INTRODUCTION
1. Quoted from the interview with Yan Xuetong in appendix 2 of this book.
2. Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 139, 90–91.
4. Yan recognizes that predictions in intenational relations cannot be 100 percent accurate, but he argues that it is important to strive for as much accuracy as possible with the use of scientific methods, and he notes that most of his predictions have been correct. In 2008, however, he publicly apologized to readers for having (wrongly) predicted that military conflict between Taiwan and mainland China would break out in the 2000–2008 period. In that article he explains why the situation changed for the better, predicts peaceful relations over the following eight years (even if the United States continues to sell arms to Taiwan), and ends with the hope that he will not have to note another mistaken prediction in 2016 (www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=129345).
5. See www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54.
CHAPTER 1
1. Many scholars doubt the authenticity of the works of the pre-Qin masters. Whether the ideas in these writings are those of the masters themselves or are ones attributed to them several hundred years later does not, however, affect our being able to learn from them and use them to enrich contemporary international relations theory. The time when these ideas were formed does not affect our use of them to understand today’s international politics. Hence, in this chapter I assume that the words recorded in these works are indeed those of the masters themselves.
2. Liu Zehua and Ge Quan, eds., Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiangshi yanjiu [Studies in the history of Chinese political thought] (Wuhan: Hubei Educational Press, 2006), 1; Liang Qichao, Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of pre-Qin political thought] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju and Shanghai Shudian, 1986) (based on the 1936 edition by Zhonghua Shuju; original version published 1922).
3. Liang, Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiangshi, 155, 156. His quotations come from Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A6 (cf. James Legge, The Chinese Classics [London and Oxford: Frowde and Oxford University Press, 1895], 2:136) and Mozi 11 Conforming to Superiors A.
4. Liang, Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiangshi, 157–159. Quotations are from Laozi 31 and Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind B2 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:478).
5. Yang Kuan, Zhanguo Shi [A history of the Warring States] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2003), 473–485.
6. Ibid., 477.
7. Yang Youqiong, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937); Sa Mengwu, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought] (Beijing: Oriental Press, 2008); Cao Deben, ed., Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought] (Beijing: Higher Education Press, 1999); Xiao Gongquan, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought] (Beijing: New Star Press, 2005).
8. Liu Zehua and Ge Quan, eds., Zhongguo Gudai Sixiangshi [A history of ancient Chinese thought] (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2001), 56.
9. Liu Zehua, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshiji [An anthology of the history of Chinese political thought] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2008), 176. Quotation from Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. W. A. Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985], 1:357).
10. He Maochun, Zhongguo Waijiao Tongshi [A history of China’s external relations] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1996), 37–43.
11. Ibid., 41.
12. Ye Zicheng, Chunqiu Zhangguo Shiqi de Zhongguo Waijiao Sixiang [Chinese diplomatic thought in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2003), 10.
13. Ibid., preface.
14. Ibid., 30, 37, 54.
15. Sun Xuefeng and Yang Zixiao, “Hanfeizi de Guojiajian Zhengzhi Sixiang” [Hanfeizi’s interstate political thought], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Scientific Studies of International Politics], no. 2 (2008): 96n4.
16. Chen Qi and Huang Yuxing, “Chunqiu Shiqi de Guojiajian Ganshe” [Intervention between states in the Spring and Autumn Period], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Scientific Studies of International Politics], no. 1 (2008): 70n167.
17. Piao Bingjiu, “Liji de Hexie Shijie Sixiang” [A harmonious world according to the Record of rites], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Scientific Studies of International Politics], no. 3 (2008): 69–70.
18. Liu Jiangyong, “Guanzi Guojiajian Zhengzhi Sixiang Chutan” [A preliminary study of interstate political thought in the Guanzi], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Scientific Studies of International Politics], no. 3 (2008): 55.
19. Chen Yudan, “Guoji Guanxixue Zhong de Jingdian yu Chanshi” [Classic readings in international relations, with a commentary], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Scientific Studies of International Politics], no. 3 (2008): 111.
20. Mozi 19 Against Aggression C.
21. Laozi 80.
22. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357, 361).
23. Hanfeizi 6 Having Standards.
24. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
25. Analects 12 Yan Yuan 1.
26. Analects 14 Xian Asked 42.
27. Mencius 4 Li Lou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:293–294).
28. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
29. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State. Distinction refers to class or grade.
30. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
31. Guanzi 15 Importance of Issued Orders (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:245–246).
32. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Mozi 14 Impartial Love A.
36. Mozi 12 Conforming to Superiors B.
37. Analects 16 Ji Shi 1.
38. Mencius 4 Li Lou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:294).
39. Laozi 46.
40. Laozi 80.
41. Laozi 46.
42. Laozi 31.
43. Mozi 14 Impartial Love A.
44. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
45. Hanfeizi 46 Six Crimes.
46. Zhang Lu, “Zhongxi Zhengyi Zhanzheng de Sixiang Bijiao” [A comparative study of just war thought in China and the West], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no. 4 (2005): 17.
47. Laozi 31.
48. Hanfeizi 36 Problems 1.
49. Huang Shouan, Duan Fude, et al., Zhongguo Gudai Jiu Da Sixiang Xuepai Jiyao [A summary of the nine schools of thought in ancient China] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2002), 31.
50. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
51. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
52. Xunzi 15 Debating the Military.
53. Guanzi 17 Methods of Warfare (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:270).
54. The Elder Dai’s Record of Rites: Employing Troops.
55. Huang Pumin, “Xianqin Zhuzi Junshi Sixiang Yitong Chutan” [A preliminary comparative study of the military thought of the pre-Qin masters], Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research], no. 5 (1996): 76.
