An Examination of the Research Theory of Pre-Qin Interstate Political Philosophy
Using the expression of Barry Buzan, we can say that there were many “statelike units” in China with complex and varied relationships. There were clans bound together in an alliance under a leader (as in the Legends of the Five Emperors), tribal states on the periphery of the land ruled by the Son of Heaven (at the time of the Three Kings), feudal states under a central royal house (the Zhou king), as well as relationships among various family clans, tribes, and princely states. This essay groups all these forms together and looks at their interstate relations, taking this as the basis for examining pre-Qin interstate political philosophy.1
In terms of monarchy, the common understanding of history is that from the Western Zhou until the end of the Eastern Zhou there was only one actual state, that of the Zhou king, and all the princely states were feudal dependencies of the Zhou Son of Heaven and hence belonged to the Zhou royal house and could not be considered as independent states in their own right. But the historical reality is that from the eighth to the third century BCE the hold of the Zhou king was gradually relaxed. The Zhou court’s overall grasp and authority were constantly weakened so that from the Western Zhou feudal era on, it no longer had the means to carry out its role of upholding the political order and system of power. In the Spring and Autumn Period (eighth to sixth century BCE), several large princely states already had two basic features of the modern “state”: sovereignty and territory. Not only did the states have independent and autonomous sovereignty, they also had very clear borders. By the time of the Warring States Period (fifth to third century BCE), states proliferated and entered into several centuries of competition to unify all under heaven under their own rule, while the Zhou royal domain sank to the level of a small, weak state. Hence, some scholars think that the way in which the various princely states gave feudal homage to the Zhou king as their common lord from the eighth to the third century BCE was rather like the relationship of the members of today’s Commonwealth to Great Britain. They accept the Queen as head of the Commonwealth but enjoy equal and independent status along with Great Britain.2 In a PhD dissertation from the War Strategies Faculty of the International University titled “The Politics of State Alliances in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods,” Zhou Yi describes the states of this period as “politically behaved bodies.” This description is more accurate than the term states.
Bearing this in mind, I think that the name “pre-Qin interstate political philosophy” is acceptable on academic grounds and is appropriate because the pre-Qin states—following the decline of the Western Zhou feudal system and the destruction of the previous harmony and balanced order between the Zhou royal house and the various states, from the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn era to the Seven Powers of the Warring States up until the “great unification” of the Qin-Han—on the grounds of protecting their own security, sought to develop and resolve the relationships among themselves and the central royal house and thus they accumulated a rich and prolific experience in politics and diplomacy. This complicated and complex political configuration created the space for scholarship to look at the international system, state relations, and interstate political philosophy. The pre-Qin masters wrote books and advanced theories trying to sell to the rulers their ideas on how to run the state and conduct diplomacy and military strategy while they played major roles in advocating strategies of becoming either a humane ruler or a hegemon, making either vertical (North-South) or horizontal (East-West) alliances, or either creating alliances or going to war. Scholars who have researched the history of thought have looked only at one side and emphasized the value of the pre-Qin masters’ thought as theory (philosophical, historical, or political), whereas most of these ideas were used to serve practical political and diplomatic purposes among the states. Their effectiveness both then and now is proven. Therefore, there is no doubt about the positive and practical role of researching the foreign relations, state politics, and military strategies of the pre-Qin classics or of applying the insights gleaned from studying these masters to international political thought by gathering together, from out of several thousand years of the legacy of historical culture, a specifically Chinese wisdom of theoretical principles and ways of thinking with a view to guiding current research and combining this with China’s present rise and its diplomatic strategy.
