Chapter 13

Application of DERs in electricity market

Yusuke Manabe    Funded Research Division Energy Systems (Chubu Electric Power), Institute of Materials and Systems for Sustainability (IMaSS), Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan

Abstract

From the 1990s, deregulation and electric power market opening has been done in several regions all over the world. Competitive environment in the early days was unfit for DER which has a difficulty for forecasting output and high construct cost. Therefore, renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and feed in tariff (FIT) have been done as DER promoting policies. Currently, installed DER’s capacity is increased and construction cost is decreased compared to the 1990s. As a result, the promoting policy’s demerit, which hid behind the merit when DER promoting was started, is standing out now. To overcome the current problems about electricity market and DERs, effective measures which do not give exceeded favorable treatment to DERs and realize a wholesome market competitive environment, are required. These will be introduced by renewed policies, feed in tariffs with contracts for difference (FIT-CfD), business models of DER, and virtual power plant (VPP).

Keywords

electricity power market
renewable portfolio standard
feed in tariff
scale merit
feed in tariffs with contracts for difference
virtual power plant

13.1. Basic concept of electricity market and DERs

In conventional power systems, vertical integrate management is carried out by a regional monopoly company. However, since the 1990s, deregulation and electric power market opening has been done in several regions all over the world. The objects of this are economic development by open competition, and construction of resilient energy system, and so on. A fundamental component of the electric power market is spot market (day-ahead market). This market decides the market price (eg, $/MWh) and electric energy quantity (MWh) of each time period [2,8]. The time period interval is 1 h or 30 min in many markets. Supply and demand biddings are closed the previous day, and all biddings are sorted to make supply and demand curves. An equilibrium point at which the two curves meet decides the market clearing price and energy quantity. Fig. 13.1 shows an image of a spot market.
image
Figure 13.1 Spot market.
This market structure is an unfit design for distributed energy resources (DERs), which are photovoltaic generation, wind turbine generation, and so on, and forecasting output is difficult. DERs should decide each bidding price and quantity of all time periods based on the day-ahead weather forecast. However, output forecast cannot be done perfectly, forecast error will be occurred [3]. Difference between actual output and bidding quantity give penalty to DER. This penalty reduces the economic value of DER. Additionally, the construction cost of DERs in the 1990s was higher than the present cost. The average market price which was decided by mainly thermal, large scale hydro, and nuclear generation was too low to pay for the massive initial cost of DER. However, DERs are one kind of the low carbon and renewable energy plant, it is good for security of energy source supply, and environmental protection. Therefore, the European Union, the United States, and other countries have promoted several DER policies, mainly renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and feed in tariff (FIT).

13.1.1. RPS

RPS is the regulation policy which decides the target percentage of DER output energy in the total electric energy supply, and electric power suppliers have an obligation to fulfill this target. Penalties are also imposed for nonfulfillment suppliers. RPS has been operated in majority of states in the United States (29 states), in the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden, and so on [9]. In most cases, governments create renewable energy certificates (RECs) to track the fulfillment of the target percentage. These certificates is securitized the values of DER for environment protection and energy security, and allow for trading in the market. The combination of RPSs and RECs makes suppliers’ businesses form more flexibly and increases the values of DER. However, RPS trading makes the RPS system more complex. Additionally, it is difficult as small-scale DERs securitize RECs.

13.1.2. FIT

FIT is the policy that decides the energy price (tariff) and purchase period of each kind of DER. All output energy is purchased without bidding to the spot market. Therefore, FIT can remove economic anxiety and increase the incentive of DER introduction. Additionally, this system is simpler than RPS. In previous research comparing FIT and RPS, FIT has been found to better promote DER development [4,7]. FIT has been operated in Germany, Spain, Italy, and some states in the United States, and so on [9]. Japan also has used FIT since 2011, and promotes the mass penetration of photovoltaic generation. However, FIT has one defect, difficult tariff setting. In general, tariffs should be set making the internal rate of return (IRR) of DERs their proper value. IRR is the discount rate value at which the net present value of future cash flow becomes same as initial investment cost. Although the tariff should be updated while considering the DER’s cost due to mass production and experience accumulation in order to keep the IRR. If this is not updated, there will be excess cash flow to the DER owner. Additionally, if the penalty caused by the spot market does not occur, the DER owner will not smooth out the output fluctuation, and uncertain and intermitted output is supplied. This makes the electric power system worse and the market price becomes more unstable.

