CHAPTER 9
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Responding to Human-made and Natural Disasters

We’re in uncharted territory.

New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik at the World Trade Center site, September 11, 2001

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The goal of incident and emergency management is never again to hear the words uttered by Mayor Giuliani when he arrived at Ground Zero. This chapter outlines the system developed since that fateful day, including modifications instituted in the wake of disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Gulf oil spill. Roles and responsibilities of federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies are discussed. The chapter addresses the all-hazards approach for planning and executing responses to all kinds of disasters, including terrorism. In particular, it outlines guidance provided in the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS), seminal frameworks for all involved in homeland security.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Understand key concepts in the National Response Framework.

2. Define what is meant by an all-hazards approach.

3. Describe the National Incident Management System.

4. Outline principles and components of emergency management.

5. Understand future requirements for improving the national response system.

THINKING … AND EXPERIENCING THE UNTHINKABLE

On the crisp, blue morning of September 11, 2001, New York City was the most prepared city in the nation. City leaders had spent four years rewriting plans and revamping emergency response procedures. A swath of local, state, and federal representatives had attended coordination meetings. The city’s emergency planning office held drills and training exercises with high-ranking officials, including the mayor.¹ But it was not enough. On the day of the incident, a lack of communications and coordination made it impossible to establish unified command at the scene. The city’s Office of Emergency Management headquarters on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center had to be evacuated. After the collapse of the South Tower, officials ordered responders to abandon the North Tower. Not everyone got the word. At least one city police officer, five Port Authority police officers, and 121 fire fighters died when the second tower collapsed. Other shortcomings were observed across the country during the disaster response to 9/11.

If human tragedies themselves are insufficient impetus, research demonstrates that developed nation slike the United States should continue investing in disaster response management because of its financial pay-off, which can be great. High-income nations have superior capacity to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disaster. And such preparation works. As one 2010 study notes, well-off countries already respond better to significant disasters than low- or middle-income countries. In particular, affluent countries incur far less damage to infrastructure (even though theirs is much more valuable) and better mitigate the threat of loss of life than middle-income countries (unprepared poor countries may experience less material damage because they have far fewer assets to protect). Wealthy countries also recover more quickly.² Indeed, while Hurricane Katrina is most remembered for short falls in the response, oft forgotten are the remarkable achievements made in responding to a massive disaster affecting over 90,000 square miles. For example, tens of thousands of residents were evacuated or rescued during and after the storm (including over 33,000 by the U.S. Coast Guard) and many others received valuable aid, preventing large numbers of people from succumbing to dehydration, hunger, exposure, or disease.

For developed societies, investments in preparedness and response leverage the advantages of societal wealth. This can make developed nations more resilient even though they may be more dependent on infrastructure at risk from major disasters.

THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CHALLENGE

The heroic but flawed response to 9/11, efforts in the wake of natural disasters, and recent major training exercises suggest the national response system in place before 9/11 was simply inadequate for large-scale terrorist threats. In each case there emerged three consistent and significant shortfalls in preventing, protecting against, and responding to large-scale disasters—specific shortfalls addressable through improved planning and management.³

Interagency Coordination

Emergency operations are frequently plagued by lack of information sharing and confusion over responsibilities among policy makers, law enforcement, emergency managers, first responders, public health workers, physicians, nonprofit organizations, and federal agencies. The need for speedy action can exacerbate this challenge. Effectively eliminating threats often requires rapid response, and operating on compressed time lines leaves little room for miscues in coordination.⁴ One significant requirement for responders, for example, is quickly establishing an incident response structure to detect and assess threats and mobilize appropriate resources. In particular for a chemical or biological attack, actions taken in the first hours to identify, contain, and treat victims may significantly reduce casualties. Major exercises, however, frequently reveal potentially crippling flaws in this area. For example, during TOPOFF I (which stands for top officials), the first congressionally mandated “no-notice” exercise to evaluate federal response to major terrorist strikes, the Coast Guard asked for assistance from the U.S. Marine Chemical and Biological Incident Response Forces (CBIRF). But the Defense Department rejected the request, arguing the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as lead response agency, was the only one authorized to request such resources. This dispute delayed CBIRF’s deployment by almost 24 hours.⁵ Even determining which agency is in charge can be a major problem. A National Capital Region exercise, conducted in Washington, DC in conjunction with TOPOFF, simulated the explosion of a radiological dispersion device. Initially, hours were lost in confusion over whether the Energy Department or the Environmental Protection Agency should take the lead.⁶