56. The Elder Dai’s Record of Rites: Employing Troops.
57. Mencius 6 Gaozi B7 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:436).
58. Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind B2 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:478).
59. Ye, Chunqiu Zhangguo Shiqi de Zhongguo Waijiao Sixiang, 177.
60. Laozi 80.
61. Laozi 3.
62. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 336.
63. Mozi 15 Impartial Love B.
64. Mozi 11 Conforming to Superiors A.
65. Ibid.
66. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
67. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
68. Analects 14 Xian Asked 41.
69. Analects 12 Yan Yuan 1.
70. Guanzi 15 Importance of Issued Orders (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:247).
71. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
72. Hanfeizi 53 Implementing Commands.
73. Guanzi 15 Importance of Issued Orders (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:245).
74. Hanfeizi 9 Eight Evils.
75. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
76. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
77. Analects 16 Ji Shi 1.
78. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
79. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:196–197).
80. Laozi 46.
81. Laozi 51.
82. Laozi 54.
83. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:362).
84. Analects 14 Xian Asked 22.
85. Xunzi 15 Debating the Military.
86. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou B8 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:223).
87. Laozi 31.
88. Mozi 14 Impartial Love A.
89. Hanfeizi 1 The First Meeting with the King of Qin.
90. Mozi 13 Conforming to Superiors C.
91. Mozi 20 Economy in Expenditure A.
92. Guanzi 1 Shepherding the People (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:56).
93. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
94. Ibid. (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:358).
95. Record of Rites: Li Yun.
96. Ibid.
97. Odes II Minor Odes 6.1 North Mountain (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 360).
98. The Doctrine of the Mean and Harmony 28 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 424).
99. Analects 16 Ji Shi 2.
100. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind B13 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 483).
104. Laozi 57.
105. Laozi 29.
106. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
107. Hanfeizi 1 The First Meeting with the King of Qin.
108. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
109. Hanfeizi 54 Yardsticks for the Mind.
110. Mozi 21 Economy in Expenditure B.
111. Mozi 3 On Dyeing.
112. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:356).
113. Guanzi 17 Methods of Warfare (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:270).
114. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
115. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:196).
116. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
117. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
118. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
119. Analects 14 Xian Asked 16.
120. Analects 14 Xian Asked 17.
121. Analects 14 Xian Asked 42.
122. Analects 15 Duke Ling of Wei 5.
123. Laozi 66.
124. Laozi 78.
125. Laozi 66.
126. Stratagems of the Warring States 3 (Qin 1) 7.
127. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:359–360).
128. Laozi 59.
129. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A7 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:147).
130. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
131. Hanfeizi 54 Yardsticks for the Mind.
132. Mozi 8 Appointing the Worthy A.
133. Analects 12 Yan Yuan 7.
134. Laozi 59.
135. Analects 2 The Practice of Governance 1.
136. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:135, 136).
137. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
138. Mozi 8 Appointing the Worthy A.
139. Hanfeizi 6 Having Standards.
140. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
141. Hanfeizi 27 Employing People.
142. Guanzi 16 Conforming to the Law (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:259).
143. Guanzi 64 Comments on Attendant Circumstances.
144. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:360).
145. Hanfeizi 6 Having Standards.
146. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
147. Mencius 4 Li Lou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:293–294).
148. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
149. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
150. Mozi 3 On Dyeing.
151. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:360).
152. Ibid. (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
153. Analects 2 The Practice of Governance 19.
154. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:199, 201).
155. Xunzi 24 The Prince.
156. Laozi 57.
157. Laozi 3.
158. Hanfeizi 49 Five Vermin.
159. Hanfeizi 46 Six Crimes.
160. Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, no. 111 (June 1998): 26.
161. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943), 10; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 535.
162. Jack Snyder, The Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 60–61.
163. Guanzi 23 Conversations of the Hegemon (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:357).
164. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 7.
CHAPTER 2
1. Ye Zicheng, Chunqiu Zhangguo Shiqi de Zhongguo Waijiao Sixiang [Chinese diplomatic thought in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2003), 315–330.
2. This essay concentrates on Xunzi’s interstate political philosophy from the perspective of international relations theory and hence has no intention of discussing historical issues and textual criticism. Historians generally rely on Wang Xianqian’s (1842–1918) Xunzi jijie [Collected notes on the “Xunzi”] (1891); therefore, in this essay quotations from the Xunzi are from Wang Xianqian’s edition, as edited by Shen Xiaohuan and Wang Xingxian. The reading of the texts cited is indebted to Yang Liuqiao, Xunzi guyi [“Xunzi”: Notes and translation] (1985); Wang Tianhai, Xunzi xiaoshi [“Xunzi”: Edited and annotated]; Jiang Nanhua and Yang Hanqing, Xunzi quanyi [A complete translation of the “Xunzi”]; and Gao Changshan’s translation and edition of Xunzi.
3. Xunzi’s ideas formed in the Warring States Period. The feudal states of the time were very much like modern states in having the three factors of a people, a territory, and a government, but they lacked sovereignty. Therefore there is a slight difference between the terms interstate of that time and international today. But now the term international is widely used to express the meaning of “among states,” whereas the term interstate is seldom used in modern international relations literature. In this essay, interstate is used for ancient times and international for the present.
4. The term ba used by Xunzi is similar to the English word hegemony as it is used in contemporary international relations discourse. It has no pejorative sense. Thus in this essay the term hegemony has no connotation of wishing to invade or bully small states.
5. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
6. Ibid.
7. Xunzi 24 The Prince.
8. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
9. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 250.
10. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
11. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
12. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
13. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi [An analysis of China’s national interest] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 1997), 4–6.
14. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
15. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
16. Pp = perceived power, C = critical mass, E = economic capability, M = military capability, S = strategic purpose, W = will to pursue national strategy. See Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977: Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977).
17. Xunzi 7 Confucius.
18. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State. Xunzi came from an agricultural society in which agriculture was seen as the most important part of the state economy and artisans and merchants were seen as secondary, just as in an industrial society, industry is seen as the most important part of the national economy and the service industry is seen as secondary. Similarly, in the knowledge economy, the service industry is seen as the most important sector of the national economy and agriculture is seen as secondary.
19. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
20. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
21. Ibid.
22. Lu Yang, “Feizhou na shenme zhengjiu ziji?” [What can Africa do to save itself?], http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-07/22/content_3252643.htm.
23. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
24. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
25. Xunzi 15 Debating the Military.
26. Xunzi 13 The Way of the Ministers.
27. Xunzi 12 The Way of the Rulers. Yü was the founding king of the Xia Dynasty and Jie the last king of the same dynasty.
28. Ibid.
29. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
30. Ibid. Shun was a king who reigned before the Xia Dynasty and is revered as a sage.
31. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
32. Ibid. Zhòu was the last king of the Shang Dynasty.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
36. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
37. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
38. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
39. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
40. Ibid.
41. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 225–229.
42. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
43. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics among Nations, 4.
44. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
45. Xunzi 19 Rites: A Discussion.
46. Xunzi 22 Correcting Names.
47. Ibid.
48. Xunzi 27 Overall Summary.
49. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
50. Xunzi 19 Rites: A Discussion.
51. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 2001), 294.
52. Ibid., 295.
53. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
54. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
55. Ibid.
56. According to Wang Xianqian’s Xunzi jijie [Collected notes on the “Xunzi”], the system of Five Services was centered on the royal city of the Zhou Son of Heaven and extended outward to form an international system from center to periphery. The area within 250 kilometers of the royal city was the area for “domain service,” where the king’s fields were sown to provide food for the Son of Heaven. A further 250 kilometers out was the “feudal service,” which provided labor and border guards. A further 1,250 kilometers out was the “tributary service,” which belonged to the states of the central plain. Every 250 kilometers of the tributary service was one qi, in the order: feudal qi, domain qi, baron’s qi, fiefdom qi, and border qi, which promoted culture and education and provided military service. Even farther out were the “formal service” and the “wasteland service,” each of 500 kilometers. It is not clear if the latter two were at the same distance from the royal city or one was farther away. The “formal service” comprised the two areas of the Man and the Yi, each of 250 kilometers. The tribes had to perform roughly the same kind of service but at reduced levels of taxation. The “wasteland service” was divided into two territories, the “settled service” and the “wild service,” each of 250 kilometers. The norms for the tribes were simple and the people could move freely. Scholars differ in their opinions on the geographical areas of the Five Services. See Ye, Chunqiu Zhangguo Shiqi de Zhongguo Waijiao Sixiang, 28.
57. Xunzi 18 Correcting: A Discussion.
58. Ibid.
59. Hu Jintao, “Nuli Jianshe Chijiu Heping, Gongtong Fanrong de Hexie Shijie: Zai Lianheguo Chengli 60 Zhounian Shounao Huiyishang de Jianghua” [Work hard to establish a lasting, peaceful, universally prosperous, and harmonious world: A speech at the summit to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 16 September 2009, 1.
60. “Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Huiyi Zai Jing Juxing” [Central foreign affairs working meeting held in Beijing], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 24 August 2006, 1.
61. “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding” [The decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dealing with key questions in the construction of a harmonious socialist society], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 19 October 2006, 1–2.
62. Hu, “Nuli Jianshe Chijiu Heping, Gongtong Fanrong de Hexie Shijie,” 1.
63. Zhu Rongji, “Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao” [Government work report], in 16 Da Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian [Shang] [A selection of important documents since the Sixteenth Party Congress, part 1] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 2005), 188.
64. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1991), 2:526, 535.
65. L. S. Stavrianos, The World since 1500: A Global History (London: Prentice-Hall International, 1966), 36–37.
66. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
CHAPTER 3
1. The Stratagems of the Warring States was edited by Liu Xiang (77–8 BCE) and contains historical material from historiographers and strategists of the Warring States Period. Scholars are divided on issues such as the identity of the author, the authenticity of what is recorded, and the meaning of the text. Where there are divergent opinions on the identity of the personages mentioned, the authors of this essay follow the majority opinion. Quotations are based on the 1978 edition published in Shanghai. On editorial questions, see Hu Ruhong, “Zhanguoce” Yanjiu [Study of “The stratagems of the Warring States”] (Changsha: Hunan People’s Press, 2002), 10–12; Luo Genze, Luo Genze Shuo Zhuzi [Luo Genze on the masters] (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press, 2001), 382; and Fu Yuzhang, Zhongguo Gudai Shixueshi [A history of the historiography of ancient China] (Hefei: Anhui University Press, 2008), 17.
2. Bai Shouyi, Zhongguo Shixueshi Lunji [Collected essays on the history of Chinese historiography] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1999), 37.
