Introduction to Security Surveys: A University Bookstore Security Survey

While the trend appears to be for colleges and universities to outsource the operation of their bookstores to companies such as Barnes & Noble, many schools still continue to operate their campus stores. Some universities have ancillary services whose operations fall under the bookstore management. Examples of such ancillary services are Technical Books (e.g., Medical, Legal), Fax and Sales Services, Office Products, Computer Repair Facilities, Vending Operations, Copy Centers, Laundromats, Retail Operations (Clothing, Gifts, and Insignia merchandise), and Food Vending Services. The loss prevention aspects of a college bookstore are generally much like those of any other retail operation, with some aspects which are unique to the college campus environment. We feel the best way to present both a broad picture of the loss prevention aspects of college/university bookstores as well as provide an introduction to security surveys is to reproduce an actual security/loss prevention survey done at a major university (whose name and personnel identities have been disguised). By reviewing the survey, you will gather not only the LP concerns of this venue, but also the format, scope, and details of an actual security survey, which can be adapted and applied to any venue.

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY SURVEY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE STORE

UNIVERSAL UNIVERSITY

MIDDLETON, NY

by

xxxx x. xxxxxxxxx, CPP

Security Consultant

July 2007

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy 1 of 5 CONSULTANT’S REPORT

SECURITY SURVEY FOR THE UNIVERSAL STORE

UNIVERSAL UNIVERSITY

SCOPE

This report is the documentation of my survey of the existing security/loss prevention policies, procedures, organization and operations at The Universal Store [hereinafter referred to as THE STORE] and its ancillary stores and Warehouse as authorized by Mr. Thomas Martin, CEO and Director. The objective of the survey was to assess existing physical and functional security and to recommend changes or improvements where appropriate to ensure

a. That efforts to provide a safe working and shopping environment are adequate and reasonable, and that appropriate emergency plans are in place.

b. That security policies, procedures, and operations comply with all applicable laws and are legally justifiable.

c. That appropriate checks and balances exist to both deter and detect internal dishonesty.

d. That adequate programs are in place to minimize losses from shoplifting and customer fraud, and to effectively and reasonably deal with offenders.

The survey identified twelve (12) Areas of Focus, which are

1. Overall Security Posture

2. Security Organization

3. Security-Related Written Policies and Procedures

4. Loss Prevention Awareness and Training

5. Merchandise Handling Procedures

6. Asset and Property Controls

7. Shoplifting Controls and Procedures

8. Internal Theft Controls and Procedures

9. Physical Security

10. Inventory Results

11. Emergency Planning

12. Miscellaneous

The 12 areas are not necessarily distinctly separate one from the other, but each does tend to blend with and/or augment another so the totality of the security strategies achieves the desired effect. For ease in presentation and comprehension, they are hereinafter referred to as Areas of Focus, some of which may have subareas. Under each Area of Focus is a listing of Findings, most of which are immediately followed by a Recommendation. Recommendations are consecutively numbered by Area of Focus for ease in referencing. The Areas of Focus are preceded by an Executive Summary.

METHODOLOGY

The Findings in this report resulted from my inspections of the facilities concerned; personal interviews with THE STORE employees; and review of documents, records, and statistics relating to security operations and personnel, inventory shortage, organizational policy, procedures and structure, receipt and distribution of merchandise, and control of cash. We have purposely not included in this report maps, organization charts, statistical summaries, etc., obtained from and readily available to bookstore management unless such documents are integral to this report.

While every recommendation contained herein is a practical enhancement of existing security, some are optional in nature and not absolutely essential to meet the objectives of the Survey; they are presented to provide the reader with a range of solutions and options available.

In all cases the optimal recommendation, in my opinion, is presented first, followed, in some cases, by less than optimal but still useful alternatives which may be temporarily utilized.

It must also be noted that my Survey was conducted shortly after the end of Fall Rush and while THE STORE was still in the process of “getting back to normal.” Admittedly, some deficiencies noted herein may well automatically be corrected when THE STORE returns to “normal” operations; however, loss prevention vulnerabilities are the greatest during Rush, so in this sense this survey may actually be more meaningful than if conducted in mid-semester.

Finally, we recognize that there may be inherent conflict between the establishment of some appropriate security procedures for a retail business of the size and type of THE STORE and the requirements, real or perceived, of operating on the campus of a prestigious and world-renowned research university in the somewhat cloistered environment of academia. In these instances, management must be the final arbiter.

The cooperation and assistance of the following persons who were interviewed is noted:

• Mr. Rich Jones, Vice President, Universal University

• Mr. T, Martin, CSP, Director

• Ms. S. Xxxxxxx, Operations General Manager

• Ms. D. Xxxxxx, Human Relations Manager

• Mr. J. Xxxxxx, Warehouse and MIS Manager

• Mr. K. Xxxxxx, Head, Computer Sales and Technology

• Mr. B. Xxxxxx, Security and Retail Supervisor

• Mr. S. Xxxxxx, Buyer—All Text and Trade books

• Mr. B. Xxxxx, Print Shop Manager

• Ms. R. Xxxxxxxxx, Warehouse Supervisor

• Ms. D. Xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Account Representative

• Ms. D. Xxxxxxx, Head Cashier, Sales Audit and Payroll Clerk

• Mr. S. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Retail Manager (Clothing and Memorabilia)

• Mr. P. Xxxxxxxxx, Retail Manager (Supplies, Electronics, and Gifts)

• Mr. L. Xxxxxx, Sales Associate

Non-Bookstore personnel:

• Ms. M. Xxxxx, Esq., Judicial Administrator, Universal University

• Mr. G. Xxxxxx, Business Solutions, Program Consulting Manager

• Mr. R. Xxxxxxx, Investigator, Universal Police Department (Crime Prevention

• Mr. G. Xxxxxxxx, Investigator, Universal Police Department (Crime Prevention)

• Mr. C. Xxxxxxxxxxx, Xxxxxxxx Alarm Company

Special Thanks to Jane Sxxxxx, Secretary to the Director, for her courtesies and help.

Executive Summary

Universal University is situated in Middleton, New York, a city with a population of approximately 30,000 people. The Universal community, during the school year, consists of 20,000 students and 10,000 faculty and staff.

THE STORE, with $30+ million of annual sales, operates under the overall supervision of Mr. Rich Jones, who, before being appointed a University Vice President several years ago, was THE STORE CEO and Director for many years. While part of the University system, THE STORE is financially self-supporting and pays 5% of its gross sales (with some minor exceptions) as a “royalty” to the University. It is housed in a two- story facility located near the center of the University campus. Its design is unique; University esthetics’ requirements [preserving a view] preclude any design changes to the building. This prohibition effectively precludes any expansion, both outward and upward, which is desperately needed.

THE STORE comprises 43,000 square feet of primarily selling space with minimal nonselling support and office space. THE STORE is open 5 days [closed Sundays] for 50 hours a week. THE STORE also operates three remote retail locations: a very small outlet at the Veterinary School, a small outlet in the Xxxxx Hotel lobby, and a brand new retail section added to the Best Copy Center. Additionally, THE STORE operates a Print Shop and a 12,000 square foot Warehouse, which houses the Universal Business Center [Travel Service, Sales Audit, and Accounting Departments] in a 3,800 square foot second floor area. In all, THE STORE has 72 career and from 10–60 part-time student employees and, as needed, from 5 to 65 temporary agency personnel.

The store is open Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and Saturdays from noon until 5:00 p.m.; a total of 50 hours per week.

The existing security and loss prevention policies, procedures, organization, and operations are inadequate to meet the stated shortage objectives of management.

The security organization is essentially nonexistent. Mr. Ben Johnson, a Retail Manager, was tasked early this year with the responsibility for security/loss prevention. To his credit, Mr. Johnson, with no background in loss prevention, began to acquire some of the fundamental precepts of loss prevention, primarily by using the Web and reading a security magazine. While these efforts are laudatory, this approach is doomed to failure, particularly when his retail operations responsibilities have not diminished and demand his full-time attention. Mr. Johnson’s status as a nonmember of senior management coupled with his lack of any formal security/loss prevention training assures not only a mediocre loss prevention effort at best, but a real danger of inadvertently creating civil liability resulting from well-intentioned but legally erroneous procedures.

Shoplifting detection and apprehension had been accomplished by a part-time employee who monitored THE STORE’s closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. This person is no longer employed and his employment violated New York state law; he has not been replaced. Consequently, the sole shoplifting detection relies on sales associate’s response to alarms of the electronic article surveillance (EAS) system at the store exits, a procedure which currently is essentially ineffective.

There is no Security/Loss Prevention Operations Manual. Mr. Johnson, again to his credit, has written a document titled “Security and Operations: Responsibility and Policy Manual.” Unfortunately, as a result of Mr. Johnson’s lack of training, this document contains numerous procedural and legal errors, which places THE STORE in legal jeopardy. Additionally, this document is totally silent on retail loss prevention techniques, fraud prevention, and internal theft.

Most employees felt THE STORE was “wide open” to shoplifting; nearly all suggested that THE STORE’s CCTVs should be monitored and that backpacks/book bags not be allowed in the store. Merchandise handling and distribution procedures seem adequate, but there are no procedures in place to either deter or evidence theft.

Some buyers felt that the computerized inventory control system had glitches resulting in reporting nonexistent missing inventory and exaggerating shrinkage. An examination of THE STORE’s back office equipment [laptops, printers, copiers, etc.] disclosed that many had no serialized property tags affixed. It is doubtful that an exact inventory of THE STORE’s equipment exists or that losses could, if noticed, be substantiated. Shoplifting controls need improvement; the antishoplifting closed-circuit television (CCTV) system, while in the process of being upgraded, remains below par. The EAS system needs maintenance; portals operate erratically, alarms are not loud enough, and the red alarm lights do not all work. It appeared that even tagged items could pass through the system undetected. Cashiers at registers cannot adequately respond to alarms when they do occur. Successful shoplifting creates the opportunity for fraudulent returns, primarily of textbooks, and there is no procedure currently in place to detect this activity.

Internal theft is a subject which apparently has received little attention. There have been few employees apprehended for stealing and, at least one that was, was reportedly allowed to continue working. Suspicions of internal theft are not referred to Mr. Johnson but rather “investigated” by the Operations Manager. CCTV surveillance of cash register checkout areas is lacking. This is an area which requires a significant increase in emphasis, the adoption of techniques to identify and surface any problems, and the acquisition of personnel trained to investigate and resolve these issues.

Physical security requires considerable attention. Physical protection of reserve stock merchandise and offices containing merchandise all create loss vulnerabilities. The continued upgrading of CCTV will improve both internal and external theft detection and provide management with a valuable tool for improved customer service and staffing evaluation. The fire sprinkler head in the ceiling of the POS computer room should be capped off; an accidental or intentional discharge of the water sprinkler would ruin the computers and put those systems out of business until replacement equipment could be installed. The door to this space should be locked when the room is unoccupied; backup tapes should be stored in a fireproof container. Alarm systems, while adequate, contain capabilities which are being underutilized. Management, therefore, does not gain the advantage of available, but unused, features providing additional safeguards and controls. Testing of alarm systems is not done; there is no exception reporting. Key controls and issuance and deletion of access control codes require written documentation; all keys should be stamped “Do Not Duplicate.” Employee package checks are rarely performed, and there have never been any real-time janitor surveillances or checks, even though they are in the store after hours and have keys and alarm codes.

Inventory figures reflect generally increasing shortages over the past several years. In FY 02 [excluding computer sales and shrink], textbooks and educational supplies represented approximately 90% of the shrinkage dollars while responsible for only 55% of sales. It is the consensus that the bulk of these losses occur during Fall and Spring Rush, where space needs and limitations result in the virtual inability to deter and detect shoplifting. Textbook shortages at nearly 6% is triple the industry average.

Dock security in THE STORE is unacceptable and offers opportunities for increased security and minimizing potential loss situations. The lack of security controls and disciplines on the dock present serious vulnerabilities; there is often unrestricted access to the dock, mechanical equipment room, and employee-only areas. The location and accessibility of the employee badges to nonemployees should be eliminated. The University has a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plan, and the Universal Business Services (THE STORE) plan has been integrated into it. It was indicated the Emergency Plan is available on campus computer terminals; this policy should be reviewed as to whether having the plan universally available (without password) on terminals for legitimate reference outweighs its general availability to a potential miscreant, particularly since the printed document is marked Confidential.

University Police resources, such as their crime prevention officers, are underutilized.

Housekeeping and neatness in general needs significant improvement.

The entire issue of security, loss prevention, and the protection of assets appears, until recently, to have been largely ignored. Efforts to establish better controls for protecting assets must be undertaken. Interestingly, no employees suggested that the community at Universal is, unlike the general population, not subject to human frailties and temptations, which include acts of dishonesty. It is, therefore, management’s responsibility to insist that procedures be in place and that they be followed to adequately protect the assets of THE STORE.

It is noted that existing policies, procedures, controls and disciplines within the various areas of focus not mentioned herein have been found to be adequate to meet currently recognized minimum security standards and practices.

The recommendations and suggestions contained in this report should help position THE STORE’s management in addressing the security needs of this vital facility to assure that THE STORE can continue not only to meet its mission. but to do so at increased profitability.