Organization and Communication

Virtually every large-scale exercise or response exhibits problems in agency notification, mobilization, information management, communications systems, and administrative and logistical support. Organizations have particular difficulty demonstrating flexible, decentralized operations and rapid problem solving, key requirements for effective response.⁷ Significant organizational deficiencies, such as the inability to muster redundant capabilities or alternative response means, are frequently hidden until the onset of a major operation. For example, when the New York City Emergency Operations Center was destroyed, the city had no adequate backup command and control capability. It took three days to reconstitute the functions and capabilities lost by the destruction of the emergency operations center.⁸

Convergence

Convergence occurs when people, goods, and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent into a disaster-stricken area.⁹ Although convergence may have beneficial effects, like rushing resources to the scene of a crisis, it can also lead to congestion, put additional people at risk, create confusion, hinder the delivery of aid, compromise security, and waste scarce resources. This proved a major concern during the response to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. When the first tower was struck, firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical technicians across the metropolitan area streamed to the site, leaving other parts of the city vulnerable and, after the towers collapsed, creating tremendous problems in accounting for emergency personnel.

Such problems would be greatly magnified by the scale of a catastrophic attack requiring mobilization of resources across the United States. Advanced planning, more funding, improved training, better communications systems, and greater operational experience are necessary but insufficient responses to some of these challenges. Welding resources and capabilities together requires an overall emergency management system.

MANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC INCIDENTS

The U.S. system dealing with the threat and aftermath of catastrophic disasters continues to evolve in the wake of 9/11, but basic jurisdictional responsibilities remain constant. Consistent with dictates of federalism and authorities in the U.S. Constitution, the primary response for managing emergencies, including responding to terrorism, falls to local and state governments. Federal authorities provide assistance at the direction of the president when dangers exceed the capacity of local officials and they request federal assistance. Only in extreme cases of national emergency, such as insurrection, loss of continuity of government, or to enforce federal laws, does the president have authority to assume command.

Along with traditional jurisdictional roles, modifications to the national management of terrorist incidents and other disasters have been built on long-standing approaches and principles. A notable example of evolving focus is the current emphasis on a single system of standardized elements for dealing with all forms of hazards.

THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH

The term all hazards covers both natural disasters and technological or human-made incidents. Natural disasters include floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, while human-made incidents include inadvertent accidents, such as chemical spills, that cause emergencies, as well as deliberate acts, including terrorism.

Debate continues among emergency response experts over the best means for responding to the breadth of emergencies that threaten the lives and property of Americans. All experts argue for some combination of general and specific preparation for disasters, but the emphasis varies. Some argue for a “specific hazards approach,” focused on developing unique plans, training, and equipment for different kinds of disasters. These experts contend that a one-size-fits-all method underplays the importance of differences between even similar threats. For example, an earthquake and a nuclear bomb may both topple buildings and put streets to flame, but an earthquake will not present radiological hazards (unless a reactor is impacted). Likewise, infectious disease and biological threats that are not contagious may require different responses, since the former spreads beyond the initial victims.

An all-hazards approach may actually encourage the diversion of excessive resources to a single kind of threat, critics assert, for example serving as an excuse for local governments to beef up public safety resources with federal anti-terrorism grants. Focus on terrorist threats, due to the availability of funding or simply because the issue is “sexy” or newsworthy, could lead officials to neglect preparations for more mundane dangers such as fires and floods.