3. On these two terms, see p. 225.
4. Xiong Xianguang, trans., “Zhanguoce” Yanjiu yu Xuanyi [“The stratagems of the Warring States”: Studies and selected texts in translation] (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1988); Gao Xiaoying, “Shi Ji yu Zhanguoce de Bijiao Yanjiu” [A comparative study of the Historical records and The stratagems of the Warring States] (M.A. thesis, Anhui University, 2005), 6–7, 11–12.
5. Wang Jingxiong, Shang Jinglong, and Guan Xiu, “Zhanguoce” yu Lunbianshu [“The stratagems of the Warring States” and the art of debate] (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press, 2002), 407.
6. Zhang Yanxiu, “Zhanguoce Zhuti Sixiang Shitan” [Topics in The stratagems of the Warring States], Guanzi Xuekan [Guanzi Journal], no. 2 (1999): 64.
7. Zhang Yanxiu, Zonghengjia Shu: “Zhanguoce” yu Zhongguo Wenhua [Verticalists and horizontalists: “The stratagems of the Warring States” and Chinese culture] (Kaifeng: Henan University, 1998), 25–27.
8. Jia Chuantang, “Zhanguoce Rencai Lun” [Talented persons in The Stratagems of the Warring States], Zhengzhou Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehuikexue Ban) [Journal of Zhengzhou University: Philosophy and Social Sciences], no. 5 (1987): 49.
9. Xu Jieling, Chunqiu Bangjiao Yanjiu [Interstate relations in the Spring and Autumn era] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2004), 129.
10. Guo Dan, “Zuozhuan” Guoce Yanjiu [State strategy in “Zuo’s commentary”] (Beijing: Renmin Wenxue, 2004), 170, 173.
11. Wang Fuhan and Meng Ming, eds., Wenbai Duizhao Quanyi “Zhanguoce” [A translation of “The stratagems of the Warring States” into modern Chinese] (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Press, 1993), 7.
12. Hu Ruhong, “Zhanguoce” Yanjiu, 160–161.
13. Yu Rubo, “Zhanguoce Moulue Sixiang Xiyao” [Strategic planning in The stratagems of the Warring States], Junshi Lishi Yanjiu [Military History Research], no. 1 (1990): 96.
14. Wang and Meng, Wenbai Duizhao Quanyi “Zhanguoce,” 3.
15. Stratagems 14 (Chu 1) 17.
16. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 7.
17. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 2.
18. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 5.
19. Stratagems 19 (Zhao 2) 1. Although the Records of the Historian says that Su Qin’s interlocutor was Prince Xiao of Zhao, mainstream contemporary historians think that Su Qin could not have lived before the time of King Huiwen of Zhao, and therefore the text adopted here refers to King Huiwen. See Wang Gesen and Tang Zhiqing, eds., Qiguo Shi [The history of the state of Qi] (Jinan: Shandong People’s Press, 1992), 410; and Yang Kuan, Zhanguo Shi [The history of the Warring States] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2003), 342–343. On Su Qin’s activities in Zhao, see Shen Changyun et al., Zhaoguo Shigao [A sketch history of the state of Zhao] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2000), 184–186.
20. Stratagems 17 (Chu 4) 9.
21. Stratagems 22 (Wei 1) 7. The Jin of this quotation is actually Wei. When Jin split into three, Wei held the old capital and therefore continued to call itself “Jin.”
22. Stratagems 22 (Wei 1) 7.
23. Ibid.
24. Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe Guoli Xinlun: Jianlun Xinzhongguo Zonghe Guoli [A new theory of comprehensive state power: Comprehensive state power in the new China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1999), 10.
25. Stratagems 11 (Qi 4) 6.
26. Stratagems 13 (Qi 6) 3.
27. Stratagems 29 (Yan 1) 9.
28. Guanzi 17 Methods of Warfare. On the tasks of the emperor, sage king, and hegemon, see Gudai Hanyu cidian [A dictionary of ancient Chinese] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2001), 310, 1603, and 105, respectively.
29. Stratagems 29 (Yan 1) 12.
30. Stratagems 17 (Chu 4) 9.
31. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 2.
32. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 5.
33. Stratagems 1 (Eastern Zhou) 15. [Da ling zhao is the sixteenth rank of nobles in a scheme of one to twenty (twenty being the highest) initiated by Shang Yang in Qin.]
34. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 2.
35. Stratagems 5 (Qin 3) 9.
36. Stratagems 20 (Zhao 3) 14.
37. Stratagems 22 (Wei 1) 11.
38. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 7. The nine tripods and map-cum-registry are the symbols of the kingship of the Zhou Son of Heaven. They are rather like the scepter and seal of modern politics. If you have these two things, then you have the formal legitimacy to issue commands to the feudal lords in the name of the Son of Heaven.
39. Ibid.
40. Stratagems 7 (Qin 5) 1. Editors disagree on the identity of the king of Qin referred to in this passage. Gao You (ca. 168–212) thought that it was the first emperor of Qin but later commentators think it was King Wu. I adopt the latter position. For a discussion of these problems, see Miao Wenyuan, Zhanguoce Kaobian [A critical edition of “The stratagems of the Warring States”] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 70.
41. Stratagems 25 (Wei 4) 18.
42. Stratagems 33 (Zhongshan) 10. The King Zhao of Qin referred to here is King Zhaoxiang of Qin. Lin Jianming, Qinshi Gao [A sketch history of Qin] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1981), 266–267.
43. Stratagems 30 (Yan 2) 11.
44. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 5.
45. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 7.
46. Stratagems 19 (Zhao 2) 4.
47. Stratagems 11 (Qi 4) 10. Historians differ on the date and historical background of Su Qin’s persuading Qi not to follow Qin in calling himself emperor. See Miao, Zhanguoce Kaobian, 120.