Seen in this light, the research into pre-Qin interstate political thought led by Professor Yan is of particular value. Following the perspective of international relations theory in highlighting quantitative analysis and logical deduction, it is worthwhile to comb through the classics of the pre-Qin masters to study the intersection between international political studies and historical studies, at the same times also seeking to draw comparisons with Western international relations theory. In “A Comparative Study of Pre-Qin Interstate Politics” (chapter 1 in this volume), Yan Xuetong examines seven pre-Qin thinkers and divides the levels of their thought into three—unifying all under heaven, establishing norms, and constructing concepts3—and contrasts these with realism, liberalism, and constructivism, leading to a plausible and reassuring conclusion: “What pre-Qin thinkers have to say about international relations is all grounded in policy; their thought is oriented toward practical political policies. Therefore, to hold up what the pre-Qin thinkers say about the role of concepts in international relations as a mirror may help constructivism and international political psychology achieve success in the field of political policy. At the same time, it may enrich the theories of realism and liberalism.”4
MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION
Against the background of this basic confirmation of Professor Yan’s work and support for his conclusion, I would nonetheless like to raise a few points for discussion, where I hold a differing opinion.
First, his essay uses the three levels of analysis of international relations—the system, the state, and the individual—to classify the theories of Mozi, Laozi, and Xunzi as at the level of system, those of Guanzi and Hanfeizi as at the level of the state, and those of Mencius and Confucius as at the individual level. He also analyzes their views on the cause of war and how to uphold peace, and draws distinctions among their ways of thinking. This analysis is debatable. In my article “The Type and Evolution of the Pre-Qin International System,” I use the perspective of how the masters constructed an ideal international system, placing Confucius and Mencius on one level, Guanzi and Xunzi on another, and Laozi and Hanfeizi on a third.5 The basis for this is their construction and description of the international system and interstate relations. Although Mozi does not present a theory for constructing an international system, he vigorously promotes the sage kings—Yao, Shun, and Yü—from the ancient times of the Five Emperors to the Three Kings as the highest leaders of the primitive joint military-political clans, holding the ideal that “political education” and “moral improvement” can realize the “harmony of the myriad clans,” and proposing abdication as the means of ensuring the peaceful transition of power between the highest ruler and his successor. Hence, I list him in a special category apart and hold that although Mozi’s view of the construction of an international system is largely an impractical dream, with his ideas of “mutual love” and “against aggression” as a basis, he proposes preventing large states from annexing small ones, takes a positive attitude toward the self-defense of small states against large ones, and argues for a security outlook in which each state should assist small states morally, militarily, and in the arts of war in resisting annexation by large states. In this his ideas take on a much more practical significance. Regarding the causes of war and the path to implementing peace, I think that the pre-Qin masters are all in favor of uniting all under heaven. It is just that they differ on how to accomplish this goal.
Second, it would seem that Professor Yan’s exegesis of the political thought of the pre-Qin masters is not sufficiently comprehensive. For instance, the pre-Qin masters do not necessarily view humane authority and hegemony as opposites; thus, Confucius reckons that Guanzi helped Duke Huan of Qi to establish his hegemony but still affirms Guanzi’s contribution to history.6 Even though Mencius says that there were no just wars in the Spring and Autumn Period, he still holds that undertaking war to preserve dying states, to ensure succession for those without an heir, to remove tyranny, and to stop slaughter is right. Xunzi thinks that the effective way to abolish war is to affirm hierarchical order and use this as the basis for assigning resources, so that in establishing norms, upholding peace, and guaranteeing security, large states should play a greater role and share a greater burden of responsibility. Guanzi’s thought combines the good points of Daoism and Legalism and has much in common with that of Xunzi. Although he wants to implement the hegemonic power of “enriching the state and strengthening the army,” he retains the “humane Way” as the supreme ideal. Even though Hanfei advocates realizing centralization and unification by strict laws, the purpose of his promoting the “rule of law” is to guarantee and realize lasting peace on the basis of an organized system established on the presupposition of universally respected international norms.