In contrast, advocates of an all-hazards approach argue the initial responses to all threats should be based on a common framework since many events create similar dangers and require identical tactics, even if their causes vary. Responses that are especially common and important warrant greater focus and preparation than more complex and less likely scenarios. For example, regardless of incident, officials must determine how to secure the area, actions as important to protecting a potential crime scene (in the case of a terrorist attack) as they are to ensuring the safety of victims, responders, and by–standers in accidents. Importantly, advocates of an all-hazards approach point to its value in a homeland-security environment of almost unlimited threats but increasingly scarce resources. They contend it is the most efficient means to prepare for multiple dangers and simplifies the fundamental challenge of coordinating integrated response among multiple agencies.

FEMA has long supported an all-hazards approach to disaster management. After the Department of Homeland Security integrated FEMA, the department adopted its approach as a guide to structuring national response efforts. In the wake of the September 11 disasters, however, there was wide recognition that after initial response, a capability was required to adjust response and resources to the specific needs of each disaster. Thus, national planning now emphasizes an all-hazards approach but continues to develop supporting plans and capabilities for unique threats, particularly those that might result from terrorism.

PRINCIPLES AND COMPONENTS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

There are four components to all-hazards disaster management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

Mitigation

Mitigation involves measures, often long-term, to reduce exposure and potential loss from hazardous events. Construction guidelines and restrictions, such as zoning and building codes, are frequently used as mitigation techniques. They may mandate the ability of homes to withstand hurricanes, or require blast-resistant windows in buildings at risk of terrorist attack. Mitigation for potential terrorist attacks may also include installing security systems or barriers to prevent car bombs. Even the installation of home smoke alarms is a form of mitigation.

Preparedness

Preparedness includes activities undertaken before an event to ensure an effective response. These may involve hiring staff; conducting training, tests, and drills; stockpiling equipment; and establishing facilities, such as emergency operations centers. A key element of preparedness is the development of plans that link resources committed to emergency management.

Response

Response measures are time-sensitive actions to save lives and property at the onset of an incident. They include issuing warnings, notifying emergency management personnel, aiding victims, providing security and traffic control, assessing the extent of damage and estimating support needs, evacuating and sheltering affected populations, keeping people informed, and requesting help from outside the jurisdiction.

Recovery

Recovery is the effort to restore infrastructure and the social and economic life of a community. In the short term, it could be establishing essential critical infrastructures such as power, communications, water and sewage, and public transportation. It may also include humanitarian assistance such as food and clothing. Long-term recovery involves restoring economic activity and rebuilding community facilities and family housing. Economic aid, consulting services, business loans, environmental monitoring, and mental health services such as treatment and counseling are part of this tool kit.

AUTHORITIES GOVERNING RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

The post-9/11 goal of creating a single, simplified and uniform national emergency management structure has proven illusive. Factors such as the nature and location of the incident still significantly affect response.

Principal Emergency Authorities

Disaster response authorities were consolidated under DHS by the 2002 law that created the department. The role of FEMA, however, was revised in the wake of Hurricane Katrina by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. Specifically, while the department serves as lead federal agency for many federal disaster response efforts, the FEMA administrator is tasked with certain specific functions as a component of the department. These include maintaining the National Response Framework (formerly called the National Response Plan) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS)and administering, coordinating, and ensuring the readiness of emergency support functions.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act lays out how the federal government provides assistance for a declared major disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act does not govern assistance for foreign disasters. Additionally, not all federal responses are directed under disaster declarations in accordance with the Stafford Act. Public health emergencies and significant hazardous materials spills, for example, are governed under other authorities.

In addition to the Stafford Act, a collection of other legislative authorities could influence general national response or affect how the government responds to specific disasters. The Economy Act specifies how federal agencies are reimbursed for disaster support (unless more specific statutory guidelines apply). The National Emergencies Act establishes procedures for declaring and terminating presidential declarations of national emergencies. The Communications Act of 1934 gives the federal government special powers to operate public communications for emergencies or natural disasters. The Small Business Act provides government with authorities to aid small businesses.

Other authorities address specific kinds of disasters. For example, the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act governs emergency responses to floods, hurricanes, and similar natural disasters. It shapes activities such as the temporary restoration of essential public facilities and services and provision of emergency supplies of water. The Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act provides for federal aid in combating forest fires. The Animal Health Protection Act establishes a framework for dealing with certain emergencies such as those requiring animal quarantine. The Federal Power Act authorizes the secretary of energy to ensure the generation and delivery of electric power in an emergency.