48. Stratagems 23 (Wei 2) 11.
49. Stratagems 4 (Qin 2) 2.
50. Li Shaojun, ed., Guoji Zhanlue Baogao [Report on international strategies] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2005), 1.
51. Stratagems 7 (Qin 5) 1.
52. Stratagems 5 (Qin 3) 9.
53. Ibid.
54. Stratagems 29 (Yan 1) 1.
55. Stratagems 5 (Qin 3) 2.
56. Stratagems 12 (Qi 5) 1.
57. Stratagems 19 (Zhao 2) 1.
58. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 3.
59. Stratagems 28 (Han 3) 5. Prince Zhaoxi of Han is Prince Zhao of Han.
60. For the logic of following a strong state, see Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 195; and Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 69.
61. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 5.
62. Stratagems 12 (Qi 5) 1.
63. Ibid.
64. Stratagems 4 (Qin 2) 2.
65. Stratagems 30 (Yan 2) 12.
66. Stratagems 14 (Chu 1) 5.
67. Ibid.
68. Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Jerold M. Post, Leaders and Their Followers in Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jerold M. Post, ed., The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
69. Stratagems 29 (Yan 1) 5.
70. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 5th edition (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 506. In the game of Stag Hunt, a group of participants hunt a stag. If one or more of them defects to chase a rabbit instead, then the stag will escape through the gap in the line. This shows that when the participants lose faith in the fidelity of the others to keep to the cooperative task, and seek their own small gains instead of the greater gain of the whole group, then collective cooperation will fail.
CHAPTER 4
1. Engels writes that the state “is a product of society at a certain stage of development.” It has two main features: “it divides its subjects according to territory,” and it “is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force” (Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker [New York: Norton, 1978], 752).
2. Pei Monong points out that those international relations in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were intertwined and complex and changeable. The diplomacy of each state was very highly advanced. The Rites of Zhou became like today’s international law. See Pei Monong, “Introduction,” in Chunqiu Zhanguo Shidai de Waijiao Qunxing [Diplomatic constellations in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods] (Chongqing: Chongqing Press Group, 1994).
3. This is how I think Professor Yan’s thought should be understood: in its domestic and foreign policy and its determination and choice of developing military strategy, there are three levels to a state—first, unifying all under heaven; second, establishing norms (that is, first using material power, and second determining the order of power). The third level, constructing concepts, is of a higher order.
4. Yan Xuetong, “The Similarities and Differences of the Schools of Pre-Qin Interstate Political Thoughts,” in Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications, ed. Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2009), 265, 286.
5. Yang Qianru, “The Type and Evolution of the Pre-Qin International System,” International Political Science 21, no.1 (2010): 110.
6. Analects 14 Xian Asked 17: “The master said, ‘But for Guanzi, we would still be wearing our hair loose and buttoning our robes on the left.’” (Translator’s note: wearing hair loose and buttoning clothes on the left were seen as uncivilized.)
7. Qi Haixia has dealt with Laozi’s strategy for winning all under heaven in her paper “Laozi de xiaoguo guamin sixiang [Laozi’s idea of small states with small populations]” and hence I do not discuss it further here.
8. “Duke Xiao met Wei Yang, who spoke eloquently for a long time. Duke Xiao gradually fell asleep and did not listen. … Wei Yang said, ‘I spoke to the duke about the way of emperors but his mind was not open to understand.’ Five days later he asked to see Yang again. Yang went to see Duke Xiao again. This time was better but he still did not hit on what was wanted. … Yang said, ‘I spoke to the duke about the ways of kings but he did not take it in. He asked to see me again.’ Yang went to see Duke Xiao again. Duke Xiao praised him but did not employ him. He left and went away. … Yang said, ‘I spoke to the duke about the way of hegemons. He is interested in using that. He will certainly see me again, I know it.’ Wei Yang went to see Duke Xiao again. The duke spoke with him and, without realizing, moved forward to sit with him. Though he spoke of many things, the duke did not tire for the whole day. … Yang said, ‘I spoke to you, O Prince, of the way of emperors and kings like under the Three Dynasties, yet you said, “It is too far away. I cannot wait for that. Moreover worthy princes must first bring it about that their personal merit shines throughout all under heaven, how can I wait so many centuries to become an emperor or king?” So I spoke to the prince of how to strengthen the state and the prince liked that very much. Yet it is difficult for his virtue to match that of the Yin [Shang] and Zhou dynasties’” (The Records of the Historian: Biography of Lord Shang).
9. “The first emperor of Qin, having annexed all under heaven, called his ministers and asked them, ‘The Five Emperors of old practiced abdication in favor of the worthy; the Three Kings practiced hereditary succession. Which should it be? I will do whatever is right.’ The seventy scholars did not reply. Baobai Lingzhi spoke in reply, ‘Offices of all under heaven should be given to the worthy; but the household of all under heaven belongs to hereditary succession. Hence the Five Emperors treated all under heaven as an office, whereas the Three Kings held it as a household.’ The first emperor of Qin looked up to heaven and sighed, ‘My virtue comes from the Five Emperors; I will be the official of all under heaven. Who is it who may succeed me?’ Baobai Lingzhi replied, ‘Your Majesty uses the way of Jie and Zhòu and yet you want to use the abdication of the Five Emperors; this is something that your majesty cannot do. … Your Majesty is what one may describe as a self-made king. How dare you compare your virtue to that of the Five Emperors and want to treat all under heaven as an office?’ The first emperor fell silent and did not reply. He looked troubled. After a long time he said, ‘What Lingzhi has said leads all of you to disrespect me.’ He desisted from his plan and did not use abdication” (Shuo Yuan 14 Zhigong 5).