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

AREA OF FOCUS #1
Overall Security Posture
FINDING:	It is the consensus of those interviewed and the observation of this consultant that security at THE STORE is less than adequate. This situation is a matter of concern to nearly every employee interviewed, but most seemed unwilling or unable to grant the solutions and disciplines required for correction a high priority. This inaction appears to stem from two basic factors: (1) lack of time and other pressing priorities, and (2) the absence of the expertise required to develop and implement loss prevention training, procedures and programs
RECOMMENDATION 1.1:	Loss prevention training, programs, and awareness must become an integral part of THE STORE environment. This will require the employment of a security/loss prevention professional whose basic duties and responsibilities are limited to his area of expertise.
FINDING:	Responses to written questionnaires and personal interviews make it apparent that there are numerous misconceptions and misunderstandings regarding some of the University’s and THE STORE’s policies, procedures, and operating standards with respect to security issues among store management.
RECOMMENDATION 1.2:	Management must assure that security standards, after adoption by senior management, are adequately promulgated, understood, and followed by all employees.
FINDING:	Senior merchants and department managers must be an integral part of the process toward shortage reduction, and should be intimately aware of the shortage percentages and dollars down to the classification level. Any lack of knowledge about shortage detail does not permit managers to design and then implement the necessary shortage reduction strategies specific to merchandise classifications.
RECOMMENDATION 1.3:	Each department manager should be given all available data regarding his department’s shortage. After each inventory, this data should be discussed with the appropriate senior member of management, and shortage reduction strategies and goals for the coming inventory period should be agreed upon in writing. Periodic follow-up should be made to assure implementation of agreed-upon action.
FINDING:	The entire thrust of THE STORE’s security program is the apprehension of shoplifters.
	The broad concept of loss prevention is totally absent. Basic loss prevention activities as employee security orientations, return/refund analysis, inventory shortage review, merchandise movement control, developing minimum security standards for merchandise presentation, audits of security-sensitive areas, employee package checks, and the development and implementation of security/loss prevention policies and procedures are either completely lacking or barely adequate.
RECOMMENDATION 1.4:	The thrust of THE STORE’s shortage control and security activities must be prevention. It is essential the program be redesigned to make prevention of loss a priority with apprehension by security considered a necessary activity only after the prevention efforts fail or are ignored. This effort should (a) start at the top and permeate through all employee levels, (b) establish defined shortage reduction goals, and (c) require that managers and supervisors be held accountable for results. A culture of discipline and controls must be established. While designated security personnel will play a key role in prevention efforts, all employees must be involved for the effort to succeed.
FINDING:	THE STORE has assigned the security function as one of the responsibilities of a Retail Manager, which is not a senior management level position. This organizational position of the security/loss prevention function, coupled with the Retail Manager’s lack of any formal security training, has, perhaps inadvertently, relegated the perception of the importance of security to a rather subordinate and unimportant role.
RECOMMENDATION 1.5:	THE STORE should recruit and hire an experienced professional security manager who will function at a senior management level. The proper candidate can assume responsibility for new employee security/safety training covering external theft, internal theft, and fraud; supervise and train the security staff; assist in inventory preparation; conduct audits; establish a meaningful shortage control and loss prevention program which functions throughout the year; and be a fully contributing member of senior management.
FINDING:	There is no Loss Prevention Manual.
RECOMMENDATION 1.6:	A comprehensive compilation of all policies and procedures designed for loss prevention and shortage control should be prepared as “the Bible” for security/loss prevention personnel as well as guidance to store management.
FINDING:	THE STORE currently has no one dedicated to the loss prevention function.
RECOMMENDATION 1.7:	A qualified Security Manager [see Recommendation 1.5 supra] will possess advanced investigative skills and can effectively train, schedule, and supervise subordinates to monitor CCTVs and assist in other security/loss prevention activities. The goal of a close working relationship between security agents and other store personnel is essential to effective loss prevention and shortage control.
FINDING:	THE STORE does not have in place procedures which both deter and provide for early detection of internal dishonesty
RECOMMENDATION 1.8:	That procedures and techniques, such as register “salting,” introduced errors, extraction programs in the distribution system, and random surprise audits and inspections be implemented.
FINDING:	THE STORE has no in-house capability to properly and successfully detect and investigate any but the most obvious, basic, and straightforward indicia of employee dishonesty or fraud.
RECOMMENDATION 1.9:	This finding further mandates the hiring of a security professional.

AREA OF FOCUS #2
Security Organization
FINDING:	THE STORE has essentially no security/loss prevention personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 2.1:	Recruit and hire a security professional and adequate subordinate personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 2.2:	Loss prevention personnel below the Manager should be referred to as Security Agents or Loss Prevention Agents.
RECOMMENDATION 2.3:	Devote at least 106 hours a week to dedicated nonstudent loss prevention personnel; typically a 40-hour Manager and 66 hours of Agent’s time.

Note: The importance of implementing RECOMMENDATIONS 1.5, 1.7, 2.1 and 2.2 will become evident as the balance of the findings under this and Area of Focus #4 are studied.

2.2 Training

Note: This section will be also referenced in Section 2.7, “Liability Issues.”

FINDING:	The lack of a professional security manager subjects THE STORE to civil liability as well as potential criminal liability.
RECOMMENDATION 2.4:	THE STORE must employ a security professional.
RECOMMENDATION 2.5:	A written test should be required to establish comprehension of the training materials given security personnel, and follow-up training should be required at least yearly to update them regarding any new legal issues, shoplifting techniques, etc.
RECOMMENDATION 2.6:	A security professional should be responsible for training security personnel who will be making detentions/apprehensions.
RECOMMENDATION 2.7:	Anyone hired to monitor CCTVs should also be fully trained to make detentions and perform essentially other loss prevention functions, such as audits, loss analysis, surveillances etc.

2.3 Deployment and Productivity

FINDING:	There are no dedicated loss prevention personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 2.8:	By utilizing properly trained full-time security agents, performing under the supervision of a qualified security manager, their role could be proactive with all the concomitant benefits deriving therefrom.
RECOMMENDATION 2.9:	Security personnel should be scheduled 15 minutes before store opening and until all personnel have left THE STORE at closing.

2.4 Supervision

FINDING:	Mr. Johnson is supervised by the Operations Manager, who is questionable with respect to his loss prevention duties.
RECOMMENDATION 2.10:	When a security professional is hired, they should report to the Store Director.
RECOMMENDATION 2.11:	Agent personnel should report only to the Security Manager.

2.5 Report Writing and Record Retention

FINDING:	At present, THE STORE’s apprehension reports are prepared on Mr. Johnson’s computer terminal. There should be a written report of all detentions, not just apprehensions. It is the detention where no stolen merchandise is found which are the troublesome ones. These must be documented and given thorough review to minimize this liability exposure and to determine if retraining is needed.
RECOMMENDATION 2.12:	Detention reports should be reviewed periodically by someone in the University legal office to assure compliance with all codes and statutes.
RECOMMENDATION 2.13:	Mr. Johnson’s computer should require a password to access Apprehension Reports; this information should not be available to unauthorized persons.
RECOMMENDATION 2.14:	A copy of the security access password should be placed in a sealed envelope and kept in a secure location for use in emergencies.
RECOMMENDATION 2.15:	Arrest report information should be retained for seven (7) years and then destroyed.

2.6 Liability Issues

FINDING:	Existing Security Policies contain inaccuracies. (See FINDING and RECOMMENDATION 2.5 supra.)
RECOMMENDATION 2.16:	A security professional should prepare the
	Security Manual; it should be reviewed by University legal counsel.
FINDING:	Christopher Extra, who monitored THE STORE’s CCTV [no longer employed or replaced] violated New York General Business Law Article 7-A [Security Guard Act] § 89-e et seq. by not having the required training and registration required by this act.
RECOMMENDATION 2.17:	Conduct all security activities in compliance with state law. A security professional would have known of this law and prevented its violation by THE STORE.
FINDING:	As noted in several sections above, various of my findings point out potential liability exposure for THE STORE/University. These exposures are inherent in the activities of any security department, but by careful and proper selection of personnel, coupled with adequate training and supervision, these risks can be minimized.
RECOMMENDATION 2.18:	The entire security function, when its structure is ultimately determined, should be reviewed with the University’s legal counsel.
FINDING:	Mr. Johnson does not have a lockable office or a locked file cabinet.
RECOMMENDATION 2.19:	Mr. Johnson [or any subsequent Security Manager] requires an office which is private and a file cabinet which locks. This protects THE STORE from civil suits for invasion of privacy or defamation.
	For example: If the Security Manager interviews an employee about any issue in an area which is not private, others observing this conversation may draw erroneous conclusions as to the reasons for the interview.
	Further, sensitive documents, which may be on his desk, are less open to compromise.
	Similarly, arrest reports, investigative reports, and other security information must be securely stored to prevent unauthorized access.

Area of Focus #3
Security-Related Written Policies and Procedures
FINDING:	The use of the current “Security and Operations: Responsibility and Policy Manual” prepared by Mr. Johnson contains various errors, omissions, and inappropriate instructions.
	For example: Under the section “Job Description” A and B state the security employee is responsible for “the maintenance of daily store activities,” including such things as “Store errands, clearing rooms, washing vans and doing odd jobs.” If loss prevention is to be effective, its personnel cannot also be janitors. There is no mention that, if a suspect is female, the industry standard is always have a female witness present.
	The policy states there is a duty to apprehend customers when they conceal merchandise and leave the sales floor without purchasing it. This statement should provide that the employee must know that the concealed merchandise belongs to THE STORE and was not previously purchased.
	The policy provides for an apprehension when another employee states he witnessed a shop-lift and is willing to provide a written statement. The industry rule is “If you didn’t see it, it didn’t happen.” Additionally, New York Criminal Procedure Law § 140.30 provides that for a misdemeanor arrest (under $1000) the crime must be committed in the presence of the arresting person. There is no mention in the Policy of the Industry standard of meeting the “six steps” prior to an apprehension. SEE ATTACHMENT I.
RECOMMENDATION 3.1:	That use of the current Security Manual be discontinued immediately until it is revised to meet acceptable standards.
RECOMMENDATION 3.2:	That all training materials utilized in training store security personnel be thoroughly examined for content and approved by University legal counsel.
FINDING:	There is no document such as “WELCOME TO THE STORE” which contains the work rules, policies, and procedures expected to be followed by employees. A draft document, intended for student employees, titled “Policy Manual,” which covers some work rules, dress code, use of time clock, breaks, absenteeism, name badges, and other similar topics, awaits final publication approval. This draft document has, in my view, several deficiencies, namely: (1) “When the store is closed for business, do not leave guests/friends unattended.” (2) There is no mention of the consequences of violating the rules against ringing up your own sale or making your own change. (3) The stated policy regarding use of store equipment is vague. “Use for other than legitimate store business is discouraged.” What does this mean? (4) There is no stated prohibition against theft of merchandise, money, or time. (5) There is no specific procedure regarding ringing all sales.
RECOMMENDATION 3.3:	(a) Friends/guests should never be in the store after closing. (b) A specific statement about theft should be included.
RECOMMENDATION 3.4:	Develop a written set of Rules and Regulations governing employee behavior. State with specificity that any act of theft or fraud against THE STORE will result in immediate dismissal and possible criminal prosecution. (This is covered in the University’s “Policy Notebook for Universal Community” given to all students.) However, it does not reach temporary agency personnel employed by THE STORE). A thorough review of all employee rules and regulations is suggested, since employer liability for employee actions is expanding as a result of statutory law and court decisions. Employee rules must be both comprehensive and clear with regard to the penalty for violations. With regard to register procedures, specific rules regarding: (a) always giving receipt, (b) immediate ringing of sales, (c) all sales must be recorded, and (d) “open drawer” selling is prohibited [except in Munch] should be published.
FINDING:	I found no specific regulations covering Buyers.
RECOMMENDATION 3.5:	Prepare a “Buyers Guide” which should contain, inter alia, the following: (a) Cash compensation is NEVER to be accepted by a buyer under any circumstances. (b) Compensation of any kind in any form from publishers, manufacturers or sales representatives must be disclosed to immediate supervisor or THE STORE Director. (c) Any incident that seems unethical must be brought to the attention of THE STORE Director.
FINDING:	I found no document covering “CUSTOMER SERVICE.”
RECOMMENDATION 3.6:	It is well established that the best defense to shoplifting is good customer service. While it is not always possible to service each customer immediately, it is possible to immediately establish eye contact, and by words [“I’ll be right with you”] or body language let the customer know that her presence is known. These actions provide an effective shoplifting deterrent; the sales associate should never wait until approached by the customer to initiate these actions. Establish a rule or statement (and perhaps signs in back office areas) to the effect that employees are expected to: Recognize each customer immediately; Establish eye contact; Smile and be pleasant; Give each customer excellent service.
FINDING:	The Emergency Preparedness Plan for Universal Business Services on page 18 refers to the appropriate actions to take in case of criminal activity or bomb threats. While the information contained in these sections is accurate, it is unlikely an employee would have the time to refer to these pages should such an event occur.
RECOMMENDATION 3.7:	Have available, at appropriate locations, a Robbery Checklist. SEE ATTACHMENT II.
RECOMMENDATION 3.8:	Have available, at appropriate locations, a Bomb Threat Checklist. SEE ATTACHMENT III.
FINDING:	The Draft document titled “The Universal Store Employee Policy Handbook” corrects many of the deficiencies noted above in the draft “Policy Manual.” This Handbook document is quite detailed and should be published and distributed to all employees. My comments for suggested changes are minor, but include (a) The statement regarding the keeping of personal belongings at the cash register should be stronger; it should state is prohibited. (b) The term “immediate family” in the employee purchases section needs definition; what constitutes “immediate family” should be clearly defined. Under the section on Holding of Merchandise, the term “any length of time” should be stated more specifically in terms of hours or days. (c) Include comments in Recommendation 3.5 supra. (d) Under the sections on Telephones, Computers, and Fax Machines, the terms “discouraged” and “greatly discouraged” are used. If THE STORE wants to allow employee use for store nonbusiness [which I don’t recommend], then some approval by a senior management person should be required. (e) See Area of Focus # 8 regarding “Hot Line” recommendation. (f) see Recommendations 3.7 and 3.8 supra.
RECOMMENDATION 3.9:	Make changes suggested in (a) through (f) supra.
FINDING:	Neither the draft “Policy Manual” nor the draft “Policy Handbook” makes provision for the employees to certify they have read, understand, and agree to its provisions.
RECOMMENDATION 3.10:	Have only one “Policy Manual.” Whatever document is finally approved and issued, it should contain a tear-off portion at the end which contains language similar to: “I certify that I have read the above, fully understand it, and agree to it. I further understand that any violations may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination without prior warning.” This statement should then be signed by the employee, removed from the main document (which should be retained by the employee), and filed in the employee’s personnel file.
RECOMMENDATION 3.11:	Establish a “tickler” system to assure the return and proper filing in the employee’s personnel file of this signed form from every new employee.

