Key accountization at Bosch Automotive Aftermarket Italy: managing and implementing a strategic change

by Paolo Guenzi

Abstract

This paper explores the implementation of a key account management programme at Bosch automotive aftermarket (BAA) Italy. Recognizing that the key accountization of a firm demands considerable organizational change, the Mc­Kinsey 7S framework was applied. It served both as a roadmap for the key account programme manager, to guide the actions he took in addressing the issues raised by a radical change in strategic direction, and as an analytical tool by the presenter of the case.

Introduction

In 1886, Robert Bosch founded the ‘Workshop for Precision Mechanics and Electrical Engineering’ in Stuttgart. Today, the Bosch Group is a leading global supplier of technology and services. The Bosch Group comprises Robert Bosch GmbH and its more than 300 subsidiaries and regional companies in over 60 countries. If its sales and service partners are included, then Bosch is represented in roughly 150 countries. Each year, Bosch spends more than €3.5 billion (8% of its sales revenue) for research and development and applies for over 3,000 patents worldwide. In the areas of automotive and industrial technology, consumer goods and building technology, some 280,000 associates generated sales of €45.1 billion in 2008.

Robert Bosch's market position

The automotive market is Robert Bosch's core business and consists of three interrelated markets. The first is original equipment, where Bosch is a worldwide leader in gasoline systems, diesel fuel injection systems, chassis systems brakes and chassis systems control, energy and body systems, radio navigation systems and car radios, and automotive electronics. The second is the spare parts market provided to car manufacturers and sold with their brand. The third is the independent automotive aftermarket, where all products are sold under the Bosch brand to end-users (i.e. car drivers) through car repair shops, spare parts retailers, etc.

The automotive aftermarket division supplies spare parts and information for Bosch products and systems, sells workshop and car accessories and provides after-sales service. Within the automotive technology business unit, the automotive aftermarket division is responsible for the supply, sales and logistics of automotive parts for after-sales service, as well as diagnostics plus workshop equipment (e.g. testers), technical information, training and consulting for car repair shops. Moreover, the division is responsible for the Bosch Car Service concept and the global technical after-sales service for automotive products and systems from Bosch. The global team comprises 3,700 people working worldwide in the division, in the regional subsidiaries and in the agencies located in 132 countries.

The Italian Bosch automotive aftermarket (BAA) division operates only in this third market and sells a broad range of spare parts (windshield wipers, fuel, oil and air filters, batteries, spark and glow plugs, ignition coils and cables, drive belts, etc.) and diagnostics equipment for repair shops (such as engine system testing, emissions analysis, brake testing, chassis geometry testing, power measurement, etc.). The division also offers a number of services, including ESI (electronic service information), that is a broad range of CD Roms with a huge amount of information and technical data on the automotive industry and products. ESI help the owners of repair shops to access all information required to do their job. These CDs provide information on Bosch products, working times, suggestions and tips for planning activities and optimizing the use of diagnostics software. In addition, Italian BAA is involved in many special projects, one example of which is Bosch Car Service, which is a sort of franchising network of specialized repair shops certified by the Bosch brand.

The independent automotive aftermarket is characterized by a complex distribution system, whose main players are:

  • Wholesalers (first-tier customers).
  • Spare parts retailers (5,000 outlets in Italy), which are considered second-tier customers.
  • Car repair shops (about 40,000 in Italy), considered third-tier customers.

This channel structure led to difficulties in coordinating an increasingly multi-product, multi-client market. The company wanted to increase coordination and cross-functional integration, in order to boost flexibility, reduce response time and improve customer service, so in 2001 it radically changed its distribution strategy, deciding to focus exclusively on 150 big and well-structured first-level wholesalers (i.e. ‘key accounts’). These customers, chosen as those with the highest levels of competency and resources, were divided into different categories:

Bosch dealer: medium-size companies with their own inventories and a well-structured organization, usually with multiple branches across Italy. They have their own sales force and technical assistance personnel for servicing their downstream customers. They sell almost exclusively Bosch branded products.
Bosch partner: smaller firms with a narrower assortment of Bosch products, as well as with lower-level technical, commercial and financial resources.
Bosch distributor: multi-brand wholesalers, who carry products manufactured by different, competing suppliers.
Special channels: larger corporate or public authority end-users (e.g. oil producers, local public transportation companies, etc.).