10. Laozi 29.
11. Translator’s note: Well-field agriculture refers to the system whereby one central field was held in common and the surrounding eight fields portioned out. The resulting nine-square pattern resembles the Chinese character for well. Mourning was prescribed for three years, one year, nine months, five months, or three months, depending on one’s relationship to the deceased.
12. Yan, “The Similarities and Differences of the Schools of Pre-Qin Interstate Political Thoughts,” 261.
13. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10. Buzan notes that contemporary international relations studies use only realism, thus overlooking the faults of historicism: “The discipline of International Relations has been mainly focused on contemporary history and current policy issues. The fast-moving nature of the subject and the pressing demand for expertise on current events, encourage a forward-rather than a backward-looking perspective. Consequently … [it] impose[s] the present on the past. … Social scientists of a positivist predisposition anxious to emulate the natural sciences, also seek to identify laws that are immune to historical variation. … But as with historicism, this story [the history of contemporary international relations] can only be told in this way by ignoring or distorting great swaths of the past” (ibid., 18, 19, 20). I think that this point applies also to the theoretical lacunae in the current study of pre-Qin interstate political thought.
14. Yang Qianru, “The Type and Evolution of the Pre-Qin International System,” International Political Science 21, no.1 (2010): 110.
15. Translator’s note: The following are all Han Dynasty politicians: Lu Jia (fl. 207–180 BCE), Jia Yi (201–169 BCE), and Chao Cuo (d. 154 BCE). On Lu Jia and the New Analects, see The Cambridge History of China 1:709–710, 731–732. On Jia Yi and Chao Cuo, see ibid., 1:148–149.
16. The History of the Former Han Dynasty 30 Gazette of Literature.
1. Liang Qichao, Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of pre-Qin political thought] (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji Press, 2003), 117–118; Xiao Gongquan, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought] (Beijing: New Star Press, 2005), 73–78; Lü Simian, Xianqin Xueshu Gailun [An outline of pre-Qin scholarship] (Beijing: Dongfang Press, 1996), 84.
2. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics [London and Oxford: Frowde and Oxford University Press, 1895], 2:196).
3. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:135, 136).
4. Mencius 4 Li Lou A7 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:298).
5. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:196–197).
6. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A7 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:142).
7. Mencius 3 Duke Wen of Teng B5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:274).
8. Both think that one can win leadership of a state by seizing it. Mencius says, “There are those lacking benevolence who have acquired states; but there has never been anyone lacking benevolence who acquired all under heaven” (Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind B13 [cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:483]).
9. Mencius 5 Wan Zhang A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:354).
10. Ibid. (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:356).
11. Ibid. (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:355–356). Mencius goes on to explain in detail that Shun’s taking the place of Yao was due to the mandate of heaven: “Shun served Yao for twenty-eight years. This was not something a human being could do, only heaven. Yao died and after three years’ mourning, Shun left Yao’s son and went to the south of the South River. The feudal lords of all under heaven came to pay court not to Yao’s son but to Shun. Those who had court hearings did not go to Yao’s son but to Shun. Those who sang elegies did so not for Yao’s son but sang and danced for Shun. Therefore I say, ‘This is of heaven.’ Later, he went to the central state and took the throne of the Son of Heaven. If he had stayed in Yao’s palace and dismissed Yao’s son, this would be usurpation rather than a matter of heaven giving it. The Great Oath says, ‘Heaven sees as my people see; heaven hears as my people hear’” (ibid. [cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:357]).
12. Mencius 6 Gaozi B2 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:426).
13. The ruler ought also to have a process for selecting good ministers, but Mencius thinks that the type of ruler decides what type of ministers he has; hence, a prince of benevolence and justice will certainly select ministers of benevolence and justice.
14. Mencius 3 Duke Wen of Teng A4 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:251).
15. Ibid. (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:252).
16. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A2 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:194).
17. Mencius 6 Gaozi B8 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:440).
18. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
19. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:196).
20. Mencius 6 Gaozi B4 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:429–430).
21. Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind A1 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:477–478).
22. Mencius 4 Li Lou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:293–294).
23. This is Yan Xuetong’s view; see chapter 2, p. 88–89.
24. The term hegemonism does not exist in English. English-speaking readers may not understand the official Chinese translation, hegemonism. In Chinese, hegemonism refers to a strong state (not necessarily a hegemonic state) seeking to humiliate weak states or to a strong state forcing a weak state to do something it does not want to do. Official Chinese texts generally use the three expressions imperialism, hegemonism, and great power politics together to show that they have virtually identical meanings.
25. Both coincide in using the historical case of King Wen becoming king with a territory of only one hundred square kilometers to prove the role of political power in the rise of a state to world leadership.
26. This essay does not specifically discuss the role of armed force insofar as it relates to the state’s military power. Regarding the use of armed force, both Mencius and Xunzi support just war. For an analysis of the conditions under which Mencius supports a state’s using armed force, see Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 49–56.
27. Yang Kuan, Xizhou Shi [A history of the Western Zhou] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2003), 95.
28. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:134–136).
29. Xunzi 19 Rites: A Discussion.
30. Mencius 6 Gaozi A9 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:409–410).
31. Yang Zebo, Mengzi Pingzhuan [Mencius: A biography] (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1998), 327–331.