I particularly note that the essays gathered in this book categorize Laozi mainly as a conceptual determinist, believing that he lacks any realist views. This is a mistake. In fact, although Laozi proposes the reduction of desires and a return to “small states with small populations,” and holds the view that war should be considered carefully and that weapons are instruments of great misfortune, this does not mean that he simply backs away from fighting. Rather, he thinks one should accumulate advantages on the terrain and adjust one’s policy in response. In fact, Laozi proposes many ideas of great theoretical value and with a high degree of philosophical sophistication, such as the Way, acting according to circumstances, and nonaction, which were adopted by Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism, military thinkers, yin-yang thinkers, and the eclectics represented by the Guanzi, who all inherited and developed these ideas to differing degrees.7 Furthermore, some historical personages, such as Shang Yang and the first emperor of Qin, who would later be described as using all their energy to promote hegemony and hegemonic government, when seen against the true backdrop of history may appear in a different light. According to the biography of Shang Yang in the Records of the Historian, when Shang Yang went to see Duke Xiao of Qin, he first proposed to him the way of the emperors and then the way of kings, but since the duke was not interested, he moved on to talk about the way of hegemons. Hence, the policy that Shang Yang advocated in Qin was a result of a realistic option, given his failure to interest the duke in the way of kings.8 Liu Xiang in the (Western) Han Dynasty records in section 14 of the Shuo Yuan that after the first emperor of Qin had united all under heaven, he called together his ministers to discuss which was better: abdication in favor of worthy successors, as practiced by the Five Emperors in ancient times, or the hereditary succession of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. He felt that his own running of the state was based on the collective wisdom of Confucians, Mohists, Legalists, Daoists, and Nominalists, who all extolled the Five Emperors and held that all under heaven belonged to all the people, and hence he felt that he should imitate the rite of abdication of the Five Emperors, but, persuaded by the academician Baobai Lingzhi, he renounced this plan.9 Leaving aside the question of the authenticity of these two stories and looking only at their messages, we find that whether Shang Yang (who was later reputed to have been a harsh Legalist intent on going the way of enriching the state, strengthening the army, and using strict punishments and severe laws) or the first emperor of Qin (who is always referred to as a bellicose tyrant without mercy) are seen as implementing the way of kings or that of hegemons is always dependent on the value judgments of later generations and does not necessarily reflect the actual historical circumstances of the time.
In his conclusion, Professor Yan writes, “If China’s foreign policy cannot improve the nation’s standing as a great and responsible state, China may follow in the dust of 1980s Japan, unable to replace the United States as the leading state in the world.” This implies that the goal of China’s current development is to replace the United States as the world’s leading state. I think that it is worth pondering whether this goal can be realized and whether it should be the goal of China’s development. At an academic conference, Professor Yan mentioned that as China gradually becomes stronger it has two options: either to become part of the Western “regime” (which implies that it must change its political system and become a democracy) or to establish its own system. My problem is that, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, China is the only large country left in the socialist camp, and therefore, even if we insist that we do not want to see the Western world as our enemy or compete for hegemony with the United States, and even if we seek to establish harmonious relations with our neighboring states, we cannot prevent the United States, Japan, India, and some European countries from viewing us as their greatest threat. Against the backdrop of struggles for security of the state and core benefits, even if we accept Western values and ideology and become what they see as a “democratic state,” will we then be accepted as part of the Western regime? If not, then how should “China’s own system” be understood?
Furthermore, China’s “rise” is a topic hotly debated by academics and the general public today. In fact, I am rather hesitant to use the word rise to describe China’s current foreign policy strategy and the trend of its future development. Rise implies “suddenly shooting up” and is said of something weak that suddenly emerges. The term is generally applied to the development of economic or military power. Moreover, rise is a comparative term, used of the rise of the state of Qin compared to the pre-Qin times or of the rise of late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century Japan. Referring to the economic takeoff in the latter part of the twentieth century, there was the rise of the “Asian Tigers.” As the core state of the ancient East Asian international system, China was in a leading position throughout the course of several thousand years of history. It is only in the last hundred years or so that China became weak, following powerful foreign invasions. At no time in the past or in the present has China made hegemony over the world the goal of its development. Rather, as a geographically large and historically ancient country with many different nationalities and the world’s largest population, China must have a place within the international system that reflects its status and it must take part in international affairs on the supposition that there is no infringement of its ability to protect its core national interests. Hence, China’s development must always have as its goal to uphold China’s national sovereignty and independence and the integrity of its territory as well as to benefit its people. We must see that, given the great gap between the soft power and hard power of China and the United States and other developed nations, our problem—both now and far into the future—is to guarantee our own survival, development, and security, not to lead the world.