While BAA focused on this relatively small number of wholesaler key accounts, the management of relationships with second- and third-tier customers was left to these wholesalers. For BAA salespeople this implied a radical switch from a sell-in to a sell-out approach. This radical change was defined as a ‘key accountization’ of BAA Italy.

The Italian BAA division was organized into four departments:

1. Sales: the chief sales manager was the head of 15 employee salespeople (area managers) and about 100 independent sales reps. Their main responsibilities were supporting the growth of customers, supporting the launch of new products in the market, broadening and deepening the range of BAA products in the assortment of customers at all levels in the distribution channel, applying discounts and differentiating commercial conditions (such as payment terms, financial support, etc.) among different customers.
2. Marketing: one marketing manager headed about 15 people. They were mainly product managers, trade marketing managers and communication managers. Their main responsibilities were product management (positioning, pricing, advertising, etc.), driving specific marketing plans for different product lines, market research, sales forecasts, customer satisfaction analysis, supporting the sales force through the provision of technical information on all products, reports on market and financial performance of different products, joint calls to customers, etc., designing and producing all promotional supports (e.g. catalogues, leaflets, point-of-sale materials, etc.) and launching new products in the market.
3. Sales administration: one manager and ten people were in charge of managing all aspects regarding payments, invoices, order processing and customer service on all administrative issues. Among other things, they had to check the orders (e.g. adequacy of financial conditions, promotional prices, etc.), provide all first-level customers with information on price lists, discounts, stock availability, order processing, manage returns and delivery errors, manage claims (which in most cases have to do with logistics and delivery time) call on first-level customers to directly install software and systems for data processing and order fulfilment, as well as provide information on procedures for data processing, order processing, stock-keeping and logistics.
4. Technical support: this department was very important for BAA. In BAA division, all technicians in the technical support department focused on the provision of technical services to first-level customers. More specifically, their main responsibilities were managing technical training to all customers, providing continuous telephone support to all technicians of customers, contributing to creating, organizing and training all the people in the 500 repair shops involved in the Bosch Car Service Project and managing all aspects of guarantees.

The radical change in BAA distribution strategy implied switching from the traditional selling approach to a partnership approach based on the identification and implementation of win–win strategies with key accounts. As a consequence, area managers had to become relationship managers, adopting a consultative approach with first-level key accounts, developing specific business plans and creating added value for them. Traditionally, the marketing function mainly targeted end-users (car drivers) and focused on brand management and communication strategies, while the sales department focused on distributors. Moreover, the marketing function tried to strictly implement the standardized guidelines provided by the German headquarters, while the sales department called for local adaptation to the characteristics and needs of the Italian market. As a consequence, conflicts and problems of poor coordination were quite frequent.

A framework to interpret BAA Italy's KAM-focused change management

McKinsey's 7S framework, which is popular for managing change in organizations (Peters and Waterman 1982), is a way of thinking about the development or remodelling of companies. The model proposes seven interdependent organizational elements that must be aligned (see Table 1). Three of these elements are perceived as hard: strategy, structures and systems; four are perceived as soft: shared values, style, staff and skills. Shared values are core to shaping all the other critical elements and are reflected in the culture of the organization.

Table 1: McKinsey 7S framework

‘Hard’ organizational elements‘Soft’ organizational elements
StrategyShared values
StructuresStyle
SystemsStaff
Skills

When a company sets out to change its organization, the seven Ss are often addressed in a given sequence. The recognition that change is necessary results in new strategies emerging, a plan and series of actions designed to achieve some form of competitive advantage. The framework can then be used to analyse ways in which the other organizational elements support or block the new strategy.