13.1.3. Effect of DER’s mass penetration for electricity market

Currently, DERs mass penetrated by these promoting policies start affecting the electricity market. Specifically, the merit order of spot markets is changing. The merit order is the ranking of a power supply plant base on short-run marginal cost. In a perfect competitive situation, the best supplier’s bid strategy becomes the marginal cost bidding. Therefore, the supply curve becomes the merit order naturally. If DER based on renewable energy source is bid to the spot market, zero price bidding becomes best strategy because renewable energy does not need fuel for the generation and the short-run marginal cost is almost free. Mass penetration of DER by RPS increases the bids of DER and these bids are sorted first. This moves the supply curve and equivalent points to the right and reduces the market price. Fig. 13.2 shows this price down mechanism.
image
Figure 13.2 Spot market with PRS.
DERs introduced by FIT do not bid to the spot market and DER energy is purchased by and integrated manager of the power system. Purchased DER energy is supplied on demand. As a result, the demand biding quantity to the spot market is reduced. This moves the demand curve to the left and the equivalent point to the right, and reduces the market price. Fig. 13.3 shows this price down mechanism. This is essentially the same as mass penetration of DER by RPS. Merit order change by the mass penetration of DER is merely shown by from different viewpoints.
image
Figure 13.3 Spot market with FIT.
Morthost et al. [11] researched some literature about the merit order change, and showed the effect of the price decrease in 2009 that appeared from 3–23 Eur/MWh in several European Union regions. Depreciation of the market price will bring the expected profit reduction of thermal plants with high marginal cost and low efficiency. This may promote the replacement of thermal plants and DERs. However, this effect has the following demerit: DER is forcibly penetrated by RPS or FIT. In other words, this penetration has no relation to the market principle, and it will be not happen that value reduction of DER by excess introduction. Specially, FIT will promote DER penetration until the electric power system problems happen (frequency control, distribution voltage, transmission capability, and so on). As a result, it will increase the possibility that the whole electric power system is lost and the electricity quality degrades. Additionally, it becomes a big problem as to who pays the massive construction cost of DERs. The spot market price is reduced by the RPS or FIT, but this price is wholesale. As for what will happen to retail price? The necessary cost of the achievement of the RPS target and the tariff payment of FIT are eventually charged to the customers. Therefore, the retail price will be increased. If tariff setting of FIT is mistaken, this problem will appear as an outflow of wealth from demand customers to DER owners.
Currently, the installed DER capacity is increased and the construction cost is decreased compared with the 1990s. As a result, the promoting policy’s demerit which hid behind the merit when DER promoting was started is now standing out.

13.2. Electricity market reform and virtual power plan

To overcome the current problems of the electricity market and DERs, effective measures which do not give exceed favorable treatment to DERs and realizes a fair market competitive environment are required, and these will be introduced by renewed policies and business models of DER.
In some countries, modification of the electricity power market design has started. For example, the United Kingdom is starting the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) [6,12]. The objective of EMR is the securement of the investment needed to deliver a reliable diverse low carbon technology mix. This reform is mainly constructed following four policies [5]:
Feed-in tariffs with contracts for difference (FIT–CfD): Long-term contracts which provide revenue certainty to investors in low-carbon generation such as renewables (DERs), nuclear and carbon capture, and storage-equipped plants.
Capacity agreements (within a capacity market): Payments for reliable capacity to be available when needed, helping to ensure security of supply.
Carbon price floor: A tax to underpin the carbon price in the emissions trading scheme.
Emissions performance standard: A regulatory measure which provides a backstop to limit emissions from unabated power stations.
The policy which has an especially high relationship with DERs is FIT–CfD. FIT–CfD stabilizes returns for DERs at a fixed level known as the strike price. DERs receive revenue from selling their electricity into the spot market as usual. In addition, when the market price is below the strike price they also receive a top-up payment for the additional amount. To compare with strike price, average market price in a certain period (eg, 1 month) use for reference price. Conversely if the reference price is above the strike price, the generator must pay back the difference. Fig. 13.4 shows the image of FIT–CfD.
image
Figure 13.4 FIT–CfD.
DERs should bid to the spot market differently from normal fixed FIT. Accordingly, DERs output should be controlled in order to avoid the penalty caused by the difference of bidding quantity and actual output. FIT–CfD retains short-term market signals for efficient operation to DERs. Additionally, the strike price will be decided by auctions or use some other competitive process. Fixed FIT only improves long-term revenue certainty, but FIT–CfD makes the construction cost lower by fair competition. As a result, FIT–CfDs have more cost-effective points than other options for support, reducing the cost to consumers. It will be interesting to see the results of the FIT–CfD starting from 2017 in the United Kingdom.
Future policies for DERs such as FIT–CfD will be more competitive and DERs will be required to have high controllability. The only one kind and one plant operation will become more difficult to get high profit. Virtual power plants (VPPs) are one of the effective business models applied to this trend and maintain the economic value without FIT. VPPs combine not only several kinds of DERs but also contracts of demanded response (DR) and increases the VPP’s diversity and robustness. Fig. 13.5 shows an image of VPP.
image
Figure 13.5 Virtual power plant.
Navigant Research, a market research and consulting company specializing in green energy market, defined VPP as,

