Contents

Cover

Wiley Series in Operations Research and Management Science

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

Preface for the Second Edition

Preface for the First Edition

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Chapter One: Matrix Two-Person Games

1.1 The Basics

1.2 The von Neumann Minimax Theorem

1.3 Mixed Strategies

1.4 Solving 2 × 2 Games Graphically

1.5 Graphical Solution of 2 × m and n × 2 Games

1.6 Best Response Strategies

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Two: Solution Methods for Matrix Games

2.1 Solution of Some Special Games

2.2 Invertible Matrix Games

2.3 Symmetric Games

2.4 Matrix Games and Linear Programming

2.5 Appendix: Linear Programming and the Simplex Method

2.6 Review Problems

2.7 Maple/Mathematica

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Three: Two-Person Nonzero Sum Games

3.1 The Basics

3.2 2 × 2 Bimatrix Games, Best Response, Equality of Payoffs

3.3 Interior Mixed Nash Points by Calculus

3.4 Nonlinear Programming Method for Nonzero Sum Two-Person Games

3.5 Correlated Equilibria

3.6 Choosing Among Several Nash Equilibria (Optional)

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Four: Games in Extensive Form: Sequential Decision Making

4.1 Introduction to Game Trees—Gambit

4.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Five: N-Person Nonzero Sum Games and Games with a Continuum of Strategies

5.1 The Basics

5.2 Economics Applications of Nash Equilibria

5.3 Duels (Optional)

5.4 Auctions (Optional)

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Six: Cooperative Games

6.1 Coalitions and Characteristic Functions

6.2 The Nucleolus

6.3 The Shapley Value

6.4 Bargaining

6.5 Maple/Mathematica

Bibliographic Notes

Chapter Seven: Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Population Games

7.1 Evolution

7.2 Population Games

Bibliographic Notes

Appendix A: The Essentials of Matrix Analysis

Appendix B: The Essentials of Probability

B.1 Discrete Random Variables

B.2 Continuous Distributions

B.3 Order Statistics

Appendix C: The Essentials of Maple

C.1 Features

C.2 Functions

C.3 Some Commands Used in This Book

Appendix D: The Mathematica Commands

D.1 The Upper and Lower Values of a Game

D.2 The Value of an Invertible Matrix Game with Mixed Strategies

D.3 Solving Matrix Games by Linear Programming

D.4 Interior Nash Points

D.5 Lemke–Howson Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium

D.6 Is the Core Empty?

D.7 Find and Plot the Least Core

D.8 Nucleolus and Shapley Value Procedure

D.9 Plotting the Payoff Pairs

D.10 Bargaining Solutions

D.11 Mathematica for Replicator Dynamics

Appendix E: Biographies

E.1 John von Neumann

E.2 John Forbes Nash

Problem Solutions

Solutions for Chapter 1

Solutions for Chapter 2

Solutions for Chapter 3

Solutions for Chapter 4

Solutions for Chapter 5

Solutions for Chapter 6

Solutions for Chapter 7

References

Index

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