Strategy tells a company how it must adapt itself to its environment and use its organizational potential, whereas the analysis of skills answers the question of how the strategy ought to be implemented. These skills define the changes that need to be made in the other five Ss: structure, systems, staff, style and shared values:

  • Structure: the way business units are grouped in relation to each other and defines reporting lines. This is perhaps the most visible factor in the organization, and that is why it is often tempting to begin by changing the structure.
  • Systems: defined as the procedures or processes that exist in a company and that involve many people for the purpose of identifying important issues, getting things done or making decisions. Systems provide management with a powerful tool for making changes in the organization.
  • Staff: concerned with the question of what kind of people the company needs. It refers to the total know-how possessed by the people in the organization.
  • Style: leaders' personal symbolic actions. Leadership and management style is not necessarily a matter of personal style but of what the executives in the organization do, how they use their personal signalling system.
  • Shared values: one or more guiding themes of the organization's culture, things that everybody is aware of as being especially important and crucial to the survival and success of the organization.

Change management in the case example

In the following the case is used as an illustrative example of how McKinsey's 7S framework can be applied to the management of KAM-focused change in organizations.

Strategy

Radical changes entail substantial modifications of corporate strategies and goals. New strategies should be clear and easy to communicate, and new goals should be easy to justify, quantify and measure. These key success factors are apparent in the words of Mr Colabucci, sales manager at Bosch Automotive Aftermarket Italy:

“From a strategic standpoint, change was driven by two main goals. The first one was to cut costs by reducing managerial complexity. For example, from the administrative standpoint, Bosch had to manage thousands of invoices every month and had a huge list of insolvent customers. The second goal was to increase revenues by targeting big dealers which could sell and provide service support for the whole set of Bosch products, especially technical goods, which could not be either purchased or distributed by small–medium sized distributors, due to the lack of qualified technical staff or the pretty big warehouse and financial requirements.

In the process of change it was crucial to share our vision and to clearly communicate our goals to customers and employees alike. You might discuss methods, timing and tactics, but the vision must be definitely shared. In addition to this, it was of fundamental importance to root our vision of the future and our goals into hard data and objective facts. We had to support our view concretely by showing research, figures and trend analysis to justify why we thought we had to go that way.”

The change management programme supporting the key accountization of the company, consistent with Kotter (1995), focused on creating a vision clarifying the direction in which the organization needed to move and developing a strategy for achieving the vision. The vision has to be simple, easy to understand and communicate, and capable of capturing the imagination of people in the organization. Without this vision, priorities are not clear and all plans, directives and projects may be confusing and perceived as incompatible: the vision should be the unifying focus of all programmes.

Skills needed to successfully redesign and manage key processes

Generally speaking, in change management initiatives companies should analyse and redesign critical processes when needed, especially to identify the critical skills needed to successfully implement the change. Such processes may refer to both back-office activities and customer interaction management of the front line. For example, Bosch mapped and redesigned some critical processes, especially to clarify roles and responsibilities, the goal being to reduce ambiguity and conflicts. Therefore, after identifying key processes, the company developed for each of them the RASIC matrix, which clearly indicated, for each phase of the process under investigation, the people involved in terms of Responsibility, Approval, Support, Information and Control.

This is in line with the recommendation made by Sirkin et al. (2005), who emphasized that radical organizational changes, such as BAA Italy's key accountization, should be characterized by a clear definition of roles and responsibilities for all the people involved.

The Bosch case highlights the critical role played by communication processes, both with internal (subordinates, colleagues from other departments, etc.) and external counterparts (e.g. customers). As Colabucci pointed out:

“We let everybody – including customers – know about our real sales and product targets. We also wanted to inform everybody about the results of the change process. So, for instance, we immediately bought a maxi-LCD screen (which cost €10,000 at the time … it took me three months to have such investment approved!) and placed it right there at the entrance of our building, so that every day everybody could see at once what the target for each channel and line of products was, together with sales progress made daily. So everyone could know exactly what was happening.