Area of Focus #4
Loss Prevention Awareness and Training
4.1 Awareness
FINDING:	My interviews and observations failed to disclose any systematic and comprehensive loss prevention awareness training.
RECOMMENDATION 4.1:	Management must give a high priority to developing and implementing programs designed to increase loss prevention awareness among all levels of employees. This should include a new employee security orientation [where the CCTV monitoring room is shown to them].
RECOMMENDATION 4.2:	After a professional Security Manager is onboard, encourage the campus newspaper to write an article, with photos, about loss prevention in THE STORE.
FINDING:	A relatively high rate of turnover among student staff and temporary employees exacerbates the ability to maintain a high level of loss prevention awareness.
RECOMMENDATION 4.3:	Loss prevention awareness must be generated and maintained by constant attention and emphasis, in varied formats, so interest and participation will be maintained.
4.2 Programs and Training
FINDING:	There are currently no programs directed toward loss prevention as a concept; the emphasis on shoplifting is not considered loss prevention, since it is purely reactive to a problem. Shoplifting apprehensions, in the main, represent the failure of effective loss prevention.
RECOMMENDATION 4.4:	A formalized loss analysis matrix must be designed and implemented so that evidence of loss can be dealt with by prevention strategies throughout the year. A committee, consisting of HR, Security, and Operations representatives should be formed to devise an ongoing loss prevention program. Some suggestions for methods to achieve this recommendation are (a) Develop and utilize a program called Minimum Security Standards for Merchandise Presentation (MSSMP). Include in the security standards merchandise which it has been determined must be under glass, in locked cases, cabled, EAS tagged, displayed behind registers, under CCTV observation, inventoried daily/weekly/monthly, stored in locked stockrooms, etc. Then audit to these standards on a periodic but random basis. This technique helps develop loss prevention awareness. (b) Develop and utilize a Security Violation/Discrepancy Notice. This form is a short notification of observed security or MSSMP violations, requiring the violator to respond within 48 hours stating the actions to be taken to prevent future similar violations. SEE ATTACHMENT IV. (c) Ensure full use of the currently available “Product Recovery Log.” Utilize this form for loss analysis; i.e., determine whether it is the product itself or the location where the product is displayed that is responsible for its theft. (d) Create a Shortage Prevention or Loss Prevention corner on the employee’s bulletin board by the time clock at the employee entrance. Include loss prevention tips, creative solutions to shortage problems, LP tips, etc. Commercial programs can be purchased which provide constantly updated and attractive LP materials, posters, handouts, etc. (e) Include, periodically, a LP handout as a paycheck stuffer. (f) Every 6 months have a Shortage Awareness Week. Utilize THE STORE’s PA system for before-store-opening announcements related to shortage. Have contests related to shortage; have a catchy theme, e.g., “Get caught with your shortage down.” Give out “Shortage Dollars” to contest winners redeemable for small prizes—cokes, candy, donuts, pens, etc. Make the event fun and encourage wide participation. The LP message will get through (even subliminally) and, more importantly, will be remembered.
4.3 Rewards
FINDING:	THE STORE has no Reward Program. Awards are not given to employees who are responsible for detecting shoplifting, reporting internal theft, or making other noteworthy contributions to shortage reduction.
RECOMMENDATION 4.5:	The introduction of a Reward Program can provide an opportunity for hyping up LP, if done with enough fanfare and enthusiasm. A formalized, well-publicized program for rewarding employees who contribute to shortage reduction is needed. SEE ATTACHMENT V.

Area of Focus #5
Merchandise Handling Procedures
5.1 Receipt of Goods
FINDING:	Receipt of goods at the warehouse appears to meet required security standards.
RECOMMENDATION 5.1:	None.
FINDING:	While opinions differ, it is evident that there is less than a tight control over and accounting for individual units of merchandise received from the warehouse by THE STORE. The best evidence indicates store receivings are not matched against transfer manifests.
RECOMMENDATION 5.2:	This deficiency should be corrected.
FINDING:	There is no physical separation between incoming and outgoing shipments at the warehouse or THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 5.3:	The physical design of the warehouse dock makes physical separation of receivings from outgoing merchandise extremely difficult. To the extent possible, goods should be staged away from the dock areas as soon as possible to minimize theft potential and inadvertent intermixing.
5.2 Transfer Records and Controls
FINDING:	As noted above, little, if any, attention is paid to manifests relating to shipments from the warehouse to THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 5.4:	All merchandise received at THE STORE should be checked against receiving documents.
FINDING:	There is no “extraction” program in use at the warehouse. An extraction program periodically and surreptitiously either adds or removes goods from shipments [assuming the paperwork cannot be easily manipulated to accomplish the same results]. The objective of these manipulations is to see how accurately the receiving personnel check in manifested merchandise and report discrepancies.
RECOMMENDATION 5.5:	Consider an extraction program.
FINDING:	The physical handling of warehouse receivings and the documentation and ticketing functions appear to be in order. Some additions to the physical security aspects of the warehouse will be noted under Area of Focus # 9.
FINDING:	University trucks (vans) are used to move merchandise from the warehouse to THE STORE, but there is no way to determine if merchandise has been removed between the warehouse and THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 5.6:	At least during Rush, seal the cages so that, if they are opened before arriving at THE STORE, it will be evident. The extraction program would also be useful in this regard. See Recommendation 5.5 supra.

Area of Focus # 6
Asset And Property Controls
6.1 Cash Handling Procedures
FINDING:	No visitor log is maintained in the vault.
RECOMMENDATION 6.1:	Such a log should be in place.
FINDING:	Register drawers are never “salted” to determine if overages are properly reported.
RECOMMENDATION 6.2:	This technique should be adopted and utilized periodically. Doing so is both a check against internal dishonesty as well as a check on whether sales associates are counting their setup (float) funds accurately.
FINDING:	There is no stated limit of the amount of cash allowed to be built up during the day in cash registers and no requirement that when a given amount is reached the register be “bled” by making an interim deposit.
RECOMMENDATION 6.3:	Registers should not be permitted to exceed a predetermined amount of cash as a robbery loss minimization practice. A procedure for early or interim deposits should be in place to permit this security precaution. Cashiers should be required to telephone the vault when cash exceeds set limits.
FINDING:	There are no surprise audits of cash registers.
RECOMMENDATION 6.4:	Surprise audits should be done periodically.
FINDING:	At store closing, some employees close and count their registers while customers remain in THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 6.5:	If possible, cash counting should not be done in public areas or when customers are about. Cash should not be transported throughout THE STORE in an obvious way, but rather done as discreetly as possible.
FINDING:	No record is kept of the dates when vault combinations are changed.
RECOMMENDATION 6.6:	Such a record should be kept.
FINDING:	When registers are bled (i.e., excessive cash removed), currency is simply taken out uncounted, placed in an envelope with the appropriate register number, sealed, and taken to the vault to be accounted for when the register is reconciled.
RECOMMENDATION 6.7:	Currency removed from a register should be counted by denomination and verified by the cashier. A self-carbonizing “Cash Withdrawal Slip” is then prepared showing the amounts withdrawn and initialed by the cashier and transporting person. The original copy of the Cash Withdrawal Slip should be placed inside the sealed envelope with the currency and taken to the vault. The copy of the Cash Withdrawal Slip is left behind in the register.
FINDING:	Both the Photo Shop and the Munch area have locked drawers containing funds for making change when the registers require it. Change is made on a strictly exchange basis [e.g., four 5-dollar bills for 20]. No documentation is kept. The Munch fund is not audited by the vault cashier. [It was reported this fund was a “deal” made between the Munch area and the Business Office.]
RECOMMENDATION 6.8:	Funds should never be exchanged without documentation.
RECOMMENDATION 6.9:	These funds should be audited on a regular and frequent basis.
FINDING:	With regard to the vault, good security practices require additional vault controls:
RECOMMENDATION 6.10:	Take the following actions: (a) Distress (panic) alarms should be tested at least quarterly and a log kept of such tests. (b) A code should be used between the security person testing the panic alarms with the Police Department to assure the “test,” which will not produce a police response, is not being done under duress. (c) A safe, rather than a wooden cabinet, should be used to store cash. (d) A log should be kept of all nonvault persons entering the vault. (e) Too many MOD (Managers of the Day) have both access and vault alarm codes. Access to the vault should be limited to the fewest number of people possible. (f) Float funds in the Business Office are audited daily; this practice should be continued after the move of the Sales Audit function to THE STORE. Written documentation of such audits should be kept.
6.2 Fraud Controls
FINDING:	There is no review or verification of returns with receipts.
RECOMMENDATION 6.11:	Random phone calls should be made to customers who returned merchandise. The thrust of these calls should be customer service [e.g., what was wrong with the merchandise?]. Such calls serve not only as a fraud detection technique but also a customer service tool.
FINDING:	Registers generate plain paper throw-out receipts headed with the “THE UNIVERSAL STORE.”
RECOMMENDATION 6.12:	Register tapes should have a running preprinted or watermarked THE STORE identifiable legend. Such a precaution makes fraud by unauthorized personal computer-generated receipts, used for fraudulent returns of stolen merchandise, more difficult.
FINDING:	I could not ascertain that routine audits of
	Vendor credits were done.
RECOMMENDATION 6.13:	Routine audits of Buyers’ write-offs and vendor credits should be performed.
FINDING:	It is highly likely that, after purchasing textbooks, students return to the textbook area, shoplift one or more books identical to those previously purchased, and then use their original receipt to return the books for credit. Currently, no procedures are in effect to detect and prevent this practice.
RECOMMENDATION 6.14:	Consider stamping the inside cover of the purchased texts with a date stamp using invisible ultraviolet ink. When stolen texts are returned for credit, a quick check with an ultraviolet “blue” light will determine if the book contains a date stamp. An alternative to the date stamp is a unique-designed stamp which would be difficult, if not impossible, for students to duplicate in the time frame required.