As to whether we can become the leading world state, I think that Laozi has the right and apposite answer: “I have seen that it is not possible to acquire all under heaven by striving. All under heaven is a spiritual vessel and cannot be run or grasped. To try and run it ends in failure; to try and grasp it leads to losing it.”10 This is proved by history: when, before World War II, the fascist states of Germany and Japan wanted to gain world hegemony, they precipitated a world war, with the result that they were ultimately defeated. In other words, when we study the structure and evolution of the pre-Qin international system and the thought of the pre-Qin masters regarding the international system and interstate politics, our purpose is certainly not to return to a past of flourishing heroism in a great state equal to heaven. The Western Zhou system collapsed in pre-Qin times because the ritual legal order, well-field agriculture, and five classes of mourning, which together constituted this feudal system, ceased to exist.11 The recent idea of an “ancient East Asian international organization” with a “Confucian China” core is very similar. The experience and lessons of history tell us that we should reject a view of Han Chinese cultural values or some special view of civilization as the core to construct an “international organization.” Borrowing Laozi’s broad view and his systematic thought, we should seek the harmony and balance of the whole as the starting point, actively join in the existing international organization, and work to raise our international status and influence.
QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS
I would like to make my own observations about this research and the fervor with which it is undertaken to raise some questions and to look toward future developments.
First, in the area of theory and method, historical research should be the foundation, and on this basis international political philosophy may be studied, combining methods of proof, exegesis, and quantitative and qualitative analysis. On the basis of the essays in this book, in order to differentiate itself from political history, intellectual history, and other historical methods, research in pre-Qin interstate political philosophy has, up to now, adopted a three-stage model. First, such research abstracts from concrete historical contexts (such as the historical background, the trend of the times, or concrete historical facts) and then chooses part of the works of the pre-Qin masters and expounds these texts. Second, quantitative analytical methods, such as diagrams and formulas, are used to help search for logical connections and then the findings are compared with Western international political theory. Finally, the results are brought together to see what light they shed on real politics. The researcher’s goal is to use evidence-based, scientific research methods to construct an explanatory model that can adequately cover all the phenomena in the hope of making normative conclusions of universal significance. The problems I find with this approach are as follows: Is the reading of pre-Qin history and the exposition of the thought of the pre-Qin masters a matter of amassing evidence or engaging in hermeneutics? If it is a matter of evidence, then it must be grounded in accurate and strict historical testimony. At present, though, there will always be doubts about the historical authenticity of conclusions based on any exposition of the thought of the pre-Qin masters. As Professor Yan explains,
What we are researching is contemporary international relations. We study ancient thought in order to more accurately understand the present, not the past. Since there is no way of establishing the reliability of the events recounted in the works of the pre-Qin masters, when we study them we focus on their thought rather than on the events themselves. In studying intellectual history, one often seeks to understand texts in the context of their time. This is necessary, but for international relations studies we cannot be—nor do we want to be—concerned with the real meaning of the texts because there is still no consensus regarding the real meaning of pre-Qin works and we cannot use different meanings as a basis for research and discussion. Scientific research can be undertaken only on the basis of common standards and shared ideas; hence, the evidence-based historical research method comparable to the scientific method can do nothing other than to take the literal meaning as its standard because most people do not disagree about the literal meaning. Rather than trying to understand the words of ancient authors by relying on what someone today imagines or on historical facts the authenticity of which cannot be guaranteed, it is better to understand the thought of the ancients from the point of view of an abstract human society. If it is said that neither is able to truly reflect the real face of history of that time, then at least the latter method is more in tune with the purpose of international relations theory, because the purpose of theoretical research is to seek what is universally reasonable, not to look for particularity.12
I agree with this view but still think that we should promote the key points of research in this area by opening our minds and looking from another angle. In fact, no reading of history is able to free itself entirely from the subjective hermeneutical perspective of the research. Any theoretical hermeneutics based on scientific method may be able to reach conclusions that are plausible and well-founded. We can try to combine the research methods of history and international political theory. Starting from international political theory, we can use what the official historical texts of the pre-Qin period have recorded of pre-Qin history as basic textbooks—the Spring and Autumn Annals, Zuo’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Records of the Historian, the Han History, the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government by Sima Guang (1019–1086)—while avoiding pedantic methods and antiquarianism, because “theory and history may sometimes make strange bedfellows,” “but the fruit of their being combined together is that what they could not achieve alone may be shown to have great plausibility.”13 Otherwise this research runs the risk that, having achieved a certain amount, it then would lack the capacity to develop further.