We also developed an intranet connecting all members of the sales force so that anyone could see their colleagues' results. Of course, they all remained anonymous. This was not meant to create jealousy or the like, but to let anyone have benchmarks and a clear picture of the situation. The same was true for customers who could see how they were growing compared to others: again, this was done anonymously. This gave rise to a virtuous cycle simply by letting information until then reserved circulate. Everyone knew exactly what they had to do and by when and also what the others were expected to do and the progress the others were making. This was an important achievement in a context where traditionally such type of transparency was not accepted. That was a really hard struggle … but it really turned out to be a key factor.”

In some cases, changes in processes were only short term, tactically oriented. For example, pricing and discount policies were made very flexible at the beginning of the change initiative. The objective was to support the change process by orchestrating some early wins when needed. In fact, the company wanted to keep performance high in the short term to reinforce employees' and customers' commitment.

All this is consistent with Kotter (1995) as well as Sirkin et al. (2005), who noted that every possible communication channel should be used to make employees perceive that the change is useful and possible, and to facilitate two-way information flows to provide feedback from the both employees and customers. Kotter (1995) also pointed out that managing communication processes in radical change management initiatives like the key accountization of the firm also implies orchestrating and creating short-term wins. Meeting and celebrating short-term goals helps boost the credibility of the renewal process, keeping the urgency level high and forcing detailed analytical thinking that can clarify or revise the vision. Since big transformations take time, without some short-term success many people are at risk of giving up and losing faith in the change process. Therefore, change leaders should deliberately plan for visible and measurable performance improvements, create these improvements, and recognize and reward employees involved in such improvements. This does not mean declaring victory too soon. Rather, successful change leaders typically use the credibility gained through short-term wins to further raise the bar and start renewal projects that are even bigger in scope than the initial ones.

Improving internal communication processes also implies the modification of measurement systems (Colletti and Chonko 1997): companies should change what to measure and how it is measured. First, accurate measurement procedures can help justify why the change is needed by providing measurable goals to be accomplished. Second, if the impact of change on results can be measured, empirical testing can reveal what works well or not in the change, thus facilitating learning and continuous improvement. Third, having measurable measures of success provides opportunities for energizing the improvement process: in fact, people feel motivated by reaching quantifiable measures of performance, and demonstrated capacity to succeed reinforces employees' perceptions of their ability to succeed in the future.

Shared values and culture

Neal and Tromley (1995) suggest that when radical changes are expected, as in the case of BAA Italy's key accountization, a culture change is needed. Culture consists of the set of values, beliefs and assumptions underlying the behaviours of individuals.

When the change management process started, Bosch was changing its priorities in terms of key corporate values. Moral integrity had always been the primary value, together with a guarantee of employment to its employees. The new number one value was entrepreneurship and the spirit of initiative: the company wanted a personal contribution from its employees. This called for, among other things, an empowering leadership style, a reduction of bureaucracy in many business processes and higher job mobility, coupled with more meritocratic career advancement opportunities. The strategic change at BAA Italy also called for a stronger market-oriented culture.

To change the corporate culture, one should start from the top: it is of fundamental importance that top managers accept, witness and spread across the whole company the key values of the new culture. To do this, members of the board needed to demonstrate and embody such values by showing consistent actions, i.e. by modifying their everyday decisions and behaviours. This is not easy to accomplish. This was how Colabucci persuaded the CEO to shift from a product-oriented culture to a customer-oriented culture, which was a necessary precondition to successfully implement the change:

“I repeatedly said that we were a product-oriented company rather than a customer-oriented one. This made the CEO criticize me. He said, ‘How do you dare make such an accusation?’ to which I replied, ‘I have just a question for you: how many customers do we have, and how many product codes do we deal with?’ Well, he knew about product codes but had no idea about customers. So I told him: ‘That's the way it is, I know how many customers we have, while you don't. Yet you know how many product codes we deal with. This means that focus is on logistics and products while you don't care about customers so much. Well … I guess you should!’

Since he was a smart person he realized I was right: we were not truly customer-oriented. So he started being sort of obsessed with it. He started go around asking everybody, ‘How many customers do we have?’ He had changed his mindset completely, and this is how some changes in mentality were introduced. In turn, this gave rise to radical changes in many key processes. For example, we completely redesigned information systems to calculate each customer's profitability. Before the change, we had no information about it, since sales statistics were organized only by product.”

