1215
n
Liaisons and intrigues
be tempted to tone down our failures (and play up our achieve-
ments a bit) in such public statements, to not feel embarrassed
and make ourselves look more successful. But there are things
that can be done, in terms of corporate governance, to stem their
and our natural inclination to obscure the truth.
That brings me to nding number two: Eric and Choelsoon
showed that having outside directors on the board made rms lie
less. The more outside directors rms had, the more forthcoming
they were with their bad news. Similarly, having large institutional
investors prompted rms to be more open about their failures in
these letters to shareholders. Large institutional investors tended
to monitor the rms they invest in quite closely, which apparently
gave them less opportunity to conceal the negative stuff.
But then came nding number three: If we gave our outside
directors shares in the company, the results ipped! Firms that
had outside directors who also were major shareholders were less
forthcoming in disclosing their bad news. It seems that having
an ownership stake in the company created a conict of interest
for these people which induced them to stimulate their rm to
hide its dirty laundry rather than disclose it.
Moreover, having lots of small institutional investors – who
don’t scrutinize companies as strictly – also made the results ip:
rms with lots of small institutional investors hid their bad news
more often, probably because they were afraid these investors
would run at the slightest hint of bad news (which they are
indeed known to do), which could snowball and send the rm’s
share price plummeting. To conclude, having outside directors
may be a good thing, but only if they don’t have a lot of shares.
Institutional investors may be a good thing too, but only if they
do have a big stake.
By the way, interestingly, Eric and Choelsoon also found that
those companies that did not disclose their bad news were
exactly the companies whose top managers would quickly sell
a whole bunch of their privately held shares shortly after the
release of the (over-optimistic) letter to shareholders. I guess
corporate crooks don’t only lie: they also steal.