Finally, other laws address the actions or functions of specific federal agencies. For the Department of Defense, the Restoration and Posse Comitatus acts were discussed in Chapter 8. There are, however, additional laws that affect this department and others. The Defense Production Act of 1950 covers the timely availability of resources for national defense and civil emergency preparedness and response. The Public Health Service Act authorizes the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to declare a public health emergency, impose quarantine and isolation, deploy the National Disaster Medical System and the Medical Reserve Corps, and operate the Strategic National Stockpile.

The list of authorities presented here is far from comprehensive. Federal laws and executive orders affect every aspect of disaster response from the use of volunteers to managing public waterways.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

In most cases, these cretary of homeland security is the principal federal officer (PFO) for domestic incident management and coordination of federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. A PFO may also be designated for specific contingencies or actual disasters.

National Response Framework

For many years before 9/11, the United States had a federal plan to coordinate the role of agencies assisting local and state governments during disasters or terrorist attacks. After DHS was established, the department was charged with developing a new plan, the National Response Plan (NRP). In 2008 that plan was replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF), which outlines the national-level policy of incident response The evolution of these plans illustrates the often complex and bureaucratic nature of emergency response.

From Federal to National

Before the NRP came the Federal Response Plan, an agreement first developed in 1992 and signed by 27 federal departments and agencies for delivering assistance to state and local governments over-whelmed by disasters and terrorist attacks. The FRP eventually established two categories of emergency management: crisis management and consequence management. Crisis management included measures to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. It was considered predominantly a federal law enforcement responsibility, with state and local law enforcement playing supporting roles. The FBI was assigned primary responsibility for crisis management. Consequence management included measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief for the consequences of terrorist acts. States had primary responsibility for consequence management, with the federal government providing assistance as directed by FEMA.

The FRP was the subject of some controversy. It was not clear when federal responsibility for managing responses to terrorist incidents would shift from the FBI to FEMA. Another concern was whether the plan accounted for all emergency response functions (ERFs, later renamed emergency support functions) required in support of a national emergency. Also unclear was the relationship between the Federal Response Plan, and other national plans for dealing with emergencies such as the release of radiological material or hazardous material spills.

Replacing the FRP engendered more disputes before it was completed in 2004. For example, the initial draft of its replacement, the National Response Plan, was considered by many too cumbersome and complex. A second draft proved overly simplistic. DHS then settled on a basic plan with supporting annexes, in effect making the NRP an umbrella for a family of plans covering natural disasters, technological emergencies, and terrorist attacks, including the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the Mass Migration Response Plan, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.

The NRP continued to evolve until early 2008, when DHS introduced the National Response Framework.

From Plan to Framework

The National Response Framework differs from the predecessor NRP in several significant respects. While the secretary of homeland security remains responsible for overall response in federal crisis management, the framework reestablishes the principal role of FEMA as the coordinator of all federal operations (consistent with changes contained in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2007).

In addition, the NRF deleted the requirement that the homeland security secretary designate an emergency an “incident of national significance” before a federal response could be undertaken. This, in effect, means that the NRF and NIMS are always active and do not have to be “turned on” to respond to an emergency.

The NRF provides more detail on the responsibilities of government agencies and nongovernmental partners. It also attempts to be more proactive in meeting potential state and local needs by establishing “prescripted mission assignments,” or agency assignments that might be required for certain disasters, and “prepositioned resources,” or maintaining assets in areas where they might be needed.

Another major revision replaces the role of the Homeland Security Operations Center, establishing the National Operations Center as the hub of federal activities. This designation includes FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center and the National Infrastructure Coordination Center.

Emergency Support Functions

Emergency support functions (ESFs), which replaced emergency response functions, designate what kinds of support the federal government may provide and establish a lead federal agency to coordinate each category of support. These functions are described in the NRF. In 2011 there were 15 ESF categories, as listed here (the lead agency of each is given in parentheses).