This statement clearly suggests that major modifications in company culture must be accompanied by substantial modifications in support systems (e.g. information systems), otherwise it is extremely difficult to implement change in practice. This is also consistent with the above mentioned need to modify measurement systems (Colletti and Chonko 1997). A typical example is the effort to calculate customer profitability to see whether the company is focusing on the right accounts, as well as to estimate the return on time invested, to make sure that salespeople are spending their time on the correct activities.

The example cited above also underlines the importance of the commitment of senior executives in implementing KAM-related change management programmes (see, for example, Sirkin et al. 2005). Furthermore, an important way to modify the corporate culture is to change some rituals. For example, to stimulate employees' entrepreneurship, Colabucci decided to change the way meetings were managed. This is how he describes this change:

“Traditionally, the company used to have meetings where some people said nothing at all. So I told them, ‘Just don't come next time if you have nothing to say. Even if it was rubbish you have to say it anyway.’ I used to say, ‘Let's do some brainstorming because from someone's rubbish there may stem someone else's good idea.’

Yet it was not so easy to encourage brainstorming in a company with a strong hierarchical culture, where everybody tended to be reluctant. So I decided to even play games like, ‘If you say nothing, you have to leave the room.’ Thus, using a little bit of ‘violence’ we could arouse creativity and people who had always kept silent until then, when forced to speak, would often contribute the best ideas.”

Another example of change in rituals refers to the challenge of stimulating a culture of interdepartmental interaction and cooperation. In Colabucci's words:

“Once there were separated dinners out for salespeople and members of the marketing department. We started to have inter-functional meetings and dinners where they all had a chance to get to know each other.

We did the same with the colleagues from information systems, who could decree success or failure of our projects, because they could dramatically facilitate the circulation of information and the possibility to have concrete data to refer to. Therefore, for example, I often invited them to our dinner meetings where we celebrated our department's accomplishments. I wanted to let them feel part of the team.”

In addition, the company started to take some people from the sales department and move them to marketing and vice versa.

Corporate culture can also be changed by modifying some artifacts, such as the company language (Homburg and Pflesser 2000). An example of this is provided by Colabucci:

“I have abolished the word ‘manage’ from my own vocabulary, because when you are busy managing something you have already lost ground in comparison with those who are developing their business. Therefore, one should only ‘develop’. We had people in charge of ‘coordinating’ something. Well, a person who coordinates rarely has responsibilities, so we have renamed many of them ‘business development managers’ or ‘channel leaders', which sound more dynamic.”

Even changing the dress code was a way to try to modify culture, attitudes and behaviours. As Colabucci states:

“We began not to wear ties because we wanted to have people feel they were part of a team where they were expected to work hard and face a change instead of feeling like managers supposed to manage business as usual. We impoverished the formal aspect in a sense while enriching the substantial one.”

Consistent with Chonko et al. (2002), perceptions of organizational readiness for change and individual learning orientation were stimulated by creating a culture whose main values were market orientation and entrepreneurship. Market orientation is characterized by a continuous effort to create customer value, to collect and disseminate customer and competitor information, and by organization-wide responsiveness to customer needs. Entrepreneurship is characterized by risk tolerance, support to proactivity, receptivity to innovation and resistance to bureaucracy.

Style and leadership

Laabs (1996) reported that 20% of people in an organization are change friendly, 50% are ‘fence sitters’ and 30% resist or even deliberately try to make the initiative fail. Change leaders play a key role in proactively managing the meaning that people attach to change. Such meaning can be interpreted in terms of shared mental models, i.e. common perceptions, beliefs and priorities that facilitate successful change implementation. Since change implies uncertainty and ambiguity, the input of management to the construction of reality is especially important when companies undergo radical changes. Leaders should manage meanings in order to:

  • Create shared perceptions and interpretations so that members' actions are guided by a common definition of the situation.
  • Justify their actions and the changes they introduce to the organization.
  • Recruit followers and motivate members of the organization to support their actions.

