June 25, 2012 12:37 PSP Book - 9in x 6in 08-Junichi-Takeno-c08
148 Machine Consciousness
as the approximate models of other areas of the brain,” Kawato says,
“Based on this hypothesis, we can say that consciousness is a process
of approximating the huge volume of parallel calculations that
occur subconsciously to resolve the ill-posedness of sensorimotor
integration with extremely simplified false serial calculations.” He
further argues, “Forward models of module integration, generally,
are similar to reverse models of the external world because they
convert sensory inputs into motor outputs. Likewise, reverse models
of module integration can be said to be forward models of the
external world. These computations circulating through the forward
and reverse models make it possible to emulate one’s own thoughts,
predict one’s own behavior and perform the act of introspection.”
Emulation here means to run part or the whole of a system
on other software or hardware that behaves like the original
system.
Kawato’s writing is not so easy to follow. I will interpret it as
I understand it, risking the claim of misunderstanding. Forward
models of interaction (Fig. 8.8a) are approximations of reverse
models (Fig. 8.8b) of sensorimotor bidirectionality modules, and
the reverse models (Fig. 8.6c) of interaction are approximations
of forward models (Fig. 8.8d) of the bidirectionality modules.
These approximate forward and reverse models are considered
to be situated above the real-world models (forward and reverse
models of the sensorimotor bidirectionality modules) and behave
as an emulator that approximates the real world as a two-tier
world. Kawato’s argument that computations circulating through
the approximate forward and reverse models, which are sparse
due to the two-tier structure, enable the “emulation of one’s own
thought,” “prediction of one’s own behavior,” and “introspection” is
understandable as an idea but lacks concreteness.
Kawato further discusses the flow of consciousness.
Each forward or reverse model of module interactions comprises
three parts: interface to the sensory module presumably located
in the prefrontal area, interface to the motor area assumed to be
partly located in the basal ganglion, and the model itself which is
said to reside on the outside of the cerebellar hemisphere, and is
divided into several micro-zones as shown with the vertical lines