“A system that relies upon software and a smart grid to remotely and automatically dispatch and optimize DER via an aggregation and optimization platform linking retail to wholesale markets” [1].

 
From this definition, we can take two important points. The first point is “remotely and automatically dispatch and optimize DER.” The output characteristic of DER is highly dependent on where this located. In order to combine several characteristics and reduce the uncertainty effect, DERs consisting of VPPs should be widely placed and have various kinds where possible. Therefore, the remote communication environment needs to be able to operate the wide spread of DERs in cooperation. Additionally, in order to enhance the VPP’s economic efficiency, entering into a real-time market or capacity market, not only the spot market, is necessary. VPPs are required for real-time operation and frequency response to enter these markets. These operations cannot be realized manually, and automatic control applied to whole VPP systems is needed. The second point is “linking retail to wholesale markets.” The market price will become even more variable and unforecastable because of the mass penetration of DER with high uncertainty. Therefore, market bidding and DER operation should be optimized to maximize the VPP profit in consideration of the DER’s characteristics and price variability [10]. Besides, advanced retail contracts, including DR, are useful. There is a probability that the combination of a bidding strategy and the condition of contracts which give high expected profit to VPP is proposed by taking into account the customer’s and DER’s characteristics.
VPP systems have already started. Next Kraftwrerk is targeting the real-time market mainly in Germany, Energy Pool is making DR an important project in France, and so on. In the future, several VPP systems will be proposed and implemented. These will have a larger effect on the electricity power system and market than simple DERs which have been introduced.

References

[1] Asmus P, Lawrence M. Executive summary: virtual power plants – demand response, supply-side, and mixed asset VPPs: global market analysis and forecasts. Denver: Navigant Research; 2014.

[2] Belyaev LS. Electricity market reforms: economics and policy challenges. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media; 2010.

[3] Bostan I, Bostan V, Dulgheru V, Gheorghe AV, Sobor I, Sochirean A. Resilient energy systems: renewables: wind, solar hydro. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media; 2012.

[4] Butler L, Neuhoff K. Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction mechanisms to support wind power development. Renew Energ. 2008;33(8):18541867.

[5] Department of Energy and Climate Change Electricity market reform: policy overview. London: Department of Energy and Climate Change; 2012.

[6] Department of Energy and Climate change Energy bill: supplementary memorandum (electricity market form). London: Department of Energy and Climate change; 2013.

[7] Dong CG. Feed-in tariff vs. renewable portfolio standard: an empirical test of their relative effectiveness in promoting wind capacity development. Energ Policy. 2012;42:476485.

[8] Gan D, Feng D, Xie J. Electricity markets and power system economics. Boca Raton: CRC Press; 2013.

[9] Japan Electric Power Information Center Electricity industry of foreign centuries, part I. Tokyo: Japan Electric Power Information Center; 2014.

[10] Mashhour E, Moghaddas-Tafreshi SM. Bidding strategy of virtual power plant for participating in energy and spinning reserve markets – Part I: Problem formulation. IEEE Trans Power Syst. 2011;26(2):949956.

[11] Morthost PE, Munksgaard J, Ray S, Sinner AF. Wind energy and electricity prices exploring the “merit order effect”. European Wind Energy Association: London; 2010.

[12] Toke D. UK Electricity Market Reform – revolution or much ado about nothing? Energ Policy. 2011;39(12):76097611.

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