32. Mencius 7 Exhausting the Mind B24 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:489).
33. Mencius 6 Gaozi A15 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:417–418).
34. Ibid. (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:418).
35. Although Xunzi does not deny the role of education and moral example, he nonetheless stresses the role of rites.
36. I say that rites are a kind of external force but do not thereby imply that rites are a purely external force imposed on one. In reference to the human person, rites are an external thing with a certain compulsory role, but rites may also be internalized (by being united with happiness), so that people live gently in a spirit of respect and obedience.
37. According to Xunzi’s theory that human nature is evil, evil persons or states will very easily emerge.
38. On this point, Mencius’s concept is very like the idea of a “norm entrepreneur” discussed by the constructivist Martha Finnemore. Norm entrepreneurs hope to give leaders of countries norms so that they can accept, inherit, and internalize them to form new norms. Finnemore studies only successful examples of norm entrepreneurs, whereas the Mencius records the failures of Mencius in trying to promote norms. Examples of failure in fact are even more deserving of our attention because they can show where the limits of the norm entrepreneur lie. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norms Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.
39. Human relationships are the core of the rites; hence, the restoration of ritual order and respect for human relationships are two sides of the same coin.
40. Mencius 6 Gaozi B5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:430).
41. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A6 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:136–137).
42. Mencius 1 King Hui of Liang A5 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 2:136).
CHAPTER 6
1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 40.
2. Robert Pahre, Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 4.
3. Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 125.
4. Robert T. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 29.
5. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 2001), 38.
6. Ibid., 23.
7. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 38.
8. Wang Li, ed., Gu Hanyu Zidian [A dictionary of ancient Chinese] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2000), 1619.
9. Dictionary Editing Office, Institute of Language, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., Xiandai Hanyu cidian [A dictionary of modern Chinese] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2005), 23.
10. Record of Rites 5 Humane Governance: Part 3.
11. Zheng Xuan (127–200 CE) in commentary on Zuo’s Commentary 8 Duke Cheng Year 2.
12. Liu Zehua, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiangshi (xian Qin) [An anthology of the history of Chinese political thought (pre-Qin)] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1996), 198.
13. Dictionary Editing Office, Xiandai Hanyu cidian, 22–23.
14. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little & Brown, 1890).
15. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1942), 106.
16. Giulio Douhet, Diario critico di Guerra (Torino: G. B. Paravia, 1921).
17. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
18. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Immanuel Wallerstein, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600–1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980).
19. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
20. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 2.
21. Mozi 3 On Dyeing.
22. Records of the Historian 32 Dukes of Qi.
23. Analects 14 Xian Asked 17.
24. Analects 14 Xian Asked 16.
25. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 5.
26. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 2.
27. Zuo’s Commentary 8 Duke Cheng Year 8 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics [London and Oxford: Frowde and Oxford University Press, 1872], 5:366).
28. Note in Zuo’s Commentary 8 Duke Cheng Year 7.
29. Records of the Historian 32 Dukes of Qi.
30. Guanzi 20 Xiao Kuang (cf. W. A. Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985], 1:336).
31. Records of the Historian 39 House of Jin.
32. Stratagems 3 (Qin 1) 1.
33. Records of the Historian 5 Qin.
34. Zuo’s Commentary 8 Duke Cheng Year 8 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:366).
35. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
36. Zuo’s Commentary 7 Duke Xuan Year 12 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:317).
37. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:196–197).
38. Sun Jiazhou, “Tianzi, Bazhu, Zhuhou: Chunqiu Bazheng Yanjiu” [The Son of Heaven, hegemonic lord, and the feudal princes: A study of the struggle for hegemony in the Spring and Autumn Period], Guizhou Shehui Kexue [Guizhou Social Sciences], no. 2 (1993): 104.
39. The Great Learning (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 1:357ff.).
40. Guanzi 51 Little Questions.
41. Guanzi 17 Methods of Warfare (cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 1:270).
42. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
43. Ibid.; Xunzi 12 The Way of the Rulers.
44. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2.
45. Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 365.
46. Keohane, After Hegemony, 137–138.
47. George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987); George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner; London: Frances Pinter, 1987); Goldstein, Long Cycles; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Wallerstein, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy.
48. Zuo’s Commentary 10 Duke Zhao Year 29 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:732). Beilu is the name of a place in the state of Jin; its location is unknown.
49. Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 206.
50. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
51. Zhang Quanmin, “Shilun Chunqiu Huimeng de Lishi Zuoyong” [The historical role of alliance meetings in the Spring and Autumn Period], Jilin Daxue Shehui Kexue Xuebao [Journal of Jilin University Social Sciences], no. 6 (1994): 46.
52. Song Liheng, “Lun Huimeng Zai Chunqiu Zhengbazhong de Teshu Gongneng” [The special role of alliance meetings in the contest for hegemony in the Spring and Autumn Period], Jilin Shifan Daxuexuebao (Renwen Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Jilin Normal University: Humanities and Social Sciences], no. 6 (2003): 91.
53. He Pingli, “Luelun Chunqiu Shiqi Huimeng, Zhengba Zhanzheng yu Zhanzhengguan” [A brief discussion of alliances, hegemonic wars, and views of war in the Spring and Autumn Period], Junshi Lishi Yanjiu [Research in Military History], no. 2 (2008): 109.
54. Xu Jieling, Chunqiu Bangjiao Yanjiu [Interstate relations in the Spring and Autumn era] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2004), 85.