ESF 1: Transportation (Department of Transportation)

ESF 2: Communications (DHS)

ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering (Department of Defense)

ESF 4: Firefighting (Department of Agriculture)

ESF 5: Emergency Management (DHS)

ESF 6: Massive Casualty Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services (DHS)

ESF 7: Logistics, Management, and Resource Support (General Services Administration and the DHS)

ESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services (Department of Health and Human Services)

ESF 9: Search and Rescue (DHS)

ESF 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials (Environmental Protection Agency)

ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources (Department of Agriculture)

ESF 12: Energy (Department of Energy)

ESF 13: Public Safety and Security (Department of Justice)

ESF 14: Long-term Community Recovery (DHS)

ESF 15: External Affairs (DHS)

Incident Response Annexes

The NRF includes annexes on responses for different types of incidents. The Catastrophic Incident Annex, for example, describes “pushing” response assets to state and local governments when officials are overwhelmed.

National Incident Management System

A major post-9/11 innovation was the development of the NIMS, a practical set of response procedures. In effect, it is the approved template for incidents at all levels of government (in contrast with the NRF, which is specific to the national response). Approved by the secretary of homeland security in March 2004, the NIMS attempts to ensure interoperability among federal, state, and local assets. It establishes procedures for managing operations; conducting training; and setting requirements standard terminology, and common procedures. State and local governments must adopt the NIMS to receive federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, and other funding.

The NIMS has six components: command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management and maintenance.

Command and Management

The NIMS standardizes incident management for all hazards and across all levels of government. It provides detailed instructions on organization, responsibilities and procedures for incident command systems (ICSs), multiagency coordination systems, and public information systems.

First developed by U.S. fire departments, the ICS has become the principal means, or standard “playbook,” used by responders across the country to direct field operations. ICS is a standardized on-scene emergency management concept that enables multiple agencies, including responders from different jurisdictions, to operate under an integrated command structure. Once established, the ICS organization has five functions: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. If required, an information and intelligence section may also be established.

When the response to an incident involves support from different governmental and geographic jurisdictions with varying functional and legal responsibilities, a unified command structure is established. Supporting agencies integrate their efforts through a collaborative process, usually at an incident command post located at or near the scene of the disaster.

The purpose of multiagency coordination systems is to support field operations directed by the incident commander. Primary activities include providing logistical support, tracking resources, directing incident-related information, and coordinating interagency and intergovernmental issues. These activities are usually managed at an emergency operations center (EOC).

Public information systems include means for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during periods of crisis. This may call for the establishment of a joint information center, a location where public affairs professionals representing various agencies can coordinate activities and share information.

Preparedness

The NIMS establishes specific measures and capabilities that jurisdictions and agencies should develop to enhance preparedness for all hazards. This includes programs for planning, training, exercises, personnel and equipment qualifications and certification, publications management, and mutual aid. The last provides means for jurisdictions to share resources, facilities, services, and other required support during an incident.

Resource Management

The NIMS establishes requirements to classify, inventory, track, and dispatch resources before, during, and after an incident. It establishes how operations are funded and reimbursed. While NIMS provides overall guidance, resource management activities are generally documented in appropriate emergency operations plans.

Communications and Information Management

The NIMS communications and information systems enable essential functions to provide a common operating picture and interoperability for incident management. Responsibilities include disseminating indicators and early warnings, communicating operational decisions, and developing and maintaining overall awareness of response activities.

Supporting Technologies

In addition to providing a process for preparing and responding to domestic incidents, the NIMS encourages use of new technologies to support implementation of the national response system. It provides an architecture for how DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate will help develop needed capabilities.

Ongoing Management and Maintenance

As part of the NIMS, DHS established a multijurisdictional, multi-disciplinary NIMS Integration Center. This center provides oversight of the NIMS. All users and stakeholders, including various levels of government and the private sector, are asked to participate in NIMS Integration Center activities.