Area of Focus #7
Shoplifting Controls and Procedures
FINDING:	The CCTV monitors are not attended; there is no monitoring. [See also Area of Focus 9.2.]
RECOMMENDATION 7.1:	To have an effective antishoplifting program, as well as to get a return on your investment, CCTV must be monitored on a full-time basis.
FINDING:	Civil Remedy is not utilized.
RECOMMENDATION 7.2:	Management should review the use of Civil Remedy. New York State Law provides for merchants to recover damages from shoplifters; see New York General Obligation Law, § 11–105. The University Judicial Administrator, starting in Fall 2002, has begun utilizing “monetary fines” in limited cases of shoplift offenders; however, the fines accrue to the University. Management should consider negotiating with the University to either split, in some fashion, fines collected by the JA or, in the alternative, permit THE STORE to utilize Civil Remedy directly and simply report the matter to the JA for administrative recordkeeping. SEE ATTACHMENT VI.
FINDING:	Backpacks and book bags are allowed in THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 7.3:	This policy should be revisited. The prohibition for backpacks is considered essential to reduce shrinkage. Discussions while at THE STORE indicated there is no space for holding backpacks while their owners are shopping. Consideration should be given to whether sufficient space for cubicles to hold backpacks could be created at the two entrances to THE STORE just inside the outer doors. Even universities which normally allow backpacks in their bookstores prohibit them during Rush (e.g., Stanford and UCSD).
FINDING:	The use of a Product Recovery Log should be encouraged.
RECOMMENDATION 7.4:	I suggest this form be renamed “Missing Merchandise Report.” It is really not “recovered merchandise” that is reported and it not a “log.” A Missing Merchandise Report is used to report merchandise which is known to be missing, or evidence of missing merchandise such as found empty packaging.
	All sales associates should be provided with a supply of Missing Merchandise Reports [MMR] and instructed on their use. A MMR is a simple form on which a sales associate can report a known or suspected known loss, with specific information about where it was displayed, when it was noticed missing, etc. These forms are then accumulated daily, collated, and analyzed to determine shortage trends and enable intelligent steps to be taken to tighten security and stop the losses.
FINDING:	As noted previously, THE STORE’s loss prevention efforts center around reactive shoplifting detection and apprehension. We have also indicated that this approach is not exactly cost effective. There is no proactive loss prevention effort at present.
RECOMMENDATION 7.5:	That store management should consider a dual program of both visible and undercover security personnel. The visible security, dressed in non-police-type uniforms [e.g., a red blazer with “Loss Prevention” or “Security” on the pocket] would patrol high or known theft areas to discourage shoplifting. They can simultaneously render customer service by answering questions, directing customers to the proper locations, etc. For those customers who are not deterred by the Visible Security Officer [VSO], the undercover security agents will be present and make apprehensions. The use of VSOs and plainclothes personnel can be reserved for peak periods, Rush weeks, etc.
FINDING:	THE STORE’s highest shrink (both percentage and dollar wise) is in the textbook world. There is consensus that the bulk of textbook shrinkage occurs during Rush, when traffic is not only very heavy, but lack of space requires merchandising the books in such a way as to deny virtually all CCTV surveillance as well as visual observation of students perusing the books. SEE ATTACHMENT VII The policy of allowing backpacks in the selling areas only exacerbates the theft problem. As an aside, the space required to make available in THE STORE all the texts during Rush requires that large segments of Insignia merchandise be relocated to another floor of THE STORE as well as to a temporary text installed outside the west doors.
RECOMMENDATION 7.6:	In this Consultant’s opinion, the best solution to this problem is to acquire a venue for textbook sales outside THE STORE. Such a move would accomplish several things: (a) Prevent this relocation of Insignia merchandise which is disruptive, labor intensive, and exposes the merchandise to damage and loss. (b) Provide a selling environment which accommodates for a “one way in—one way out” arrangement. With this arrangement, backpacks could be accommodated, since they would have to be emptied at the exit registers, at which time all merchandise leaving the exit would have to be paid for. (c) See also comments in § 6.2, “Fraud Controls” (supra) and Recommendation 6.13. Objections to this solution have mentioned the availability of suitable space, the loss of ancillary purchases of supplies and Insignia goods, and the problem of students getting to and from the offsite [from THE STORE] venue.
	These objections can be overcome by the following:
RECOMMENDATION 7.7:	(a) Rent a school-type bus to transport students on a fixed ½ hour schedule to and from THE STORE’s employee entrance parking area to the warehouse venue. (b) Place a quantity of school supplies and Insignia items in this venue. Since all items will be paid for, there is little risk. (c) Consider the warehouse as a Venue. It appeared at first impression that sufficient space could be created in the current area occupied by the “rolling cabinets” used to transport textbooks. Any additional space required could be created and separated from other merchandise stored in the warehouse by plastic netting such as used on construction sites. By forming a large “U” traffic flow pattern from the front of the warehouse to the rear and back to the opposite side front, with netting used as traffic flow barriers, this appears to be a feasible solution. Backpacks could be allowed, since all books and backpacks would be subject to inspection at the checkout registers; this would assure that all textbooks were paid for. It would also eliminate the labor-intensive moves in THE STORE which the present arrangement requires.
FINDING:	When the dollars of loss in textbooks during Rush are considered, an investment of the dollars required to make the suggested changes presents a highly attractive cost/benefit ratio.
RECOMMENDATION 7.8:	If Recommendation 7.7 cannot be accepted, and textbook sales must remain in THE STORE as configured for Rush Fall 2002, consider the following: (a) Hire a sufficient number of personnel in Red Security jackets to provide full surveillance of all rows of textbook cages. (b) Prohibit backpacks. (c) Install very obvious CCTV (some of which may be dummy). (d) Make frequent PA announcements “Security to area—–.” This practice can also be employed during non-Rush times as well.
FINDING:	The EAS system requires attention and maintenance. The sound level of alarms is too low; the system frequently will not alarm when tagged items pass through the portals. Several of the red alarm lights do not function properly.
RECOMMENDATION 7.9:	Perform required maintenance to bring EAS system up to peak performance.
FINDING:	“Used” textbook stickers do not self-destruct when removed, permitting illicit switching of them to new books.
RECOMMENDATION 7.10:	Use self-destructing “Used” stickers.
FINDING:	There is no form for shoplifters to admit guilt.
RECOMMENDATION 7.11:	Utilize an “Admission Form.”
SEE ATTACHMENT VIII.
FINDING:	The current store Apprehension/Arrest report form is confusing.
RECOMMENDATION 7.12:	Consider using a revised Detention Report form.
SEE ATTACHMENT IX.
FINDING:	EAS portal alarms are frequently not responded to.
RECOMMENDATION 7.13:	More intensive training of cashiers specifying not only when to respond, but how to respond.
FINDING:	There is no “advertisement” of the existence of CCTVs, which can serve as a deterrent to shoplifting.
RECOMMENDATION 7.14:	Install one or two fixed CCTV cameras with monitors on the selling floor so students can see that there is a CCTV system and that it works.
FINDING:	It was reported that a large number of empty computer printer ink cartridge boxes are found throughout the store.
RECOMMENDATION 7.15:	Consider corralling the computer area in which ink cartridges, cables, and peripherals are sold. This should be done in such a way as to provide an in-turnstile on one side of the area and an exit by the POS terminal on the opposite side of the area.
FINDING:	There is currently no method whereby selling employees can discreetly call security.
RECOMMENDATION 7.16:	Utilize a “Code 5” or “Mr. Sam” code which, when called over the telephone to Security, will alert them to report to the area (or person) from which the call emanates.
FINDING:	Currently, small electronics (cassette recorders, MP3s, Walkmans) are secured by double-backed tape and plastic ties to a pad which is secured to the display by a cable.
	No immediate alert occurs if the item is removed from the display. There is evidence of attempted and accomplished theft of these relatively high-priced items.
RECOMMENDATION 7.17:	Utilize electronic cables for securing these items; any attempt to remove them will sound an immediate alert.

AREA OF FOCUS #8
Internal Theft Cont rols and Procedures
FINDING:	Employee package checks are rarely, if ever, done.
RECOMMENDATION 8.1:	Routine but surprise package checks are a proven deterrent to internal theft and should be conducted. THE STORE’s draft policies provide for such checks by “management or operations/security.” We suggest such checks should be done exclusively by management or security; it is not a good practice to have peers doing such inspections.
FINDING:	There is no auditing of employee purchases made under the generous employee discount program.
RECOMMENDATION 8.2:	Employee purchase records should be audited for both the absence of purchasing as well as an extremely heavy volume of purchases; such anomalies should be investigated, since they may indicate either a theft problem or an abuse of the discount program.
FINDING:	There exists no honesty shopping program.
RECOMMENDATION 8.3:	Honesty shoppers should be employed periodically. Such a program not only may provide indications of dishonesty, but also serve to provide an assessment of the level of customer service being given.
FINDING:	There have been very few identified dishonest employee cases in the past 3 years.
RECOMMENDATION 8.4:	Institute those loss prevention/security measures and procedures [recommended throughout this report]. Employ a professional security manager who possesses the knowledge and skills to legally and effectively investigate and resolve internal dishonesty problems.
FINDING:	Bonding forms are not used.
RECOMMENDATION 8.5:	A bonding form should be used for all nonstudent employees. Answers to bonding form questions, executed after employment, provide an easy means of comparison with answers to similar background questions contained on employment applications. The use of a bonding form does not require actual bonding of employees. The form itself has been shown to produce more truthful or accurate answers than those submitted on employment applications.
	Note: A “bonding form” should contain many of the same basic questions as the employment application, but in a different order. The theory behind this technique is that most persons who lie on an employment application cannot remember the exact nature of their untruths, and thus these will show up as discrepancies. The new employee should be questioned regarding these discrepancies, and if the application was falsified in any material way, it is well established that such falsification is grounds for immediate dismissal.
FINDING:	Senior management and “sensitive” positions within THE STORE should received some type of background investigation by the Universal Police Department, consistent with New York and federal law.
RECOMMENDATION 8.6:	Consideration should be given to a more thorough vetting of new career personnel and particularly those in cash handling or other sensitive positions. Thought should be given to utilizing additional screening tools for these applicants. The judiciousness of more thorough screening would appear to be more than justified as statutory demands for workplace security increase.
	Note: Any use of additional pre-employment screening techniques should be cleared with the University Human Relations office and with legal counsel.
RECOMMENDATION 8.7:	Vetting should include (a) Records checks to include [1] A criminal history check covering the past 7 years. [2] A DMV driving records check. [3] A Social Security number check [did applicant work under any other names?]. [4] Credit checks of vault employees. (b) Job offers to applicants can be made under two scenarios: [1] A job offer is not made until favorable background check results are obtained, or [2] the job offer is made contingent on a favorable background check. (c) For all applicants subject to a background investigation, the University will obtain the necessary releases. [Currently covered with University Employment Application].
RECOMMENDATION 8.8:	Anyone driving Bookstore vehicles should be subject to annual DMV checks.
FINDING:	No surprise audits are conducted of any of THE STORE’s operations.
RECOMMENDATION 8.9:	A program of surprise audits of THE STORE, remote facilities, and the warehouse should be scheduled. These audits should not be confrontational or adversarial in nature, but more of a “Hi, how ya doin’?” approach, during which appropriate auditing can be accomplished in a casual but thorough way.
FINDING:	THE STORE has no covert CCTV, “Trojan horses” (covert observation areas), or two-way mirrors for investigating either shoplifting or suspected internal theft.
RECOMMENDATION 8.10:	Adequate equipment and facilities should be acquired to permit appropriate investigations to be conducted effectively. (See comments in § 9.2 below.)
FINDING:	There is no reported mention of internal dishonesty as part of new employee indoctrination.
RECOMMENDATION 8.11:	The security portion of the new employee orientation should include the topic of internal dishonesty. It is suggested this orientation include the video The Best Defense (covering shoplifting) and its companion, Choices (covering employee dishonesty.) The security aspects of the orientation can be made into a positive event by including some information on personal security issues such as buddy systems, personal security awareness, etc.
	Note: These videos can be obtained by contacting ETC (Excellence in Training Corporation), 11358 Aurora Avenue, Des Moines, IA 50322-7979, 1-800-747-6569.
FINDING:	There is no procedure for the intentional introduction of errors into control systems.
RECOMMENDATION 8.12:	A procedure for the introduction of errors into control systems is desirable. Such a procedure tests whether such systems are in fact working as designed, and if so, by whom, when, and how the error surfaced.
FINDING:	There is no “hard and fast” prohibition against employee purses and packages on the selling floor.
RECOMMENDATION 8.13:	Implement such a policy and require strict and consistent enforcement. See Recommendation 3.8.
FINDING:	Custodial personnel work essentially unsupervised.
RECOMMENDATION 8.14:	A program of periodic surveillance of custodians is needed.
RECOMMENDATION 8.15:	Occasional package/equipment checks should be made when janitorial personnel leave THE STORE at night.
FINDING:	THE STORE uses common register drawers.
RECOMMENDATION 8.16:	If registers are ever replaced, individual drawers are always preferable to common drawers. Individual drawers significantly increase personal responsibility for cash accountability.
FINDING:	THE STORE has no Reward Program.
RECOMMENDATION 8.17:	Consider instituting a Reward Program. See Recommendation 4.5. SEE ATTACHMENT V.
FINDING:	THE STORE has no “Hot Line.”
RECOMMENDATION 8.18:	Consider either a commercially available service which provides a confidential means for employees to telephone information to management or an in-house program which accomplished this objective by a post office box. Investigation should be conducted toward perhaps utilizing the University’s “Silent Witness” program through www.cupolice.Universal.edu/witness.
SEE ATTACHMENT V.

AREA OF FOCUS #9
Physical Security
9.1 Alarms
FINDING:	The is no procedure to assure that the batteries in the emergency flashlights are operating.
RECOMMENDATION 9.1:	A log, similar to those used on fire extinguishers, should be kept in the security office and batteries tested on a monthly basis.
	Then after each test a notation is made on the log with the date and the initials of the person who made the test. This procedure assures at a glance that the batteries were tested, working, and the date of the test and who did it.
FINDING:	There is no written procedure for testing intrusion alarms.
RECOMMENDATION 9.2:	Alarm tests should be conducted every 3 months (after hours). Contact the police department and advise a test will be conducted. Advise them you will break a zone, and have them tell you what zone has been tested. Occasionally, after advising you will break a zone, don’t, and see what response you get when you inquire which zone was tested. Document all tests.
FINDING:	The Universal Police Department currently receives and responds to alarms. This procedure does not allow for exception reporting. The alarm control panel/server is capable of storing up to 200 prior events (e.g., setting and disarming system) but this information is rarely requested.
RECOMMENDATION 9.3:	A printer should be installed in THE STORE’s security office which prints out in real-time all alarm activity. This report should be reviewed daily by the Security Manager for unusual or suspicious events.
FINDING:	When alarm access codes are canceled (e.g., when an employee with the code is terminated), the cancellation is done by telephone with Omega (the alarm supplier), but no written record is kept.
RECOMMENDATION 9.4:	Log all such cancellations.
9.2 CCTV
FINDING:	Staffing levels, combined with store layout and customer velocity, suggest that new and/or improved CCTV is required in various locations. There are presently five (5) color and twelve (12) black-and-white cameras. Such CCTV will not only deter/detect shoplifting, but also provide the ability to give better customer service when customers are in blind areas of THE STORE(s). Cameras should be in domes and positioned to enable both antishoplifting and internal dishonesty investigation coverage.
RECOMMENDATION 9.5:	THE STORE: Replacement of old cameras with new color cameras is required in several areas. SEE ATTACHMENTS X and XI for location and types of cameras recommended. BEST COPY CENTER: Blind back area needs a small fixed camera with an 8-inch monitor by the cash register. SEE ATTACHMENT XII for details. HOTEL STORE: Install a convex mirror in the southwest corner of the store to enable the sales associate to see the greeting card area from the register. WAREHOUSE: SEE ATTACHMENT XIII for camera location.
FINDING:	Some Sensormatic equipment (a camera and controller keyboard) need repair.
RECOMMENDATION 9.6:	Ensure that Sensormatic is responsive in quickly repairing/replacing broken equipment.
FINDING:	CCTV camera in vault provides poor image for recognizing currency denominations.
RECOMMENDATION 9.7:	Upgrade vault CCTV.
9.3 Access and Key Controls
FINDING:	Keys are issued by key number, and a written record is made, by the Operations Manager, but keys from terminated employees are recovered by the HR Manager.
RECOMMENDATION 9.8:	All keys retrieved by the HR Manager should be turned over to and a notation of its return made by the Operations Manager in the key log.
FINDING:	Not all keys are marked “Do Not Duplicate.”
RECOMMENDATION 9.9:	ALL keys should be marked DO NOT DUPLICATE.
FINDING:	The Access Control system should be upgraded.
RECOMMENDATION 9.10:	Replace the access control system to operate from University-issued magnetic student or employee cards.
FINDING:	There is no routinely scheduled key inventory to compare issued keys to key issuance log.
RECOMMENDATION 9.11:	Conduct such an inventory at least annually.
9.4 Docks and Stock Areas
FINDING:	THE STORE’s dock door is often open and unattended, both during store hours and before THE STORE is open to the public, providing access to employee-only areas and merchandise. Vendors use the open dock for access, thereby bypassing the required sign-in procedure.
	SEE ATTACHMENT XIV.
RECOMMENDATION 9.12:	Develop a discipline that assures the dock door is only open when attended by a responsible person..
FINDING:	The dock door operates from open/close/stop switches located both inside and outside the dock. These switches are activated/deactivated by a simple on-off switch inside the dock door.
RECOMMENDATION 9.13:	Even though the dock rolldown door is alarmed at night, the on-off switch could easily be left in the on position inadvertently.
	A mechanical timer should be added to the on-off switch circuit, which will automatically turn off this switch during night hours after the dock door no longer needs to be opened. A red light should also be located by the Director’s secretary (and in the CCTV monitoring room) which turns on when the dock door is open. Such an arrangement will alert someone to the fact that the door is open and he can assure that the dock is attended.
FINDING:	There does not appear to be any locked stockrooms; even the small electronic, but expensive, items are stored in a metal filing cabinet in an employee-only area essentially adjacent to the Photo Department. This cabinet was not locked and was usually open.
RECOMMENDATION 9.14:	Effort must be expended to assure stock is secure.
FINDING:	Much stock is intermingled with store supplies in back office areas.
SEE ATTACHMENT XV.
RECOMMENDATION 9.15:	This condition must be corrected. It is easy to miss stock items at inventory when intermingled with nonretail supplies. Insist upon neat and organized stockroom/office areas. In addition to creating difficulty in finding specific merchandise, stockrooms in disarray tend to create safety hazards and lend themselves to theft.
FINDING:	There is unrestricted access by customers to back areas via the openings in the computer and backpack sales areas.
SEE ATTACHMENT XVI
RECOMMENDATION 9.16:	Install barriers (e.g., swinging doors) which will deter unauthorized access. Place signs, facing the selling floor, stating: “RESTRICTED AREA – EMPLOYEES ONLY – Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted.”
9.5 Warehouse
FINDING:	Business office personnel and visitors have unrestricted access to the warehouse.
RECOMMENDATION 9.17:	Complete the wiring of the access control pad outside the door leading up the stairs to the business office. Deny unauthorized access from the stairway to the warehouse.
SEE ATTACHMENT XVII.
RECOMMENDATION 9.18:	Upon completion of Recommendation 9.15, install an access key pad outside the door leading from the bottom of the business office stairway into the warehouse. In this way, access to the warehouse can be gained only by possessing the proper access code. Note: Warehouse personnel must have access to the restroom facilities in the business office.
FINDING:	The dock doors at the warehouse are open at times when there is no receiving or shipping for ventilation purposes.
RECOMMENDATION 9.19:	Keep the dock doors closed unless actual shipping/receiving is in progress (an accepted security standard). If the doors must be open for ventilation, then install and secure the openings with rolldown mesh doors.
9.6 POS Computer Room
FINDING:	Access to the computer room, a sensitive area, is too easy.
RECOMMENDATION 9.20:	Maintain tighter access to the computer room; keep the door locked.
FINDING:	The computer room is protected against fire by a sprinkler head in the ceiling of the room. SEE ATTACHMENT XVIII.
RECOMMENDATION 9.21:	Replace the sprinkler head with a halon (or acceptable substitute) fire suppression system. Water is the biggest enemy of computers. A discharge of the sprinkler head, either intentional or accidental, would essentially ruin the computers, shut down all computer-controlled operations, and probably necessitate the purchase of new equipment.