Second, we need to correctly grasp the reality of historical texts and the thought of the pre-Qin masters, and then deepen and expand the areas and perspectives of current research. At present, study of the thought of the pre-Qin masters has focused on expounding the points of similarity and difference between them but has overlooked their common historical-cultural origin. This means that we must understand the substance of their thought in depth. For instance, in my article “The Type and Evolution of the Pre-Qin International System,” I stress that most pre-Qin thinkers take the Western Zhou system as the blueprint to construct their own ideal international system.14 The use of legends, literary allusions, and particular cases as examples to expound their own ideas is a method that is universally adopted in the works of the masters. (In chapter 2, “Xunzi’s Interstate Political Philosophy and Its Message for Today,” Professor Yan calls this “simple case-selection.”) Most of the theories of the masters were designed to propose plans and policies to the rulers and to serve in Realpolitik (in his essay, Professor Yan notes that the works of the masters are markedly strategic). Therefore, all find it hard to avoid utilitarianism and bias and tend to have a marked inclination to favor their own disciples. So that their own theories would be used by the rulers, the pre-Qin thinkers proposed outstanding persons who could help in the development of the country (some people even have hatred or suspicions that are biased in their emphasis and of unlimited expansion). These are all things that should be carefully distinguished in the research. Once a thinker’s theory has been used by a ruler to determine the main direction of the country and the plan for its development, however, both ruler and thinker will consciously or unconsciously draw in those factors in their school of thought that can be of service so as to adapt to the actual needs. This is a manifest character of the thought of the pre-Qin masters. Just because the thought of the masters has a common historical and cultural origin, in many cases, as in the discussions of the merits of royal or hegemonic rule, the path of enriching the state and strengthening the army, and the use of benevolence, justice, and morality to establish the state, the differing opinions in fact come together into one idea and only then does it become the foundation that affirms unification in the areas of politics, the economy, and the intellectual culture of the Qin and Han times. From this it can be seen that there are no insurmountable barriers between the theories of the pre-Qin schools; rather, they draw from one another, with each stressing its own angle.
Besides the works already studied, many other pre-Qin works could be added, such as the Book of History, the Sayings of the States, the Book of Lord Shang, the Spring and Autumn Annals of Yanzi, the Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics, and Sunzi’s Art of War. The interstate political thought of these works is very rich. After the unification of the Qin-Han period some works and treatises on political theory, such as Lu Jia’s New Analects, Jia Yi’s Discourse on the Passing of Qin and Tract on Ruling in Peace, and Chao Cuo’s Notes on Discussions of Military Affairs and Tract on Eliminating the Barbarians,15 as well as the parts of the Records of the Historian, Han History, and Later Han History that deal with political thought all have great value for theory. Besides this, although the Qin-Han established a centralized unified imperial court, yet it still had long-lasting and frequent interaction with the surrounding tribes and states. Throughout its long history, China’s frequent divisions have meant that the various nationalities and ruling bodies have had complicated periods of struggle and coming together, as in the times of the Three Kingdoms (222–265), the Western and Eastern Jin (265–316 and 317–420), the North and South Dynasties (420–589), the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960 and 902–979 in north and south China, respectively), the entrenched opposition between the Song (960–1279) and the Liao (947–1125), Jin (1115–1234), Xi Xia (1032–1227), and Mongols (1206–1271), the wars during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and both the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1367) and the Later Jin, who renamed themselves Manchu and seized power in 1644. All of these can provide ample historical material for international relations, ethnic relations, state security, military strategy, and diplomatic achievements. If more theories of value can be drawn out from all this, then it will certainly help us in understanding history in more depth and in resolving current issues. And all of this can rely on accurate historical documentation as its premise and we can ask the researcher, in addition to showing a comparatively high standard of theory, to make a practical contribution to history.