55. Zuo’s Commentary 3 Duke Zhuang Year 15 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:93).
56. He Pingli, “Luelun Chunqiu Shiqi Huimeng, Zhengba Zhanzheng yu Zhanzhengguan,” 109.
57. Note on Zuo’s Commentary 5 Duke Xi Year 29. [Translator’s note: Jiantu was part of Zheng, now in Henan Province; Zhequan may be the city of Luoyang, also in Henan Province.]
58. Records of the Historian 31 Lords of Wu.
59. From the conclusion by Sima Qian in Records of the Historian 41 King Goujian of Yue.
60. Records of the Historian 5 Qin.
61. Note on Zuo’s Commentary 7 Duke Xuan Year 16.
62. Li Ruilan, Chunqiu Zhanguo Shidai de Lishi Bianqian [Historical changes in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods] (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji Press, 1994), 36.
63. Zhang Erguo, “Xian Qin Shiqi de Huimeng Wenti” [The issue of alliance meetings in the pre-Qin era], Shixue Jikan [Journal of Historical Studies], no. 1 (1995): 18.
64. Stratagems 12 (Qi 5) 1.
65. Zuo’s Commentary 10 Duke Zhao Year 23 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:698).
66. Zuo’s Commentary 9 Duke Xiang Year 9 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:441).
67. Zuo’s Commentary 10 Duke Zhao Year 1 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:577).
68. Zuo’s Commentary 10 Duke Zhao Year 13 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:653).
69. Chen Zhiyong, “Shixi Chunqiu Mengshi Dui Chunqiu Shiren de Yingxiang Ji Shiren Dui Mengshi yu Mengzhu de Pingjia” [The influence of oaths on people in the Spring and Autumn Period and contemporary criticism of oaths and lords of alliances], Zhongguo Lishi Bowuguan Guankan [Journal of the Museum of Chinese History], no. 2 (2000): 23.
CHAPTER 7
1. Ni Shixiong et al., Dangdai Xifang Guoji Guanxi Lilun [Contemporary Western theories of international relations] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 487.
2. Guo Shuyong, ed., Guoji Guanxi: Huhuan Zhongguo Lilun [International relations: A call for a Chinese theory] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 2005), 1.
3. Qiu Yuanping, “Guanyu Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu de Ruogan Kanfa” [A view of Chinese international strategy], in Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Pinglun [An assessment of China’s international strategy] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 2009), 5.
4. Yan Xuetong, “Guoji Guanxi Lilun Shi Pushi de” [International relations theories are universal], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 2 (2006): 1; Yan Xuetong, “Why Is There No Chinese School of International Relations Theory?” in Wangba Tianxia Sixiang Ji Qidi [Ruling over all under heaven: Theory and lessons], ed. Yan Xuetong, Xu Jin, et al. (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 2009), 294–301.
5. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 4.
6. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, Classic Readings of International Relations (Boston: Wadsworth, 1998), 225. The quotation from Thucydides comes from The Peloponnesian War, book 5, chapter 17 (Melian Dialogues) (New York: Modern Library, 1951), 331.
7. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
9. Xunzi 10 Enriching the State.
10. Ibid.
11. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
12. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 60–78.
13. Xunzi 9 Humane Governance.
14. Xunzi 23 Human Nature Is Evil.
15. Mencius 2 Gongsun Chou A3 (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics [London and Oxford: Frowde and Oxford University Press, 1895], 2:196–197).
16. Zuo Zhuan 5 Duke Xi Year 30 [Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:217].
17. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam, 1977), 531; cf. Ian Clark, “Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 2 (June 2009).
18. See Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), chapter 2.
19. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 81–82, 93, 97.
20. Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 21 July 2009, 1.
21. “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi de Guoji Huanjing yu Guoji Zhanlue” [The international environment and international strategy for the peaceful rise of China], Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu [Education and Research], no. 4 (2004): 5–20.
22. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
23. Mr. Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals 7.2 The Origin of Weapons.
24. Odes II Minor Odes 6.1 North Mountain (cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 4:360).
25. Xunzi 11 Humane Authority and Hegemony.
26. Hu Jintao, “Gaoju Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Weida Qizhi Wei Duoqu Quanmian Jianshe Xiaokang Xin Shengli Er Fendou” [Holding the great banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and struggling to achieve the new victory of the construction of a prosperous society], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 25 October 2007, 4.
APPENDIX 2
1. This translation is based on the original interview, which was shortened when it was published. It was published under the title “Yan Xuetong: Zhizhuo yu Kexue Yuce de Xianshi Zhuyizhe” [Yan Xuetong: A realist scholar clinging to scientific prediction], Shijie Jingji yu Zhenzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 7 (2005): 57–62.
APPENDIX 3
1. Ni Shixiong et al., Dangdai Xifang Guoji Guanxi Lilun [Contemporary Western theories of international relations] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 487.
2. Shi Bin, “Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu ‘Zhongguohua’ de Zhenlun” [Debate about the “localization” of international studies in China], in Zhongguo Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu (1995–2005) [IR studies in China (1995–2005)], ed. Wan Yizhou (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), 521–527.
3. Barry Buzan, “Yingguo Xuepai Jiqi Dangxia Fazhan” [The English school and its development], Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly] 2 (2007): 101.
4. Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 90.
5. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
6. Terence Ball, “From Paradigms to Research Programs: Toward a Post-Kuhnian Political Science,” American Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1 (1976): 151–177.
7. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 91–196.
8. Colin Elman and Miriam Elman, Progress in International Relations Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
9. Stephen Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 931–935.
10. Larry Laudan, “From Theories to Research Traditions,” in Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, ed. Larry Laudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 70–120.