AREA OF FOCUS #10
Inventory Results
FINDING:	Shortage over the past few years shows a disturbing upward trend, with the bulk of the shortage in textbooks and writing instruments.
FINDING:	Reduction of shrinkage does not seem to be a high-priority item with some merchants and managers.
RECOMMENDATION 10.1:	Inventory results should be disseminated and discussed in detail with individual department managers. Departmental shortage reduction goals should be set and progress toward achievement monitored throughout the inventory period.
RECOMMENDATION 10.2:	Assure that all merchants and managers fully understand the effect of shortage on THE STORE’s bottom line and their performance reviews.
FINDING:	There is concern among merchants that missed markdowns and RTVs have resulted in artificially high shortage.
RECOMMENDATION 10.3:	Do what is required to not only assure merchants that all markdowns and RTVs are captured, but also audit to guarantee that they, in fact, are captured.
FINDING:	There is a concern among some merchants that the price lookup (PLU) system contains pricing errors.
RECOMMENDATION 10.4:	Take necessary actions to assure accuracy of the PLU system, and assure merchants of its accuracy. In reviewing the system, if possible, assure that (a) If the PLU amount is overridden at the register, an audit trail and exception report is generated. (b) All markdowns are automatically captured.
FINDING:	It was reported that known losses are written off as markdowns.
RECOMMENDATION 10.5:	If true, this should be considered when reviewing shrinkage figures.
FINDING:	As noted elsewhere in this report, retail merchandise is stored in back office areas, and housekeeping is less than desirable.
RECOMMENDATION 10.6:	Assure that all merchandise is counted at inventory.
FINDING:	Two managers suggested that the inventory system shows more items on hand than physical counts indicate when merchandise is first received.
RECOMMENDATION 10.7:	It is essential that everything be done to ensure that merchants have faith in the accuracy of the inventory control system.
FINDING:	It was reported that changes can be made to the inventory control system by merchants without any audit trail as to who made the adjustment or when it was done.
RECOMMENDATION 10.8:	If such adjustments are permitted, there should be an audit trail identifying not only who did it, when it was done, but also the justification for doing it.
FINDING:	It was reported that outdated merchandise which remains unsold is given to employees.
RECOMMENDATION 10.9:	Discontinue this practice; give it to charity.

AREA OF FOCUS #11
Emergency Planning
FINDING:	Refresher training sessions on dealing with emergencies and other important topics should be discussed with all employees.
RECOMMENDATION 11.1:	Discuss emergency procedures at orientation sessions and once a year thereafter.
FINDING:	THE STORE has no Safety Committee. The Operations Manager functions as the Safety Director.
RECOMMENDATION 11.2:	A Safety and Loss Prevention Committee composed of both management and staff from THE STORE and the warehouse should be formed. The Committee’s mission should be as follows: The Safety and Loss Prevention Committee will coordinate and facilitate all aspects of promoting security and safety at all THE STORE’s facilities. Purpose: To review all security, emergency, and safety procedures and processes; to develop security and safety programs; to identify risks and hazards; to conduct inspections; to review accidents and recommend corrective action; and to promote enforcement of THE STORE’s policies and procedures.
RECOMMENDATION 11.3:	Consider involving members of the Safety and Loss Prevention Committee in appropriate aspects of this consultant’s report; this will bring about a feeling of ownership in decisions to adopt recommendations. Names of committee members should be publicized and their photographs displayed on employee bulletin boards, giving recognition to those who serve, underscoring the importance of the Committee and making future membership, on a rotating basis, coveted.
	Note: Recommendations 11.2 and 11.3 will also have a beneficial effect in management’s efforts to enhance loss prevention awareness.
FINDING:	Neither THE STORE’s receptionist/telephone operator or any of the remote facilities have bomb threat or Robbery Checklists.
RECOMMENDATION 11.4:	Supply all appropriate personnel with a supply of Robbery and Bomb Threat Checklists. SEE ATTACHMENTS II and III.
FINDING:	There were no fire alarm pull stations except at each main entrance to the store.
RECOMMENDATION 11.5:	Check with Engineering and Health Safety to determine if this aspect is up to code.
FINDING:	There were no signs pointing out the location of fire extinguishers which would be hard to find if one did not know where they were located.
SEE ATTACHMENT XIX.
RECOMMENDATION 11.6:	Place large red arrows pointing toward and containing the words “Fire Extinguisher” high up on the walls or columns where the extinguishers are located.

AREA OF FOCUS #12
Miscellaneous
FINDING:	The crime prevention officers of the Universal Police Department have not been fully utilized by THE STORE.
RECOMMENDATION 12.1:	This is a resource that should be used from time to time for their input into THE STORE’s loss prevention efforts. For example, request the crime prevention officers to review your loss prevention efforts and procedures, alarm systems, etc.
FINDING:	Housekeeping was well below acceptable standards, both on the floor and in back office areas.
SEE ATTACHMENT XX.
RECOMMENDATION 12.2:	More attention must be paid to neatness in back areas and stocking the floor before opening. Unkempt areas are safety hazards and create theft vulnerability.
SEE ATTACHMENT.
FINDING:	Access to electric and equipment rooms was blocked by storage of miscellaneous items in violation of signs posted to not block access.
RECOMMENDATION 12.3:	Remove obstructions.
FINDING:	Many of the “management” employees felt overworked, understaffed, and frustrated. They complained of severe staffing cuts and an inability to give proper consideration to all aspects of their responsibilities. It was my impression that ensuring that proper controls were followed gives way to expediency.
RECOMMENDATION 12.4:	None specifically, except that this is an issue which must be dealt with. It is recognized that there is an inverse relationship between morale and shrinkage: the lower the morale, the higher the shrinkage.
FINDING:	It was my impression that there is a lack of discipline among management and supervisors. It appeared that good procedures are in place, but often not implemented. I am not confident that management accepts their responsibility for the nonperformance of their subordinates.
RECOMMENDATION 12.5:	No specific recommendation; if true, this is a problem which must be corrected.
FINDING:	There are currently no employee recognition programs or suggestion boxes.
RECOMMENDATION 12.6:	Consider the implementation of an employee recognition program and/or suggestion boxes.
FINDING:	Managers are not routinely given cash over/short information for their areas.
RECOMMENDATION 12.7:	Managers should be given this information.
FINDING:	The one fitting room has no controls.
RECOMMENDATION 12.8:	Place a sign on the fitting room reading “Limit 3 items.”
	Employees should be encouraged to check the fitting room frequently for left items; if practical, establish an assigned schedule.
FINDING:	Employee badges are openly displayed by the employee entrance; they are accessible to anyone who is in the area.
RECOMMENDATION 12.9:	They should be in a cabinet with, at least, a self-closing door.

Index of Attachments

Attachment Number and Name		Cited on Page
I.	The “Six Steps”	17II
II.	Robbery Checklist	20, 51III
III.	Bomb Threat Checklist	20, 51IV
IV.	Security Violation Notice	23V
V.	Reward Program	24, 41VI
VI.	Civil Remedy Law—New York	31VII
VII.	Photo—Textbook cages during Rush	33VIII
VIII.	Voluntary Admission Form	35IX
IX.	Detention Report	35X
X.	THE STORE First Floor Plan—CCTV revisions	43XI
XI.	THE STORE Second Floor Plan—CCTV revisions	43XII
XII.	Best Copy Center Pan – Proposed CCTV	43XIII
XIII.	Warehouse Plan—First Floor—CCTV proposal	44XIV
XIV.	Photos—THE STORE Receiving Dock	45XV
XV.	Photos—THE STORE – Back areas	46XVI
XVI.	Photos—Unrestricted back area access from selling floor	46XVII
XVII.	Warehouse (Business Office) Plan – 2nd Floor	46XVIII
XVIII.	THE STORE—POS Computer Room	47XIX
XIX.	THE STORE—Fire Extinguisher	51XX
XX.	Photos—THE STORE—Housekeeping	52

Facial Recognition Technology

Facial recognition technology is one of the most intriguing yet widely used technologies in the field of biometrics, if not security as a whole. Facial recognition technology involves the measuring of facial features to identify an individual or verify his identity. Similar to other biometric modalities, facial recognition algorithms encode a subject’s facial image from a standard headshot photograph into a biometric template, based on the dimensions of his face. The template is then used to match against a specific template (1-to-1 matching) or database of templates (1-to-many matching). One of the main reasons facial recognition technology has received so much attention is the potential of widescale deployment with little or no subject authorization. Unlike most other biometric modalities, facial recognition does not require participation and/or cooperation. In certain environments facial recognition software can be integrated with standard CCTV cameras, which look no different from the cameras in your parking garage, the lobby of your office, or a sports arena.

Perhaps the most widely publicized usage of facial recognition in recent history was the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida. The administrators of the program compiled a database of facial images of known criminal suspects. The facial recognition software was incorporated into the surveillance cameras that were fixed on the incoming traffic of Super Bowl goers. Presumably, the facial image of each attendee was matched against the watch list database. The system turned up a handful of accurate matches though many more false matches.

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the facial recognition community received a tremendous amount of attention. Was there a possibility that this technology could have identified the hijackers as known terrorists prior to their boarding the planes? While this still remains a question, the need for accurate facial recognition technology was spawned.

The Achilles heel of facial recognition technology, more than any other biometric technology, is the occurrence of false matches. False matches are quite simply the facial recognition software mistaking one person for another. The problem arises, however, when too many false matches result in a “boy who cried wolf” situation.

If you think about it, the concept of false matches is quite familiar to us. Many people look alike. How many times have you thought, “Boy, doesn’t she look like …?” A false match is the software’s way of telling you that it thinks it found someone who looks very much like a particular person. Now, to our human eye, the people may not look anything alike, but to the facial recognition matching algorithm, they are very similar.

The question arises, then, in the balance of false matches to positive matches. How many false matches are you willing to view and dismiss as a trade-off to finding one accurate match of a potentially dangerous person? At what point do you ignore the alerts and disregard the system?

While the government sector will continue to evaluate facial recognition technologies for use in the War on Terror, these same technologies have applications for everyday usage. At the time this piece was written, quite a few companies are beginning to evaluate facial recognition technology in the private sector as a way to combat problems that have plagued them for years. One such application is the retail security market and the fight against shoplifting.

Current loss prevention measures vary from retailer to retailer, from industry to industry. Some of the most common security tactics include electronic article surveillance (EAS) tags, CCTV camera networks, and human security guards. For most shoppers, these measures are enough of a deterrent to steer clear of any temptation. But for experienced thieves, there are always methods of circumventing the system and more sophisticated deterrents are needed to truly make an impact. Enter facial recognition technology.

Many retailers have different procedures when dealing with shoplifters. Certain retailers are interested only in getting the merchandise back. Other retailers prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. Regardless of protocol, the goal is to prevent the shoplifter from ever coming back into the store.

