4
Communicating Analysis Results

One of the most difficult challenges facing analysts in organizations is effectively communicating the results of their work on a timely basis to their decision makers. This is important because analysis often underlies decisions, and decision makers cannot always wait for the analyst to complete their work. Also many of the decisions that are made about competitive business matters rely on data inputs that have a short shelf life. In other words, the intelligence generated about competitive actions is only useful to the enterprise for a short time period before it becomes out of date, at which point, it no longer has the ability to deliver competitive advantage. Analysts must place considerable attention on delivering their findings to, and gaining the attention, understanding, confidence, and ultimately trust, of their decision makers. Presenting results to decision-making clients is one of the vulnerable areas where intelligence and other strategy-related processes can fail.

The Art of Effective Communication

Individuals new to the field or those who remain ignorant of the art and science of communication will do their best to avoid the challenge of this element of the analyst's task. It is important to realize that the analyst's job is not over when the formal analysis process itself is concluded. Delivery of the findings to the decision makers, gauging their understanding of the analyst's recommendations, making sure that no critical intelligence was lost in the exchange of ideas, and understanding how the analysis product will be used are among the analyst's key communication task responsibilities. Failures in these final stages of the analysis process can devalue the analyst's work and can ultimately be a prime contributor to bad decisions and inappropriate actions taken by an enterprise in the marketplace. Additionally, the communication stage is a vital feedback mechanism for the analyst to understand how well he has done the job in hand. It also provides pointers on how he might improve his performance on the next one.

Within each enterprise, there will be established procedures for communicating with decision-making clients, writing a report, and presenting results. Many of these are generic across business or management professions, while others will be more specific to an enterprise and its particular culture. A major responsibility of analysts is to learn these procedures, particularly those associated with demonstrated and proven communication performance, and to pay close attention to them when communicating their own findings and insights.

A common theme regarding the relationship between communication and audience satisfaction is that the more confidence that the audience (decision maker) has in the ability of the communicator (analyst), then the more satisfied they are likely to be with what is being communicated (analysis product). Distortion, ambiguity, and incongruence in communication can all act to increase a decision maker's discomfort or uncertainty. Analysts who are able to lessen the amount of distortion in their communication will reduce their client's levels of discomfort and uncertainty, and ceteris paribus, achieve higher levels of satisfaction, and receive better feedback. These communication results are all beneficial in achieving successful analytical outcomes over time.

We want to state, for the record, that you will have difficulty becoming an effective analyst in an enterprise unless you demonstrate effective communication skills, knowledge, and abilities. Resources spent in supporting analysis efforts are wasted if the analyst's recommendations are not used. This is even more serious if the reason for non- or misuse is that the decision makers did not understand what was being provided to them, that the conclusions were not clear, or that the analysis product was delivered in an incomprehensible or inappropriate manner. Ineffective communication of results will negate what might otherwise have been outstanding work in all the other phases of the analysis process.

Over the past 20 years or more, the form in which competitive analysis is delivered has been dramatically altered. In the 1980s, most analysts' outputs were communicated through either occasional written reports, regularly written reports, and in a passive manner by making the contents of files available in a centralized location or database on an as-needed basis to decision makers.1 Today, more active and regular delivery of results occurs through reporting, presenting, and pushing reports through electronic means to users.2 What used to be contained in manila folders in large filing cabinets has now been shifted over to internal electronic databases or custom-developed intranet portals. Intranets have become a common means for communicating intelligence in most large organizations.

Packaging the Results of Your Analysis

How intelligence is presented and packaged affects the client's perception of its validity.3 One thing the analyst must always consider is the need to inform versus the need to protect critical information from being shared beyond the persons for whom it was originally intended. Some analysis results are delivered through automated electronic means, while others are offered in face-to-face group settings or in-person. Regardless of the manner in which the analysis product is delivered to decision makers, the analyst must also address trade-offs between depth, breadth, speed, security, and convenience.