STATE, TERRITORIAL, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL RESPONSE

While federal agencies work with officials at other levels of government to establish unity of effort, these agencies have their own laws, policies, and directives that may or may not be fully compliant with the NRF and NIMS. Even if state, territorial, local, and tribal officials are fully compliant with the NRF and NIMS, their capacities and methods of implementing NRF and NIMS can vary significantly. The greatest challenge associated with the NIMS is lack of uniformity in how it’s implemented by local governments. The Texas Department of Emergency Management, for example, conducts robust planning at the state level. The state also has an aggressive training and exercise system, as well as a well-developed network for command and control and liaison to major metropolitan areas and rural communities. This is not true for some other jurisdictions.

DOMESTIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

In the normal course of events, state, territorial, local, or tribal officials declare the need for an emergency response and initiate action. This includes both establishing an incident commander at the scene under the ICS and activating emergency operations centers to support him or her. As needs are assessed and forwarded to the emergency operations center, it’s determined if they can be met using available resources or through a sharing, or mutual aid, agreement with another jurisdiction. Requests that cannot be met at the level managing the incident are forwarded to state and federal officials.

As the scale of the incident grows, a FEMA regional headquarters may establish a JFO to coordinate federal support. This office serves under a FEMA federal coordinating official (FCO). Present at the JFO are representatives of all relevant federal activities, such as the Defense Department’s Defense Coordinating Element. The FCO adjudicates and allocates assistance requests in accordance with the ESFs.

The Stafford Act and implementing federal regulations establish how governors or territorial officials request a presidential declaration. The event must be beyond combined response capabilities of state and local governments and damages must meet certain levels, validated by a joint federal-state-local preliminary damage assessment (conducted under FEMA’s auspices). If the situation is fast moving or the destruction is clearly devastating, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the assessment can be deferred.

The president has authority to direct emergency assistance without a request from a governor or territorial official if an incident involves an area exclusively or preeminently the responsibility of the federal government, such as a domestic military installation. For large-scale incidents, the president may also designate a PFO.

ISSUES IN DISASTER RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

While establishment of the NRF and the NIMS provides the framework for establishing an integrated national system for responding to terrorist attacks and other national disasters, many issues involving their implementation have yet to be resolved. Changes and modifications will be a hallmark of national response for years to come, probably including issues discussed below.

Establishing the Incident Command System

A case in point is the implementation of the ICS concept. State and local governments have considerable flexibility in how to implement the system. In most incidents either the local police or fire service representative is in charge. For some emergencies, such as a fire or hostage taking, there would be little dispute over which agency should take the lead. But for others, for example a combined crime and fire scene, establishing the lead responsibility would be more difficult. In some cases, different command traditions, local political disputes, or disagreements between agencies or leaders might complicate the process.

The Role of the Principal Federal Official

Another issue to be resolved in the NIMS is the role of the PFO, who is supposed to take charge of national assets at the scene. There are, for example, questions about the extent of the PFO’s authority, particularly in relation to the role of the FEMA regional director, who has traditionally served as the senior federal official at the scene of a major disaster.

Developing Supporting Technologies

The state of supporting technologies is also a major concern. Lack of interoperable communications between emergency responders and across different government jurisdictions remains a cause of consternation.¹⁰ While NIMS requires interoperable communications standards, neither supporting equipment nor specific standards are provided. DHS established the SAFECOM program to coordinate development of an interoperable wireless communications network, but even many years after 9/11, communications problems persist across the nation.

Complicating emergency response are limitations of first responders to address terrorist attacks with the assets and equipment providedfor normal duty. Police officers, for example, don’t have room for significant emergency response equipment in the trunk of their patrol cars. Officers on foot, bicycle, or equine patrol have even less capacity. Undercover agents and antiterrorism squads attempting to blend into their surroundings have problems carrying additional equipment as well.¹¹

Even when equipment is available, it can limit first responders. For example, clothing, gloves, and masks that protect against chemical threats are heavy, hot, and physically demanding. Most protective gear is too uncomfortable for extended wear. Routine activities such as communicating, pushing buttons, and observing surroundings cannot be easily accomplished.¹² This assumes the officer has been trained adequately in the first place to use the equipment. As with other elements of homeland security, the pressure of daily requirements may limit preparation, in training and/or procurement, for events that, while devastating, may never actually occur in a responder’s career.