Whether you manage a small retail shop or are a loss prevention professional in a large department store, it is unrealistic to expect your staff to study the facial characteristics of each customer and compare them to a printed list of headshot images. While you would expect them to stop someone in the act, a preemptive measure of this sort is not feasible. In essence, facial recognition technology is handling this job for you.

Because there is no known widescale usage of facial recognition within the retail market at the time of this writing, the following is a theoretical description of usage. A typical facial recognition identification system would include a standard CCTV camera fixed on the incoming flow of human traffic into your store. Each frame captured by the camera would be automatically searched for the presence of any facial images. If any images are found, the images would be converted into a biometric template and matched against a database of previously apprehended shoplifters. If the system finds a match, your staff is notified and, in most cases, given the opportunity to visually compare the match.

How is this database compiled in the first place? The answer to this question depends on the procedures in place for each retailer. In an ideal environment, the shoplifter is apprehended and formally processed. This gives store management the opportunity to capture multiple images of the individual for the enrollment process. If this is not possible, certain facial recognition systems allow you to search through video feeds obtained that day and isolate the facial image of the individual. This is helpful for the scenarios when it is not practical to detain the subject, or, during post-event analysis.

The potential for facial recognition within the retail industry is tremendous. By identifying known shoplifters as they enter the store, management is given the opportunity to trail the person, follow him on camera, or even refuse service. As with any security technology, however, facial recognition deployments must be coupled with human participation to be able to realize the full benefits.

Privacy Concerns

No discussion of facial recognition would be complete without acknowledging the privacy implications of the technology. The word “biometrics” raises eyebrows for many people because there is a growing concern that the move toward a biometrically enabled society will ultimately result in our personal information—financial data, medical history—being connected to our fingerprint, iris pattern, or our facial features. In addition, the increase in surveillance cameras has led people to believe that we are being tracked everywhere we go and that we are one small step from an Orwellian society.

It is important to remember, however, that biometrics are not inherently privacy invasive. As with many other security technologies, the privacy danger lies in the purpose for which they are used and the manner in which they are deployed. For the purpose of tracking citizens from street to street, location to location, facial recognition biometrics poses a serious threat to privacy. For the purposes described previously, namely the identification of shoplifters within a retail environment, the usage of facial recognition is less concerning. But it still does not necessarily mean that customers will be agreeable to their favorite retail store’s usage of facial recognition.

Even though the system is not operated or monitored by some sort of centralized tracking agency, the fear of the technology lies in the fear of the unknown. Are the facial images gathered from the entrance cameras linked with other cameras around the city? Are these images being shared with public agencies to help track citizens?

The best method of addressing these questions is by proactively informing your customers as they walk through the door and offering additional information if necessary. There is no risk in being transparent. Shoplifting affects everyone, and to keep prices competitive, the store must try to reduce shoplifting as much as possible. Facial recognition is simply the means to do this.

Summary

As the search continues for effective loss prevention measures, security technology will maintain its major role in the battle against shoplifting. Facial recognition presents a unique advantage in that it is the only practical method of identifying a potential thief as he walks in the door. By deploying such a system, retail stores of all types and sizes will be armed with preemptive knowledge that has never before been offered.

Regardless of performance enhancements, the major barriers to entry will remain largely political. Fears of a surveillance society are very real. We must remember though that facial recognition technology, when used appropriately, is no different from an enhancement to the CCTV cameras that are already in place. It is not the technology that threatens privacy; it is the usage. An active dialogue between privacy advocates and the biometrics community will be a necessary component of introducing the technology into the retail environment.

Drug Test

If you are looking to hire or promote an entry-level person, that person must overcome the lack of experience through regular, documented training on company policies, law, and all elements of required skills needed to perform to the job description. All new hires, regardless of their level of past experience, should be assigned to work with another seasoned LP agent or manager. Only after the new hire repeatedly demonstrates proper judgment, abilities, and tactics should he be cleared to make solo apprehensions or detentions. While it may seem obvious, don’t overlook the environment where the successful candidate will be working. For example, you may find a male candidate with excellent background and skills, but if you are hiring for a covert loss prevention position in a store that primarily sells women’s shoes or accessories, that person will find it very difficult to blend in with the customers over long periods of time.

Most companies use the services of a third party to perform criminal records checks. Make sure the company you use actually follows up on adverse information by physically reviewing court documents. It may be tempting from an economic standpoint to rely on some of the inexpensive database checks or to purchase the DVD check systems. With cutbacks in public services throughout the country, many records are not entered for several months, if ever. Simply performing a county or state records check where the applicant has lived for the past 4 months is hardly adequate. Unfortunately, this often passes as a “records check” for many companies eager to quickly fill a much-needed position. Some employers ask only about felony convictions.

Limiting the check to only felonies is a mistake. The candidate should be asked about being convicted of any crime. There are some exceptions. For example, in California, you are not supposed to ask about a misdemeanor marijuana conviction over 1 year old. In reality, many felony crimes are ultimately reduced to misdemeanors in a plea bargain. Even grand theft can be reduced to “misdemeanor grand theft.” The candidate should be informed in writing that a previous conviction might not automatically eliminate him from hire, but that failure to disclose such conviction will. Primarily, you are looking for violations involving “moral turpitude” or a propensity toward violence. Both should be “showstoppers” in the hiring of a loss prevention officer. There is room for a judgment call. For example, a 25-year-old candidate who has a conviction for “joy riding” or a minor shoplifting conviction as a teenager might have learned something from his past mistake.

Personally, I recall hiring a candidate who admitted stealing two candy bars when he was 15 (one for his sister and one for himself). There was no criminal record found, but the candidate revealed the offense on his application, as instructed. His sense of honesty and otherwise clean record was taken into consideration. This candidate became one of the finest loss prevention agents I have known and eventually became a security director. I’m glad I gave him the chance.

A welcome new process allows you to submit security candidates to FBI scrutiny. To comply with recent new legislation, consistent with improved homeland security, the FBI will run prospective security candidates through their files to determine whether there is any criminal history known to them. Check with your local FBI office to obtain more specifics on the requirements to take advantage of this service.

A credit check is important. If the check reveals a bankruptcy or the person’s seemingly living beyond stated income level, there may be a strong temptation to misuse the position for personal gain. The credit check is also a good means of comparing the listed employers and residences on the job application to those shown in the credit report. Gaps in history or major discrepancies deserve careful follow-up with candidate. Information that leads to other geographical residences or work sites should be followed up with proper criminal background checks in those jurisdictions.

Why is a motor vehicle records check important, particularly if the candidate will not be driving a company vehicle? Often, indicators might appear that may or may not be discovered in the criminal background check. For example, a history of Failure to Appear (FTA) may show a disregard for obeying the law and may even mean there is an outstanding bench warrant. Also, DUI(s) indicate the possibility of an alcohol or other drug addiction.

With current technologies, such as scanners, color printers, and use of the Internet, it is very easy for applicants to produce phony diplomas, training certificates, certifications, etc. It is critical to verify credentials directly with the educational institution or ask the applicant to have the institution send copies directly to your attention. Your HR management has information on the high percentage of applicants who lie or exaggerate on their resume. This is a serious matter when done by any applicant but cannot be tolerated at any level with loss prevention personnel.

Paper testing for honesty, cognitive abilities, and other traits is offered by a number of service providers. It is important to use a standard test that has been documented to be an accurate indicator without being prejudicial to race, sex, or other protected classes. Again, your HR department may be able to assist you in this area.

As for evaluation by a psychologist, if used, it should be performed by one who specializes in high-stress occupational evaluations. Often those involved in vetting law enforcement candidates are a good choice, or they may be able to recommend a psychologist who will be right for your company. The cost in time and money for such testing may seem a small price in comparison with hiring the wrong person.

A number of companies are offering inexpensive drug tests that you administer quickly on the spot. The low cost may seem tempting, but unless you are prepared to administer in a manner that guarantees not intermixing tests or the candidate substituting another’s fluids for his own, then you should use a local lab that is experienced in conducting drug tests. All too often candidates for positions at every level try to beat drug tests. Don’t this let happen to you. The consequences can be devastating.

One day, in a trial or deposition, you may have to answer how you go about selecting your loss prevention officers. If you follow selected high standards and guidelines consistently, you won’t be embarrassed to give your answer.

Knowledge of Thief Behavior

Until now, most in-store sales performance and link-it systems were oblivious to the behavior of consumers. Merchandising displays were placed with little measure of effectiveness or consumer draw. Shrink-management systems tended to catch the thief after the fact and not prevent the activity from occurring.

Understanding the behavior of the shopper and the thief will be the focal point of retailers over the next decade. With the movement toward urban locations, coupled with the increase in organized professional theft, the need for better loss prevention strategies is evident. More sophisticated shrink-management strategies will be needed that can work in higher risk stores, while also providing merchandising support for the store.

For many retailers, the use of real time in-store analysis can help to redirect merchandising and asset-protection measures based on consumer traffic and the interaction consumers have with promotions, displays, and shelf systems. Video-based data can translate in-store consumer movement and relay real-time information to the store personnel to improve customer service, as well as manage professional theft situations. RFID tied to promotional displays can help track sales performance and link it to out-of-stock situations. Sensor-based shelf management systems can help determine the frequency and duration of product handling.

We are witnessing a rapid convergence of technologies that can provide retailers with new insights into the behavior of their customers. Sensor devices that measure traffic flow, temperature variations, motion detection, and entrance activity are now installed in most stores. With sophisticated CCTV software, the movement of consumers through the store can also be monitored.

Islands of Automation

Most of these systems are still “islands of automation” with no easy means to connect their outputs, but a convergence of in-store communications and network architecture is helping to merge the various technologies.

The evolving role of the LP organization in retail will depend on its ability to effectively combine expertise in store operations, merchandising, and IT systems. LP organizations that understand how to use these emerging technologies will contribute significantly to profit optimization of their companies. These real-time, decision-support tools must focus on profit optimization (selling more while losing less), as well as consumer satisfaction.

Measurement will focus on sales, margins, total supply chain shrink, profitability, and internal/external customer satisfaction surveys. For the LP managers, it is no longer sufficient to be an effective manager of loss. Today, they must help their retail organization sell more.

Abduction from the Property Followed by a Sexual Assault Off-Premises

Most commonly, female employees and customers are accosted as they near their vehicle in the parking area which serves the store, or are forced into their vehicle once the door is unlocked and opened and are driven to some remote location and sexually assaulted. We have served as consultants and experts in numerous attacks. In some cases, the victim’s little children witnessed the assault on their mother.

In those cases in which the victim was an employee, the general employee population is affected and demoralized, and prior efforts to build a climate of mutual respect between the company’s associates and the loss prevention department plunge. Basic prevention strategies could include

Rape or Attempted Rape of Adult Women

With respect to the problem cited in the preceding section, in many cases the actual sexual assault occurs in the vehicle in the parking area itself (rather than removing the victim to another location). The same preventative strategies/measures apply here.

Rape of employees inside the store, especially when the employee works alone at night, is a known operating risk. Some have been savagely brutal. I recall a case in which the customer entered the ladies’ restroom and entered an enclosed stall. She noted the adjacent stall was occupied by someone wearing “feminine-appearing” boots. That party exited the stall and moments later the lights were switched off, leaving the restroom in total darkness. An intruder forced open her door and commenced to disrobe and assault the customer. In retrospect, the light switch should have been key operated, rather than the typical home toggle switch which anyone can operate.

In another matter, an attractive young shoplifter was told to submit sexually or she’d go to jail. She opted for jail rather than sex. The LP agent took her to the display storage area of the store and raped her in the privacy of the props and display materials and then released her. She went to the police. Company policy should prohibit a male agent processing a female suspect without at least one witness, preferably a female witness if possible.

Detainees Threatened with Arrest or Submit to Sexual Advances

It’s not possible to quantify the number of times a member of management or a representative of the loss prevention department has offered to release a suspected dishonest employee or shoplifter in return for sexual favors or, on the other hand, has threatened to call the police unless the detainee submitted. It is reasonable, however, to speculate that a percentage of such “consensual arrangements” have adversely backfired against the store, causing substantial financial loss. As stated in the preceding category, witnesses are the best preventive strategy. Another deterrent is a careful review of detention/arrest reports to assure full compliance with company policy.

Sexual Assault and/or Sexual Solicitation of Young Children

The most recent case in this category occurred while this section was being written. A 9-year-old boy went into the men’s restroom in the store while his mother waited outside the restroom. While the boy was inside the restroom, a customer offered him a dollar if the boy would unzip his pants and allow the man to touch his private parts. The boy declined and exited. His mother sensed something was wrong and asked, but the boy said nothing was wrong. They went home, where the father then inquired, and the boy admitted what had transpired. The store was called.

The store received two calls that day on that same problem. It’s unknown how many other similar solicitations (rejected or accepted) occurred that day in that store or how many other children were sexually traumatized or disturbed that week in that community. The assistant store manager called the police, but LP was never advised, nor did anyone go down to the restroom and investigate. A lawsuit was filed.

How many times have children been “lost” in big stores. I recall one incident in which the mother frantically searched in the expansive area dedicated to ladies’ lingerie, swimwear, and sportswear, assisted by a number of employees, only to finally find the child outside a fitting room bank, whimpering, with semen dripping from her face. She said there was a “bad man” in there, but no male customers were sighted in that area.

Children are vulnerable in public places, and their presence should always be noted by the professional LP practitioner.

Exhibitionism in the Parking Area

Most “flashers” (exhibitionists) engage in their bizarre behavior of exhibiting their genitals to persons of the opposite sex in parking areas. Why parking areas? The collection and assemblage of vehicles provides avenues for movement to get into the desired location to confront the “victim,” and yet the flasher can shield his conduct from those he doesn’t want to know what’s happening. Further, the place where cars are parked is often some distance from where people are assembled, so help is not close by. Unless the woman is armed with a cell phone, she must reach someone to report the incident to, allowing the bad guy time to casually move on. It takes a pretty aggressive woman with a cell phone to call and stay with the culprit, and it take good luck that any police officer would be close by and respond. Even if a police officer comes immediately to the scene and the customer points him out, there’s little, if anything, he can do because the offense is a misdemeanor (a petty crime). Police officers, as a rule, cannot make an arrest for a misdemeanor offense not committed in their presence.