The management of meaning by strategic leaders primarily involves shaping organization members' perceptions and interpretations about (1) the environment, (2) the state of the organization and its performance, (3) the organization's vision and goals, (4) the appropriateness of various means, decisions and actions employed by the organization to achieve its goals, and (5) the ability of the organization to make progress towards meaningful goals.

Change leaders must be credible, and their leadership style should incorporate personal values and personality traits that are consistent with the values of the corporate culture. For example, as stated above, a major modification of Bosch's corporate culture was the emphasis now placed on the employees' entrepreneurial attitudes and capabilities. This calls for a leader who stimulates and supports empowerment and risk-taking. This was clearly a characteristic of Colabucci, as demonstrated by the following statement:

“I used to say, ‘Maybe at the beginning you do ten things, eight are wrong and two are right. Yet later it may go the other way round: you do eight right things and two wrong ones. If you stand still you might make no mistakes, but you don't contribute to any achievement either.’ This is why I kept saying, ‘Just do it, just try, we'll surely learn from our mistakes.’ ”

Similarly, a participative leadership style was needed to foster followers' entrepreneurial spirit. Again, this was part of Colabucci's style:

“I remember that at first everybody said, ‘Yes, sir’, and at the end many would say, ‘No, I disagree’, which helped me grow as well.”

Radical changes usually require a radical discontinuity in the management team. Hence, hiring leaders from outside can be a wise choice, as Colabucci witnessed:

“For many customers it was important to interact with a new sales manager. I told them, ‘I have nothing to do with what has been done so far. I only know that I am here to do something else.’ I was credible because, while being very competent about the products and the market, I had not contributed to building up the situation like it was. Many customers understood that Bosch really wanted to change things by introducing some new managers coming from outside. They saw me as a living proof of Bosch's willingness to change.”

On the other side, hiring a new leader from another company may create problems internally, because the newcomer may lack credibility. To gain credibility, the leader should be perceived as competent, honest and powerful. The company and the leaders can and should do whatever they can to improve such perceptions. Such characteristics in Colabucci's words:

“At the beginning some people thought: this guy is too young and doesn't know the Bosch world … soon he won't be around any more. In Bosch, people who started a change process were rarely granted credibility as employees were generally not in favour of it and bound to tradition. In fact, one of the main values for Bosch is: ‘We have always done so successfully since 1890.’ So it's truly difficult to say, ‘Starting tomorrow we'll do it another way.’ I had to give the impression of being appointed to a strategic mission instead of being seen as a person who, as a latecomer coming from outside, wanted to put into discussion all that had been done before introducing change processes which perhaps were not welcome and not even shared from a strategic viewpoint. I was successful especially because I was given special power on many decisions, which was highly unusual and demonstrated that I was backed by a strong commitment from the top management.

People trust you if they see that you have concrete ideas and possess the necessary competence. Fortunately enough I had technical and market competence. This helped me a lot.

Another key success factor was that I was very clear to people. If they are not aware of what is both positive and negative about the change process, they feel confused, overpowered by ambiguity and they stand still, they just don't move. You've got to be very outspoken.”

The leader's communication style is especially important in change management initiatives, since it has a strong impact on the cognitive, affective and behavioural responses of individuals affected by change. A communication style characterized by clarity and openness is usually a relevant trait of successful change leaders.

Structure

In terms of organization structure, two major modifications were made at BAA. The first involved the reduction in the sales force size. In fact, since Bosch would no longer manage 4,000 customers but 150, the company needed to downsize its sales force. Therefore, Bosch decided to relocate many members of its sales force to the dealerships, thus reducing the number from 100 to 30; only 10 salespeople did not accept this proposal. To be successful, one key variable was to prove that everyone would earn more in the process. For Bosch, the main advantages were that salespeople helped convey the culture of Bosch to dealers, and that salespeople (and their customers) did not move to competitors. Salespeople did not lose their jobs and continued working with their customer base. Often they also had new career advancement opportunities in the dealers' organizations. Finally, they put their portfolio of downstream customers at the disposal of dealers, who broadened their customer base and hired experienced salespeople.

