, but it is unlike the principle in contemporary international politics that demands respect for the equality of state sovereignty. What this says about theory is that the establishment of international norms must combine the principles of equality and of hierarchy and that it should not rely only on one principle. This is like upholding the equality and fairness of a boxing match. There should be norms for judging who the winner is but also norms for distinguishing between the weights of the contestants. The former is the principle of equality, whereas the latter is that of fairness. For the most part, contemporary international relations theory relies on the principle of equality to study the role of international norms. If, however, we combined the two principles of hierarchy and equality in our research, then we could deepen our understanding of the role of international norms.
Hegemony can of itself generate legitimacy for the use of military force. What The Stratagems of the Warring States says about the sources of the legitimacy of the use of force by a hegemon is very similar to what we have witnessed in contemporary international political reality. This fact tells us that hegemony itself may have the role of generating legitimacy for the use of force in foreign affairs. The international responsibility, ideology, and power of a hegemon are all able to create legitimacy whereby it can use force externally: (1) When a state is accepted by a good number of other states as hegemon, these states think that that state has the duty to protect its allies militarily, uphold the current international order, and maintain its own hegemonic status; (2) One reason for accepting a hegemon is that a fair number of states accept its ideology. The dominating ideology of the hegemonic state gives rise to the conceptual superiority of its civilization, such that the hegemon has the legitimacy to use military force against states of peripheral civilizations; and (3) When a hegemon is accepted by other states, it then has the status to guide the formation of international norms. The interest in upholding the international norms formed under its guidance is for the most part at one with the interests of the hegemonic state itself. This also provides grounds for the legitimacy of using military force to uphold these kinds of interests.
Message for the Study of the Theory of a Grand Strategy
The core of successful grand strategy is creativity rather than any one model of strategy. Many of the discussions concerning strategies for attaining hegemony in The Stratagems of the Warring States are opposed to one another. This tells us that there must be many different ways to realize the political goal of attaining hegemony. Although contemporary international relations theories have surveyed the types of strategy for attaining hegemony found in history, they have not discovered any successful strategy for attaining hegemony that can be successfully repeated. This may be because the essence of a strategy to attain hegemony is creativity, and imitation of strategies used in the past will never be successful. Contemporary international relations theories have studied the various conditions for the success of a strategy, but these studies have overlooked creativity as the essence of any strategy for attaining hegemony, namely, that a strategy for attaining hegemony is without a fixed form. It changes according to the times and is something that the strategists must invent in accord with circumstances. In other words, it may be that the strategies for attaining hegemony found in history are of no use for the later rise of a great power. Deng Xiaoping’s construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics happens to be a grand strategy of this kind. From the discovery that strategies for attaining hegemony cannot be repeated, the focal point of research in contemporary international strategic theory should, it seems, shift to the two themes of how strategies for attaining hegemony were invented and what the basic principles of inventing a successful strategy are.
A successful strategy for building alliances is based on strategic credibility. There is much in The Stratagems of the Warring States about successful or failed vertical or horizontal alliances. These records reflect that success in alliance formation depends on the strategic credibility of the leader of the alliances, and failure comes when the partners lack fidelity in undertaking their parts of the bargain because they do not trust the leading state. Discussions in the book about the unreliability of strategies to form alliances are strikingly similar to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s game of Stag Hunt.70 The strategists in The Stratagems of the Warring States ascribe the unreliability of alliances to a lack of fidelity among the allies, whereas Rousseau ascribes it to the allies not believing in the fidelity of other allies. What this tells us is that contemporary alliance-building theory is based on study of the common interest, the function of the organization, and the concept of cooperation, but there is not much study of the role of strategic credibility within the alliance. If one were to look at how the strategic credibility of the lord of the alliance is formed, at the origins of the fidelity of the allies, and at the principle of formation of mutual trust among the allies and were to deepen contemporary study of alliance building, then this would enrich not only current study of international security cooperation but also our understanding of the success and failure of states’ strategies for ascent.
Message for China’s Strategy for Ascent
A strategy for China’s rise must adopt the principle of balanced development of the factors of comprehensive national power. The principle of economic construction as the center is of assistance in increasing a state’s material power under certain conditions, but this principle cannot become the basis of comprehensive power for Chinese national resurgence. By adopting the principle of balanced development of the factors of comprehensive state power, China will maintain balanced development of both political and economic power. It is only by constraining the worship of money formed by placing the priority on economic construction that the factors of comprehensive state power can be developed evenly. The focal point in improving political power is to improve national leadership, and the key to this lies in constructing a system for promoting superior cadres and demoting inferior ones. Seen from the point of view of increasing international political power, China must stress the construction of a system that attracts talented persons. In a globalized era, it is necessary to reflect on the experience of The Stratagems of the Warring States and recruit talented persons according to international standards, irrespective of their nationalities.
The strategy of China’s rise must tend toward strategic creativity. A successful strategy for the rise of a major power is created by adapting to constantly changing international circumstances. Ever since 1949, when the new China was founded, China has proposed many strategic foreign policy principles according to the international environment of the time. These principles are variously used to respond to the international environment; hence, contradictions are unavoidable. Since the circumstances of international competition are constantly changing, China must adapt to the times and adjust the guiding principles of its strategy of ascent. It should not be constrained by old principles. Still less should it restrain the adjustment of its strategic principles on account of any long-lasting, unchanging theory. Following the rise of China’s power status, the limitations of the principle of nonalignment have already become apparent. China can reflect on the alliance-building strategies of The Stratagems of the Warring States and adopt a strategy beneficial to expanding its international political support. The alliance-building strategies of The Stratagems of the Warring States and the Communist Party’s United Front principle are very similar. This kind of principle was able to bring about victory in the War against Japanese Aggression [i.e., World War II], and it may also be successful in guiding China’s rise.
This essay has analyzed and summarized many of the ideas and understandings of interstate relations in The Stratagems of the Warring States related to hegemony. It has undertaken its analysis of The Stratagems of the Warring States on the basis of the idea of contemporary international relations theory. It has not considered the historical background of discourse in the book. In fact, there are at least three different backgrounds of discourse to be found in The Stratagems of the Warring States. The first is that of the language and concepts used by people in the Warring States Period. The second is the language and thought of the editor of the book, toward the end of the Western Han Dynasty (i.e., before 24 CE). The third is that of the historical status of the personages in the book and their relationship to the persons they are addressing. According to these three backgrounds of discourse, it is very probable that people may draw different conclusions and find different things in what The Stratagems of the Warring States says about hegemony. We think that however great the differences are in the conclusions drawn on the presupposition of different backgrounds of discourse, all are positive so long as they enrich the development of current international relations theory or can help in perfecting China’s strategy for ascent. We hope that this essay will inspire more colleagues in academia to study The Stratagems of the Warring States from the point of view of international politics.