June 25, 2012 12:45 PSP Book - 9in x 6in 09-Junichi-Takeno-c09
Problem of Free Will 199
to our consciousness. This may be called free will. Wrist-flexing is
not a very common social activity; so it may be difficult to use it to
discuss the importance of suppressing behavior as it relates to free
will. If wrist-flexing were replaced by the gesture of aiming a gun at
a person, for example, the role of free will to suppress a behavior
would be more keenly appreciated.
In later research, Libet found that an awareness of conscious
will occurs about 0.15 to 0.2 sec prior to the physical action, and
just at that moment, one can select between stopping the behavior
or going ahead with it. Libet formulated a hypothesis that the
possibility of this selection is the entity of human will. The brain is
always ready to perform behaviors, but consciousness controls the
execution of behaviors. In short, humans do have free will and are
held responsible for their actions.
The author’s model does not specifically use control signals
for suppressing the execution of a behavior. However, the author’s
consciousness system can execute suppressed behaviors without
jeopardizing the consistency of cognition and behavior (Suzuki et al.,
2005; Takeno et al., 2005) Therefore, it is possible to suppress
behaviors using signals to execute or not execute. A suppressed
behavior means the act of imagining the behavior. A process
seems to exist in the human brain in which the brain imagines a
behavior just before the behavior is executed and determines the
possibility of releasing the suppression by evaluating the condition
of representations firing at that time.
It is possible for the consciousness system proposed by the
author to have a similar function to the human mechanism of free
will.
The problem here is the relationship between will and respon-
sibility, i.e., who is responsible for the behaviors performed by
humans? Generally, if a behavior is performed with awareness, the
performer is responsible for the behavior. If, on the other hand,
a behavior is performed without awareness or unconsciously, the
performer may not be held responsible. And even if the unconscious
performer is held responsible, the responsibility seems to be lighter
than that assumed for a conscious performer. If a robot has the
function of will, can the above concept be applied also to the robot?
The problem is, who is responsible for the behavior of a robot? If we