Why does the retailer see this as a problem? Most customers find this conduct disgusting and upsetting. If the police don’t show or do show but take no action, the customer is frustrated. Her other recourse is to complain to management of the store. If the store isn’t sympathetic, or fails to take some form of corrective action or perceived correction action and the conduct is repeated, the store risks losing a customer.

Customers who report “flashers” should be interviewed for as much information as they are willing to share, and such reports must be memorialized. If the problem persists, LP resources should be committed to identify the culprit and turn the matter over to the local authorities.

Exhibitionism Inside the Store

Whereas most “flashing” occurs outside a store, there are those brave souls who opt to operate inside stores, and they tend to select busy retailers with lots of customer traffic. This way, after the “flash” (exposure), they can turn and disappear into the crowd. Should a customer inform an LP agent “that man just exposed himself to me,” pointing to some gentleman, the LP agent, like the police officer cited previously, cannot detain the suspect but rather can covertly follow in hopes of gathering information, such as his auto’s tag, or “burning” the culprit. The former is preferable, if possible. Local police detectives, not patrol officers, can be contacted with information obtained for intelligence purposes, not necessarily for the filing of a criminal complaint.

In the event the culprit is seen again in the store, LP has a choice, depending on company LP policy, to maintain a close surveillance in hopes of observing a criminal act of indecent exposure and making an arrest on that observation, or in “burning” the subject so he’ll leave the store.

Sexual Contact Between Men in the Store’s Men’s Restroom

Men’s public restrooms (often referred to as “tea rooms” by those who use them for illicit purposes), irrespective of the location, are notorious for accommodating sexual activity between men, i.e., fellatio, mutual masturbation, and anal sex. A store’s restroom is no exception. Some time back, a two-way mirror viewed the interior of a big store’s restroom located in the basement, and for relief from prowling the selling floor, LP agents watched for and detained men engaged in sexual conduct. Despite the arrests made in that room, the activity continued for all the years it remained open to the public. It was a well-known spot.

This activity is perpetuated by messages printed in the grout lines or on the partitions between stools, in very small print, seeking one another. Big scrawling dirty words or obscene drawings are the work of juveniles, as a rule, but the informed LP agent can monitor for the little messages and understand, if they’re found, the likelihood of sex-related traffic in and out of that room. Another indicator of activity is the presence of “glory holes” and peep holes in the partitions. “Glory holes” accommodate oral copulation, where the man in stall #1 stands facing the partition, and the man in #2 puts his mouth to the hole to commit fellatio. Peep holes about the size of marbles allow a stall occupant to look into the adjacent stall and allows the occupant of that second stall to see the first man’s eye (and its movement) at that small hole, which clearly indicates intentions.

All writings, when they appear, should be cleaned off or painted over. All holes should be patched. If traffic continues, some stores have gone so far as to remove the stall doors (to preclude privacy) and to place signage on the restroom’s entrance door that the room is frequently checked by patrolling security.

In this day and age, LP personnel shouldn’t attempt to make arrests, but rather concentrate on discouraging traffic and preventing sexual encounters.

This problem became serious enough for me to write the following procedure in the late 1980s:

After the offending individual(s) have left the store, a detailed security information report should be written detailing the observations which led to the eviction, the name(s) and/or descriptions of the person(s) evicted, and comments made by them, any other witnesses, etc.

“Peeping Tom” (Voyeurism) Activity into Women’s Restroom

Grates, grills, and vent covers are common camouflage over openings which allow interior viewing of the ladies’ restroom from vertical and horizontal surfaces (walls and ceilings). The problem exists in both public and employee-only restrooms. There are men who have this aberrant compulsion to watch women using such facilities. It’s incumbent upon the loss prevention department to regularly and carefully inspect such rooms.

“Peeping Tom” (Voyeurism) Activity into Women’s Fitting Rooms

Although the fitting room/dressing room areas are definitively different from restrooms, in every conceivable environment, from major theme parks to gas stations, the voyeur’s attraction to fitting rooms is obviously restricted to retailers. The following examples should be helpful in understanding the scope and diversity of the problem:

Example 1: A routine security inspection of a closed-off and no-longer-used stairwell disclosed an extension ladder propped against the wall at one of the landings. The ladder led to a fan which apparently pulled air from the stairwell for the interior of the store. Out of curiosity, the agent climbed the ladder and, as he neared the top, noticed layers of a dried substance on the rungs and, higher, relatively fresh deposits of semen. The opening for the fan looked down on a fitting room used for swimwear customers. Clearly, someone was using the ladder as a perch to watch into the room and masturbate.

It was important to determine who the culprit was. It seemed most likely an employee was involved, and it was necessary to identify such a person and remove him from the workplace. A surveillance revealed the voyeur was a customer who would surreptitiously enter the closed-off stairwell. For fire safety regulations, it was impossible to seal the stairwell; only “Closed. Do Not Enter” signs discouraged its use. Evidence clearly indicated this voyeur had been using this ladder-perch for over a year, and past security inspections had overlooked the ladder’s location as nothing more than a convenient place to store the ladder.

Example 2: Two teenage girls were in a fitting room trying on swimsuits when a man’s leg crashed through the ceiling tiles. The girls screamed. The leg withdrew back into the space above the tiles. The girls and other customers marched to the store manager’s office to complain. Later, a lawsuit was filed against the store.

Investigation disclosed two male agents had entered an elevated surveillance post constructed next to a column. Entry into the post was a “secret” door known only to and accessible by LP agents in that store. Agents, in the legitimate use of the surveillance post (which allowed viewing of the selling from through a two-way mirror), became aware that not far away was a bank of fitting rooms which serviced the swimwear department. And one of the agents discovered that, by carefully lifting certain ceiling tiles, he could view the interior of one of the rooms. He shared this knowledge with another agent, and on this occasion while “enjoying” the view, one inadvertently stepped off the braces and placed his weight on the tiles, which immediately gave way.

Example 3: A store detective with keen sense of smell, while walking through a stock area hallway, detected the odor of sawdust. Such an odor was uncommon and caused her to follow her nose, out of curiosity. She sniffed her way into a narrow stockroom and, on one of the many shelves, moved goods aside to find the fresh wood debris created by a brace and bit drill. By standing on the bottom shelf and resting her arms on an upper shelf, she could peer through the round hole that had been made. The hole provided a view into a fitting room.

A scenario was created in which the most likely suspect, a young and new member of the engineering staff, would be asked to change florescent lights above the door of the human resource director’s office. As this young man stood on a ladder changing the bulb, the manager of the selling department came to the door, informed the HR director her new swimsuit had just arrived and asked whether she could come down and try it on. “I’ll be down in 10 minutes,” replied the director. The engineer almost fell off the ladder. Then minutes later the engineer was caught with his eye to the hole.

In one Texas case I handled, an LP agent entered a dead space behind a women’s fitting room and made a hole in the plasterboard wall to which the full-length mirror was attached inside the fitting room. He then scratched away a small area of the silvering on the back of the mirror, creating a clear view into the fitting room.

The loss prevention department, or in its absence, store management, has the responsibility to ensure the integrity of every fitting room in the store, with particular emphasis on those rooms in which women are obliged to remove any underclothing. Periodic inspections of fitting rooms for evidence of illicit means of surreptitious viewing, together with keeping a written record of such inspections and the results thereof will help meet this responsibility.

Obscene Phone Calls, Allegedly from the Store

Telephone “surveys” have been used to engage female customers into conversations which are designed to become obscene. For example, “Mrs. Miller, my name is Charles Glotz with the American Department Stores, and we’re contacting select customers with a survey about our lingerie department and its assortment, quality, and pricing. Those customers gracious enough to answer fewer than 25 questions will receive a $25 gift certificate that can be used in any of our stores. Can you spare 7 or 8 minutes to respond to this survey?”

Mrs. Miller graciously accepts. Charles then starts with questions which are innocuous and reasonable, such as whether she has personally visited the store’s lingerie department and made purchases. If not, which store does she prefer? Why that store? Then he asks questions about color preferences, and from there, the size of her bra, size of her panties, whether she likes roomy sizes or real tight. From there, depending on how long the customer will tolerate the increasingly intimate questions, the “survey” turns obscene. The customer hangs up and calls the store to complain to the manager and complain about Mr. Glotz.

We’re not suggesting this an ongoing and common problem. Suffice it to say, it does occur, and you are so advised.

Obscene Phone Calls into the Store

Depending on the store’s phone system, incoming calls may be specific to an employee or may be random. The caller may start a string of questions similar to the previous scenario about the items in the department or may directly launch into questions about the employee’s sexual preferences. There are two important points in this arena: (1) Employees should be informed that infrequently they may receive bizarre calls; however, they shouldn’t be unduly alarmed, but rather report them immediately to management or loss prevention. And (2) such calls should be documented with as much information as possible, similar to a bomb threat call. Depending on what the caller says, it may behoove the store to refer the incident to the police.

Obscene Letters, Notes, or Photos Sent to Employees

Although employees receiving obscene messages isn’t an everyday problem, when it does occur, the recipient is often very alarmed. Therefore, the incident must not or cannot be easily dismissed. Loss prevention resources must be committed to identifying. The message can range from a note under the windshield wiper of the recipient’s car to a note or photo enclosed in a sealed envelope. The message may be a proposition for a sexual encounter or a self-taken photograph of a person’s genitals. Whatever the case, it’s a demand on the investigative resources and skills of the loss prevention department. Although it wasn’t in a retail setting, I did track down a particularly obscene letter sent to a student about his fiancée and by careful comparison of typewriter samplings, I discovered the student’s mother proved to be the culprit. She didn’t want her son to marry the girl.

Aberrant Sexual Contact with Mannequins

The precursor to plastic blow-up dolls used for sexual activity was (and still is) the common store mannequin. Indeed, at the time of this writing, I noted in the local newspaper a brief article which reads as follows (the name has been changed):

Now here’s a gentleman who is so desperate to possess a new mannequin that he’s willing to engage in the crime of burglary, with all its consequences. But in the retail industry, many stores have mannequins, some on display and in use for their designed purpose, and some stuck away in reserve. Who really is responsible for the mannequins, and who oversees their disposal, let alone use on premises?

Not all abuse of these objects is of a copulative nature; i.e., some are abused in other ways. One store had a rash of damaged goods while on display. Investigation disclosed all the damaged merchandise was women’s apparel limited to blouses, sweaters, coats, and bras. Further investigation and surveillance resulted in the discovery of an employee who had a fetish for large breasts and the compulsion to stab large busts with a knife. Hence, those mannequins which seemed to emphasize the size of the breasts were stabbed during early morning hours, and the goods used to dress them were damaged.

Other Miscellaneous Aberrant Sexual Activity

Be alert for “crawlers,” i.e., those men who crawl on their hands and knees to look up ladies’ skirts. If detected, they pretend to be looking for their dropped money or keys.

Less conspicuous was a gentleman who carried a shopping bag which contained only a mirror, facing up when lying flat on the bottom of the bag. His method of operation was to ride the up escalators and place an open shopping bag on the step immediately behind a lady so he could view down into the bag and catch the reflection of her underside. After this man was detained a number of times, the police didn’t want to be bothered by him anymore, and LP agents were known to break his mirror and eject him from the store. But he would reappear with a new, clean mirror some weeks later.

Of more alarm to early morning employees was the sudden and then daily appearance of a plate containing fresh human feces. The location of this disgusting event varied, and the loss prevention department was hard-pressed to catch the employee responsible. When he was finally apprehended, it was clear the man had a sexual quirk and fetish with respect to feces. When the police were summoned at the close of the LP investigation, they transported him to a local mental institution rather than to the local jail.

Consensual Illicit Sexual Conduct Inside Store or Distribution Center

Although conduct falling in this category more often than not fails to rise to the level of a “crime,” it does, or at least should, violate company policy. There are various reasons why policy should prohibit affairs on premises, but that’s not the objective of this material. Our objective is to enlighten the loss prevention professional to the wide spectrum of criminal, disruptive, tortious, and otherwise unacceptable activity that exists in the retail environment which does or may require loss prevention intervention. And in this section of the book, the conduct in question focuses on sex-related activities.

Here’s a classic example: The marking area of the distribution center, with over three dozen employees, became suspicious of one new female employee who loafed on the job, was often tardy without consequences, and failed to carry her weight in the demands of marking and ticketing literally thousands of pieces of goods that required processing every day. Morale plummeted when it became obvious that the supervisor and this employee were having an affair. Complaints were funneled to human resources and passed on to the security department for investigation. The investigation established where and when sexual relations were being engaged in, and at the appropriate time and place, the two were caught in a compromising position. Both were terminated. Confidence in the professional proficiency of the security department was confirmed, everyone was treated equally, morale rose, and productivity returned to expected and necessary levels.

Summary

The diversity of “sex crimes” which are foreseeable and do occur in the retail environment, as evidenced here, put the professional loss prevention/security practitioner, from line to executive, on notice that there’s a lot more to this career path than catching shoplifters and inventory shrink. As a reminder, the loss prevention department has a mission to protect the company, its assets, property, merchandise, employees, customers, proprietary information, and reputation. In meeting these responsibilities, the LP department needs to make every incident of illicit sexual activity the subject of a detailed written report, which should include any recommendations for or remedial actions taken.

The Future of Shoplifting Prevention: Introduction

The 1992 edition of the book Shoplifting by Charles Sennewald and John Christman has all the who, what, when, where, how, and why about shoplifting, and I recommend it as the source for all retail executives and loss prevention personnel. These same experts and authors have now asked me to write a section for this book about shoplifting prevention based on my research and experience with shoplifters since 1968. This section will explain the real problem behind shoplifting, why millions of people (from all walks of life) engage in it, how to realistically address the root cause of the problem (both before or after an incident occurs), and how to become proactive in prevention in a way which will sustain itself over time. This section is not about how to eliminate shoplifting; it’s about how to permanently reduce shoplifting to perhaps one-third of its current level.