Similar to most forms of communication, analysts must always consider how each output format is likely to create the conditions necessary to influence the client of the importance of their insights. Analysts must also be cognizant of their own predisposition to particular formats. Properly factoring in these two considerations on the analyst and decision maker's communication preferences and taking account of these before communication takes place will strengthen the likelihood that the client will accept their recommendations.

Analysts who develop recognized levels of communication effectiveness are more likely to present results that

  • are future-oriented with detailed predictions of the evolution of the phenomena of interest.
  • contain well-articulated conclusions that are developed through comprehensive research and logical reasoning.
  • include clear explanations of subjects that go beyond the reasonable technical grasp of their decision-making clients.4

Delivering the Message

By what methods does the analyst deliver these results? It should be reiterated here that the method(s) used should be mainly based on the decision maker's needs.5 That premise does suggest, though, that the decision makers actually know what they need to know, and as previously mentioned in this book, that is not always the case. It is in these situations that the analyst has an even greater responsibility, not only to meet the decision maker's perceived needs, but to produce a back-up set of additional analysis product, recommendations, and/or communication channels. This added-value back-up set is where the analyst's communication skills, knowledge, and abilities become highly visible as it will address what the decision maker might have asked for, if only they had known what to ask for. It is in this role that the analyst acts more proactively, as a subject expert or an internal consultant, rather than as a reactive employee simply completing a task. At the end of every reporting event, the decision maker should always ask three questions of the analyst:

  • "Is there anything else I should have asked you to do?"
  • "Is there anything else you think you should have done?"
  • "Is there anything else you want to tell me?"

The appropriate communication packaging of analytical outputs is essential. Analysts typically provide their outputs to decision-making clients in the following forms.6

Face-to-Face Briefings

One of the most effective two-way models of communication, face-to-face briefings allow the analyst to physically and orally present their findings to a client. This not only encourages discussion and exchange of understanding to take place in real-time, but it minimizes second-hand distortion or the effects that a time lag can have on the acquired understanding.

Written Reports and Briefings

Printed outputs are a cost-effective way of distributing results. Some executives still prefer to read items from the printed page rather than from a screen, particularly if a screen is not readily available or inconvenient (i.e., the decision maker is traveling on an airplane or his e-mail networks are not easily accessible). A problem with this form of communication is that there are many more pages of materials printed than are ever read, and much of the information that is read is not fully understood by its readers. It is not unknown, quite common even, for the readers of paper-based intelligence reports to be overlooked. Additionally, the report itself has the potential to fall into the hands of an unintended audience and can create undesirable vulnerabilities.

Presentations in Meetings, Seminars, and Workshops

These are a very effective way to deliver results to a group of decision makers and are a good way of gaining a group's attention. The main advantage in this format is that it provides opportunities for the analysts to discuss their findings in real-time, not only with those who may have initiated the task in the first place, but also more importantly with those individuals to whom it was designed to inform. It is important that the appropriate decision makers are available to observe and interact with the presenter, and this scheduling aspect is often an overlooked part of the analysis communication process.

One criticism of this method is that many times, analysts prepare PowerPoint slide decks whereby the aesthetics of their slides, the fanciness of their presentations, or the structure of their slide organization overpowers the important content or message, which then gets lost or missed because of the high reliance on the presenting technology.7 Analysts need to be wary of spending too much time thinking about how snazzily they can present reports, at the expense of worrying about the robustness of content.

Seminars and workshops are two other forms of presentation-based communication. They can allow the analysts to present their ideas more formally while still allowing for the collective benefits of quality question and answer time. This encourages discussion among the collected group of executives in an audience and aids the exploration of solutions to competitive and strategic problems.

E-Mail/Instant Messaging

Digital communication is probably the most commonly used means for analysts to communicate with their decision-making clients. The major benefit of this format is the almost immediate attention and quick replies. E-mail and instant messaging are good ways to disseminate "alerts," regularly published newsletters, and other forms of analytical results that need to be acted upon in a quick manner. A drawback of this form of communication is that it makes it difficult to communicate the "richness" of the recommendation context and can limit the format of the results to mostly, if not entirely, text.