Revealing the evolution of international relations in the course of history and the similarities and differences in interstate political philosophy also implies assigning a more profound value to theory. The advantage of this is that, after going through a long period of historical verification, there is not only the hope of constructing a new and broader historical discourse but also, by using a comparative method, creating a new model of “original theory” for interdisciplinary research and opening up eye-catching new fields of discourse. I will provide one example. In the Sayings of Zheng section of the Sayings of the States, there is a discussion between the historiographer of Zhou and Duke Huan of Zheng of the rise and fall and succession in all under heaven toward the end of the Western Zhou. The historiographer understands the circumstances of all under heaven and analyzes the situation of the feudal states of the period, including the Zhou royal household. He finds a place for the weak state of Zheng to establish itself and correctly predicts the rise and fall in power of each state and the changes in their relationships. What the historiographer and Duke Huan are engaged in is an assessment of the times, a prediction of the near future, and development of a plan of strategy toward the outside world. What is worth noticing is that the author of the most important strategic plan is not a key official holding power in the state or a highly placed general, but a historian. This must be related to China’s long and ancient historiographic culture and the tradition of revising and writing history books—our ancestors could value the editing and transmission of history because it clearly served practical politics. Once this point is understood, then we can understand why Laozi was formerly the historiographer of the Western Zhou and why many of Confucius’s important political ideas were expounded through his editing of the historical work the Spring and Autumn Annals.
Third, we should avoid using a simple checklist style in comparing Chinese and Western international political thought. Western international politics and international relations theory play an important role in guiding us and are of significance as a point of reference. Currently, Chinese research in this field is mostly founded on Western theories, but it should be observed that China’s and the West’s historical-cultural and social backgrounds and ways of thinking are very different. In research an effort must be made to avoid a checklist style or a fixed way of thinking. The meaning of Western political theories and concepts, the theoretical system, and construction of disciplines themselves are parts of an open and constantly developing system. In many ways this system adapts to changes in actual politics and the international situation and so is constantly changing. By contrast, our study of the pre-Qin international system and interstate political philosophy has been developed on the basis of historical research. In other words, Western international relations theory is oriented toward the future, is constantly changing, and is full of uncertainties and risks, whereas pre-Qin interstate political theory must be faithfully grounded in basic historical facts and historical documents. Study of history is inevitably founded on reality, but when the fruits of its theory are used to serve actual politics it cannot respond to the needs of only one era, by taking a biased view from history books or indulging in wishful thinking to explain things. Even more to be avoided is simplistic copying and blind imitation.
Finally, on the basis of results already obtained, I think that to undertake this study the following areas remain to be explored: the evolution and laws of the international configuration in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods; international relations at the time of the leadership of the two great hegemons Huan of Qi and Wen of Jin during the Spring and Autumn Period; the pattern of the rise of the Five Hegemons in the Spring and Autumn era and the Seven Powers of the Warring States era and what this has to say in reality; and how the thought of the pre-Qin masters was used in the rise of the various states, and how it can be used in later history and politics.
In summary, I borrow a passage from the bibliography of the Han History to serve as my conclusion. While Ban Gu was verifying the origins of the thought of the pre-Qin masters and their points of similarity and difference, he recommended that “if one can learn the skills of the six arts and observe the words of the nine schools, rejecting the dross and retaining the good, then one will be able to master all possible strategies.”16 This way of putting things is very apt and sheds light on our study of the pre-Qin international system and of the interstate political thought of the pre-Qin masters and shows how it should constantly be deepened.