While the shoplifting problem is typically discussed in terms of lower profits for stores, higher prices for consumers, an increasing crime rate, and the character of our people, it will be discussed here not in theoretical or moral terms, but rather in practical terms.

[A word of caution: Reading this section can arouse a variety of emotions because some readers will be the victims of shoplifting, whereas others will have had personal experiences with shoplifters. Hardly anyone is indifferent on the subject. To gain real value from this section, you will find it beneficial to keep an open mind and temporarily put aside any preconceived notions about shoplifting or the people who shoplift and replace them with your own common sense.]

So that you don’t have to wait for the end of this section to figure out what it is I am trying to say, the future level of shoplifting will depend on our understanding of the people who shoplift rather than only the devices to try to stop them.

Three key facts identify the future direction of shoplifting prevention:

The Shoplifting Problem in Our Nation

If we briefly look at the 20-year period from the end of World War II in 1945 to 1965, the losses in department stores remained at about 1% of retail sales. By 1968, the average losses in department stores had risen to 3.5% of sales because of a cultural revolution among our youth and others which sought nonconformity and lessened traditional values. It’s been some 40 years, and we have not yet returned to the 1% level. Shoplifting in our nation has become a more serious problem which affects not only kids, parents, families, retailers, consumers, police, courts, state and local government, and the community as a whole, but also negatively affects the lives of an estimated 25–30 million Americans (1 in 11 people) who shoplift from stores each year.

Key Facts You Should Know

There are an estimated 200 million shoplifting incidents in our nation each year, or approximately 550,000 incidents per day.

Retailers estimate they lose about $11 billion per year to shoplifters, or approximately $30 million per day.

Shoplifters rarely get caught. Surveys reveal that shoplifters get caught an average of only once every 35–48 times they steal, and 20% of habitual offenders say they have never been caught.

There are two primary groups of shoplifters: professionals and nonprofessionals. Any approach to shoplifting prevention must recognize these important distinctions:

When we combine professional and nonprofessional shoplifting, we see that a small percentage of the people are responsible for a large percentage of the dollar losses.

When we combine both professional and nonprofessional:

With this current information at hand, the challenge is to focus on both preventing and apprehending the nonprofessional “habitual repeat offender.”

In seeking ways to prevent shoplifting, we must first look at the root cause of this problem which drives so many different people who are not career criminals to become “habitual repeat offenders” in stores.

The Shoplifter: Why Do Shoplifters Steal?

Shoplifting—Is it need or is it greed? Or is it something else that tempts approximately 25–30 million people to steal from retail stores each year? Except for the drug addicts and hardened professionals who steal for resale and profit as a business, most shoplifters are otherwise law-abiding citizens. The vast majority of adult offenders have no idea about how or why they become thieves, or why they continue to shoplift, even after getting caught.

Retailers, police, prosecutors, and judges see hundreds of thousands of apprehended shoplifters, of all ages, who don’t fit the profile of typical criminals. For example, they don’t use shoplifting paraphernalia, they don’t use drugs, they carry proper identification, they have no prior criminal record (except perhaps for shoplifting), they don’t associate with known criminals, they don’t steal for resale, they usually have the money to pay for the item(s) they stole, they frequently have a job and a family, they steal things they don’t really need and often don’t use, and they know what they did was wrong and frequently feel ashamed and remorseful. Their overall lifestyle is not that of typical thieves or criminals.

Retailers, law enforcement, and the courts process these people through the criminal justice system, as they should, but with little understanding of why they committed the offense and what kind of action would be effective to help prevent such thefts (before an incident occurs) or reduce recidivism (after an incident occurs). Thousands of survey responses and interviews conducted with nonprofessional shoplifters have made it clear that shoplifting behavior among nonprofessionals is rarely related to criminal intent but is rather the result of a person’s internal personal struggle with social and psychological issues. People who shoplift are not doing this to hurt the store or cause consumers to pay higher prices or put themselves in jeopardy. Their objective is rarely to hurt anyone.

Of course, whatever their motive, it does not make shoplifting okay for any reason. But, we must ask, if their motive is not criminal intent for profit, why do people shoplift? In simple and concise terms, “TO GET SOMETHING FOR NOTHING.”

Let me explain! While we all like to get things for free, like receiving birthday presents or winning the lottery, and while retail stores constantly promote and place merchandise on “sale” to generate excitement about getting a bargain, you and I never cross over the line and steal the item, whereas other people do. Why? The answer is: To most people who shoplift, getting something for nothing is like giving themselves a “reward” or a “gift” or a “lift” at a point in time when they feel they need or deserve it. A study by MasterCard International found that “shopping” was second only to dining out as the primary way that people reward themselves. Take it one step further and you can see how “shoplifting” the merchandise could increase the reward.

FIGURE S-1

People who shoplift have given the idea of “getting something for nothing” a special meaning which (unknowingly) represents something more to them than the value of the merchandise. This is important for us to understand. For different people, it can mean different things, but it all serves the same purpose in the end. For example: For some, shoplifting acts as a “substitute for loss” because they were unfairly deprived in some way (the loss of a parent or partner from a divorce situation, the loss of health because of a serious illness, the death of a loved one, a bad work-related situation, loss of income from a job or investments, or an increase in expense for a car repair, etc.) which often causes people to feel needy. To others, shoplifting represents “justified payback” for all they believe that they give to others and how little they get back in return. It is often described as a feeling of “entitlement” or a way to help make their world fair. For some, it’s a “relief mechanism” for anxiety, frustration, boredom or depression. The excitement of “getting away with it” provides temporary relief from these type of uncomfortable feelings.

While most people know right from wrong, when people feel needy in some way (i.e., lonely, fearful, depressed), the need for them to do something to relieve their discomfort creates an impulse to act. After impulsively taking their first item and getting away with it, they often experience what they describe as an incredible “high” or “rush,” which gives them temporary relief from their emotional discomfort or need.

Several studies have found diagnosed depression to exist in approximately one-third of the shoplifters studied. Depression was the most frequently found psychological problem and is the result of anger turned inward. The “high” or “rush” helps to temporarily relieve depression. This helps to explain why so many people steal from stores on their birthday and around holiday times.

In truth, to the eye of a trained therapist, shoplifting behavior is no more than simply a “symptom” and a “signal” to the individual (and to others) that a person is in trouble primarily because of his inability to effectively cope with personal issues in his life. Any way you look at it, shoplifters unknowingly pursue shoplifting as a form of compensation or self-nourishment as a way to relieve fear or pain in their life. In truth, shoplifting is self-destructive, not self-nourishing, but shoplifters often can’t see the paradox.

While it is the responsibility of the offender to deal with and correct his thinking and behavior, to be able to make needed changes, people often need to be pointed in the right direction because they may have already developed a habit or addiction to shoplifting.

Of course, some people don’t want to see shoplifting as a functional or psychological problem. They say, “What do you mean that a person can’t stop shoplifting? Of course, they can; they’re just greedy.” The idea that shoplifting is habit forming or addictive (except for a few “kleptomaniacs”) is ridiculous, they say. People who shoplift should go to jail and not be coddled or told they have an addiction. This is like telling them it’s okay to steal because they really can’t help it.

A person’s addiction to shoplifting can develop quickly when the excitement generated from “getting away with it” produces a chemical reaction (i.e., adrenalin, etc.) resulting in that “rush” or “high” feeling, which many shoplifters will tell you is the “true reward,” rather than the merchandise itself. Realizing how easy it is to get that “high” feeling, they are pulled toward doing it again … “just one more time” … and their addiction begins to develop. Even though most nonprofessional shoplifters feel guilty, ashamed, or remorseful about what they did and are fearful of getting caught, the pull is too strong for many to resist.

Juveniles

Shoplifting, among juveniles, is remarkably similar to adult shoplifting in many ways. However, the primary issues which are related to shoplifting among youth revolve around family pressure, school pressure, and peer pressure.

If you were to ask juveniles caught shoplifting, “Why did you do it?” the most frequent reply would be “I don’t know.” As with adults, the reasons teens shoplifted will vary, but most commonly they wanted nice things or felt pressured by friends and wanted to see if they could get away with it, or were angry, depressed, confused, or bored. Sometimes they are just mad at the world and want to strike back.

While teens, like adults, usually know the difference between right and wrong, when their life becomes too stressful, they become more vulnerable to temptation, peer pressure, and other issues that can lead them to shoplift. This is especially true when they feel unworthy, angry, depressed, unattractive, or not accepted.

In summary, shoplifting, for millions of our citizens, is simply another maladaptive way of coping with stressful life circumstances, ways similar to overeating, drinking, taking drugs, gambling, or becoming withdrawn. It is not an issue of good versus bad people, rich versus poor people, young versus old people, or education versus illiteracy. All nonprofessional shoplifters will tell you that, going back as early as they can remember, not a single person had ever decided that they wanted to be a shoplifter when they grew up. It just happened! At any time, or even many times in a person’s life, the temptation to “get something for nothing” and to reward oneself can easily be present. Realistically, the many personal issues which all people face in their lives are their own responsibility to correct. There can be no excuse, rationalization, acceptance, or justification for criminal behavior. No question, there must be consequences for people’s actions, but there must also be a realistic understanding of the overall problem and a way to point people in the right direction to make needed changes.

You may ask, “So what do we do with this information?” The answer is: To prevent future shoplifting, we need to continue to pursue prosecution, but also find another way to get people to stop themselves from shoplifting.

Getting Shoplifters to Stop Themselves

“This is prevention at its best.”

Of course, you might wonder why people would want to stop shoplifting when they get free stuff, they save money, they get a “rush” when they get away with it, they can be more generous to others, they rarely get caught, and the penalties may be no big deal unless they have a record of multiple offenses. The answer is … because they just don’t like themselves anymore or find that they like themselves even less than they ever did before. The three primary reasons why nonprofessional shoplifters say they want to stop stealing is (in their own words):

Imagine a time in the not-too-distant future when kids and adults who are tempted to shoplift for the first time say to themselves, “I don’t want to do it,” and those who have shoplifted say, “I don’t want to do it anymore.” This is clearly a realistic expectation because we have learned that nobody wants to be a shoplifter. This is the “hook” that motivates the willingness to change.

If people really didn’t care, there is little anyone could do to stop them. However, when people learn the truth about how self-destructive shoplifting behavior can be for them, they do begin to care (about themselves) and are suddenly willing to discard their current illusions about shoplifting and replace them with current reality. Part of the current reality is that whether a shoplifter is caught or not on a particular day, he is faced with added pressure in his daily life as the result of just being a shoplifter. For example:

When Not Apprehended

When Apprehended (in their own words)

While these are all motivating factors toward preventing future thefts, the facts must be presented in a prevention format (which connects the dots for people) to drive the message home. So, how can we get people to stop themselves from shoplifting? Provide them with the information they need to make the right decision for themselves.

People care most about what is best for them, not what is best for society, what their parents want, what the school wants, what the criminal justice system wants, or anyone else. They act in ways that they perceive or feel will benefit them the most (at any point in time), and if it is contradictory to the law or what others want, they will either refrain from doing it or try to hide their act.

Shoplifting is a bad choice for people who care about themselves. The facts which support this statement need to be widely communicated to youth and adults through education in all communities throughout our nation.

The simple fact is that education is a powerful way to prevent shoplifters from attempting to steal or to stop stealing. The education must be comprehensive enough, must be “offense-specific,” and must be backed up by the ongoing supportive actions of retailers and the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Education is recognized globally as the “treatment of choice” for almost all social behavioral problems, and shoplifting is no exception. However, any type of formal education has rarely been used as a way to prevent shoplifting.

At this point, you might be saying to yourself: “Educate shoplifters … about what? They already know it’s wrong to steal. What could you tell them that would make a difference?”

Although you know people shoplift for many reasons, one common denominator is that shoplifters lack an understanding of the problem as it relates to society and themselves. For example:

Once people hear the truth about shoplifting and themselves, the education “process” begins to take hold on both an intellectual and emotional level. They commonly experience a range of emotions: from initial resistance and denial to concern about what they might become to gratitude that someone really cares to resolve to take greater responsibility for their behavior. They finally choose not to make their life any harder than it is already … by shoplifting.

The value of education to apprehended shoplifters is well documented for tens of thousands of shoplifters in the files of the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention (NASP), a nonprofit organization which provides public awareness, prevention and education programs, and services. However, until a person is apprehended by a store, there is no way to know that a person is a shoplifter.

When and How to Deliver Education (For Prevention)

There are two types of education (for prevention) which are administered at different times:

Both forms of prevention must exist because, when primary prevention fails to deter an individual before the fact, secondary prevention must seal the issue after the fact.

Where We Are … and … Where We Need to Be

Our nation’s response to the shoplifting problem is almost nonexistent on a national level and varies widely on a community level. The reason is that shoplifting is viewed as a state or county problem, and not as a national problem.

In spite of its current magnitude, shoplifting is rarely considered a serious crime and therefore is rarely given serious attention. While it is not murder, it affects many different victims and crime in our society. Various segments of the community which are directly affected by shoplifting address the problem in different ways, largely based on their personal level of interest. Because the message about shoplifting from parents, schools, retailers, police, courts, mental health professionals, and communities at large has been inconsistent or unclear, shoplifting continues to thrive. The lack of a clear message serves to (unintentionally) perpetuate the problem.

Whom to Contact for Assistance

In Conclusion

This message of this section is about recognizing that anyone can stop a shoplifter, but no one can stop him from shoplifting; only he can stop himself.

When shoplifting is embraced as an important social issue in a community, we will see a community where parents talk to their children about it; schools address it; kids say “no” to it; consumers resist the temptation to do it; retailers actively pursue it; law enforcement willingly responds to it; courts effectively sentence it; mental health professionals understand it; and people engaged in it seek help to stop.