The second relevant change was that the company created formal teams (as recommended, for example, by Neal and Tromley (1995) and Beer et al. (1990)), thus giving rise to a matrix organization structure. In fact, area managers became leaders of selling teams, each one incorporating a couple of agents and one member from each of the other three departments: marketing, sales administration and technical assistance.

Staff

Bosch realized that most of its employees did not possess the set of skills and competencies needed in the new scenario. At the same time, the company understood that investing in training was a necessary step to motivate people to change. In fact, many employees felt a lack of self-confidence. Empowerment also required an increase in employees' capabilities. Therefore, most members of the organization from all four key departments were involved in inter-functional coaching, training on team building and training to develop management skills and competencies.

In short, the training process at BAA Italy consisted of the following steps:

1. Definition of the ‘ideal profile’ of area managers in terms of skills and competencies required by the new approach.
2. Self-evaluation of area managers on such skills and competencies.
3. Comparison of ideal and actual profile, which led to the identification of individual gaps and areas for improvement.
4. Aggregation of individual gaps and improvement priorities to identify group-level priorities (e.g. managerial competencies versus relational soft skills).
5. Application of the same process to all other members of sales teams.

All the investments of time and money made by BAA Italy with regards to the development of employees' skills, knowledge and capabilities were consistent with Beer et al. (1990), Claret et al. (2006) and Sirkin et al. (2005), who emphasized that to successfully implement profound change projects such as BAA Italy's key accountization, companies should develop new skills and competencies in those affected by change, in such a way that they feel they are ready and well prepared to deal with the challenges of the new context.

Systems

In addition to the interventions on information systems cited above, two other modifications were important to support and successfully implement change at BAA Italy. The first one involved planning: all salespeople were provided with an information-based customer planning tool aimed at setting goals, developing projects, tracking progress, monitoring problems and creating benchmarks for every single customer.

Second, consistent with the recommendation made by Beer et al. (1990), the company completely revised its incentive system. This is a critical issue in a KAM-focused change like the one made by BAA Italy. In fact, since salespeople's remuneration is typically largely related to market performance, change directly threatens the level or variability of sales force income. As a consequence, compared with other personnel, salespeople may be more reluctant to change, because unlike other employees in the organization they have to take upon themselves the risk of losing money (Hurley 1998). The challenge here was to change employees' priorities from monetary rewards to career development opportunities and professional growth. To do this, for example, the company strongly invested in cross-functional training and interdepartmental coaching, stimulated cross-functional mobility and redesigned job advancement paths.

Investing in control systems (e.g. measurement systems, reporting systems, etc.) is also a key success factor in KAM-related change management programmes – as pointed out by Sirkin et al. (2005), companies should schedule milestones and assess their impact. Carefully monitoring the change project's progress implies providing reports, determining whether achieving the milestones has had the desired impact on the company, discussing the problems, determining improvements, etc.

Conclusions

The key accountization of a company usually implies radical changes in the organization. Managing such a change in the sales force is ‘special’ for a number of reasons that are well exemplified by the BAA Italy case. The case is an example of the application of McKinsey's 7S model to successfully implement the change management initiatives implied by a KAM-focused strategy. The key message of this model is that a structured, integrated and consistent set of interrelated changes is needed at different levels of the organization.

The case is an empirical demonstration of the relevance of some general rules for managing KAM-focused change in sales organizations (Hurley 1998):

  • The vision of the future relationship with customers should be clear and grounded in good market analysis.
  • Expectations about earnings during the change process should be carefully managed.
  • Complex and abstracts ideas in the vision should be translated as much as possible into concrete behaviours and actionable programmes.
  • The vision and the rationale for change should be over-communicated across levels and locations.
  • Salespeople's resistance to change should be reduced by involving them in the process.
  • Change progress should be measured and monitored continuously.
  • Specific change management structures should be created (e.g. task forces).
  • Change leaders should be empowered at all levels/locations.
  • Multiple parts/processes of the systems should be changed in an integrated and consistent manner.
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