Finally, it is often difficult to extend critical situational awareness to frontline responders. For example, fire personnel need to know hydrant and stand pipe locations, as well as utility and building designs and hazardous material inventories. Often, critical information is stored in locations or formats (for example, paper records or security video streams) not easily accessed. They must also track responders and others in the danger zone.

These challenges present enormous obstacles to responders who may face multiple catastrophic attacks requiring integration of multiple assets across multiple regions and layers of government. To address such threats, the United States requires better technology.

Despite increasing federal guidance and involvement, state and local jurisdictions face many challenges in adopting common command and control standards, ensuring equipment interoperability, and implementing mutual aid agreements. In many cases, emergency plans also must be revised to address continuity of operations and services, part of ensuring governmental capabilities and authority are not disrupted by a terrorist attack or other major disaster.¹³

Many state and local jurisdictions had emergency operations plans in place before the September 11 attacks, but these plans required updating for NIMS and mutual aid agreements, the threat of terrorist acts, and the potential for catastrophic threats, including weapons of mass destruction.

Critical Infrastructure

State and local governments often give significant consideration to the identification and protection of critical infrastructures. Local officials are primarily responsible for ensuring critical services in disasters. Aside from economic and quality-of-life implications, protecting critical infrastructures is also essential for enabling rescue operations and ensuring continuity of government. For example, the destruction of power lines by a flood could impede rescue and communication efforts. Emergency operations plans must inventory and assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and develop suitable mitigation and preparedness measures.

Interstate and Intrastate Mutual Aid Agreements

In the wake of September 11, many state and local governments added new capabilities or sought to expand their capacity through cooperative agreements. This is often accomplished through intrastate (communities within a state) and interstate (among two or more states) mutual aid pacts, such as emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs).

Establishing and updating mutual aid agreements are a priority for revising emergency plans. An effective mutual aid agreement addresses liability and reimbursement, as well rapid identification of the availability and location of needed resources and means for tracking them. Emergency operations plans also account for the reception and employment of national resources, such as the Strategic National Stockpile, National Medical Disaster System, and urban search and rescue task forces. Employing each of these assets introduces challenges of their own.

Strategic National Stockpile

The Strategic National Stockpile is a supply of medications and medical/surgical equipment maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services to supplement and resupply state and local public health agencies in the event of a national emergency. The stockpile includes “push packages” located around the country that can be deployed to a designated place within 12 hours. Follow-on supplies can be delivered within 24 to 36 hours. Currently, many state and local governments lack robust plans or capabilities to distribute supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile. Coordinating the deployment of these resources at the state and local level remains a concern.

Continuity of Government and Operations

Emergency operations plans must account for continued performance of state and local government and essential services during a crisis. According to FEMA, planning goals should include the ability of support resources to operate within 12 hours of activation, as well as sustain operations for up to 30 days. A viable emergency capability includes a line of succession for leaders, delegation of authorities, establishment of alternate facilities, safeguarding of vital records, providing for communications, and ensuring adequate logistical support for essential activities.

International Assistance

Offers for international assistance to aid the United States are coordinated through the Department of State and governed by a plethora of laws and regulations, from “Buy America” provisions to food and agricultural inspections. The United States is known around the world for sending help, from in-person medical assistance to financial donations, when disasters strike in other countries. When disasters have recently struck the United States—9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the Gulf oil spill—other countries have been eager to reciprocate. Yet, as astute as the United States is when it comes to delivering aid, the opposite is the case when it comes to responding to foreign offers of aid.

Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Gulf oil spill disasters produced an outpouring of support and offers of aid—including proposed donations of supplies, expertise, and funds—from countries around the world. After both disasters, however, U.S. officials declined the majority of the assistance offered and were slow to accept the small amount they did. This hurt American response and recovery. An unresponsive policy toward foreign offers of aid can also have negative diplomatic consequences, potentially alienating important allies whose assistance the United States needs on other issues.¹⁴

Catastrophic Disaster Planning

Since 1993, FEMA has been federalizing “routine” natural disasters, such as floods, fires, and storms, historically dealt with entirely by state and local governments. This “federalization” of routine disasters, say some experts, created two major consequences.¹⁵ First, many state and local governments cut funding for their own emergency management, thereby rendering themselves less prepared. Many states have little capacity to plan adequately for large-scale disasters. Second, FEMA spends too much time responding to routine natural disasters and not enough preparing for catastrophic natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions, which could have a national impact. This increases the chance that the response to the next catastrophic event will be insufficient.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The concept of national response management has evolved significantly since the 9/11 attacks. Governments at all levels have responsibility for responding to terrorist attacks. The national response is guided by the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System. The principle of all-hazards response, including an on-scene incident commander for each event, guides the U.S. approach to emergency response.

Though significant progress has been made since 9/11 in building a more structured national emergency response system, much work remains. Technical, organizational, and doctrinal issues must be resolved at all levels of government.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. What is an all-hazards approach?

2. What are the principles of emergency response? Why are they important?

3. What are the most significant challenges in emergency response?

4. Who will be in charge at the scene of a terrorist attack?

5. Why was the National Response Plan changed to the National Response Framework?

NOTES

1. Testimony of Jerome M. Hauer before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (May 19, 2004), 1, www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/hauer_statement.pdf.

2. “The United Nations and the World,” in Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2010).

3. See, for example, FEMA, Responding to Incidents of National Consequence (2004), http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa–282.pdf.

4. For example, an analysis that modeled the economic consequences of a biological attack found speed of the response was the single most important variable in reducing casualties. Arnold F. Kaufmann et al., “The Economic Impact of Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?” Emerging Infectious Diseases (April–June 1997), www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no2/kaufman.htm.

5. Environmental Protection Agency, Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital Region (NCR) After-Action Report, National Response Team Final Report (Washington, DC: August 2000), 10. For other shortfalls, see Thomas V. Inglesby, “The Lessons from TOPOFF,” Comments at the Second National Symposium on Medical and Public Health Response to Terrorism (Washington, DC, November 28–29, 2000); Thomas V. Inglesby et al., “A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF,” Clinical Infectious Diseases (February 2001): 436–45; Richard E. Hoffman and Jane E. Norton, “Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise,” Emerging Infectious Diseases (November/December 2000), www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/hoffman.htm.

6. Environmental Protection Agency, Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital Region (NCR) After-Action Report, 17.

7. For a discussion on the importance of decentralized execution and flexibility, see Kathleen J. Tierney, “Disaster Preparedness and Response: Research Findings and Guidance from the Social Science Literature,” Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 1993 13–14, www.udel.edu/DRC.

8. James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Elements of Resilience in the World Trade Center Attack,” Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2002, 6–9, www.udel.edu/DRC.

9. For a discussion of convergence, see Julie L. Demuth, Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), 7.

10. National Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk: Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to Save Lives, A Guide to Public Officials” (February 2003), www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_guide.pdf.

11. Tom LaTourrette et al., Protecting Emergency Responders, Vol. 2: Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 53.

12. Brian A. Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks (Arlington, VA: RAND Science and Technology Institute, nd), Proceedings of a conference held on December 9–11, 2001, xii, 8.

13. FEMA, Introduction to State and Local EOP Planning Guidance (August 2002), www.fema.gov/preparedness/introstate.shtm.

14. This section was adapted from Jena Baker McNeill, James Carafano, Matt Mayer, and Richard Weitz, “Accepting Disaster Relief from Other Nations: Lessons from Katrina and the Gulf Oil Spill,” Heritage Backgrounder No. 2519 (February 17, 2011), www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/accepting-disaster-relief-from-other-nations-lessons-from-katrina-and-the-gulf-oil-spill.

15. This section was adapted from Matt Mayer and Mark DeBosier, “Federalizing Disasters Weakens FEMA—and Hurts Americans Hit by Catastrophes,” Heritage Backgrounder #2398 (April 13, 2010), www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/federalizing-disasters-weakens-FEMA-and-hurts-Americans-hit-by-catastrophes.