Intelligence Systems

Customized systems offered by specialized competitive intelligence vendors, or systems tailored for analytical use within the larger corporate communication system, are becoming more commonplace. These allow analysts' clients to either see their findings in refined and finished formats, which can include digital links to other materials, and/or in their original input such as documents, interview notes, articles, and so forth. Such systems nearly always allow for selective access and viewing by clients on a need-to-know basis, or they can be designed to send out various forms of information in the form of e-mails, instant messages, or fax to a selected numbers of recipients. The drawback to these systems is that they can be cumbersome, costly, complex, and do not always allow for two-way communication to take place.

Exercises and Planning Sessions

Many analytical tools require two-way interaction between analysts and their decision-making clients. Some of the tools in this book are best practiced in this way, including techniques such as war gaming (see Chapter 23, "War Gaming"), scenario analysis,8 or shadowing (see Chapter 13, "Shadowing"). These frequently involve the analyst or designated individuals playing the role of one or more competitors. These techniques require a vast amount of data before anything is attempted and can be conducted in a one-off session, over an extended period of time in a person-to-person format, or can be conducted in teams in tightly planned and scheduled sessions aided by expert facilitators.9

Common Products and Reports Used by Analysts

Analysts ordinarily generate outputs in a variety of forms for use by their decision-making clients. Each of these has a typical audience, for which they are designed, are produced on a particular frequency, and are viewed to hold a certain level of perceived value in the eyes of the report recipients. They should always be tailored for the known and unique needs of the decision makers.

The most common types of analyst reports are given next and are discussed in greater detail with respect to their relative advantages and disadvantages.

News Bulletins and Newsletters

Targeted most frequently to field sales personnel, marketing, managers, sales managers, or other decision makers, these analysis outputs contain largely tactical and/or operational information and utilize data gathered from all sources. They can include both publicly available and internally available information. They frequently focus on current or immediate past events. They are rarely oriented toward the future.

Newsletters are typically of lower strategic value relative to other types of outputs.10 Although these items may be seen as less valuable than other products in a comparative sense, their cumulative value can be higher and strategic in nature. This can be especially true if they raise the level of competitive awareness over time in the enterprise. When done well, newsletters and news bulletins can be catalysts for not only conversations and discussions between analysts, analyst groups, and their clients, but encourage new questions to be asked of the analyst group. One way of achieving this catalyzing effect is to ensure that newsletters do indeed include analysts' interpretations and insight, along with the informative "news" aspects of the bulletins.11

Assessments

These are fairly brief and regularly generated products that look at particular business decisions, providing an assessment of the current situation facing the decision maker, identifying the critical success factors associated with the situation, and suggesting likely outcomes in terms of probabilities. The content can range from a very general overview of broad issues to detailed answers to highly specific questions.

Competitor Profiles

Competitor profiles are produced as needed but are constantly updated and contain general information about the enterprise's competitors in the marketplace. They are valuable for field sales personnel, marketing, and sales managers, as well as other functional decision makers who not only benefit from their existence, but contribute to their augmentation and evolution. Seldom actionable in their own right, they are of lower strategic value relative to other types of analytic outputs, but can be combined with other types of outputs that have higher overall decision-making value.

Done well, competitor profiling is carried out at many different layers of the enterprise, addressing the competitive landscape and associated activities right across the value chain. Passive competitor profiles are simple historical commentaries, compiled from publicly available documents and as such, carry little or no analytical value or originality. Active competitor profiles are future driven, contain identification and assessments of critical success factors, deconstruction of published financial reports, qualitative and quantitative judgments on current/future capabilities, probabilities of competitor action taking place, and recommendations on how best to react to each and every one should it occur.

Strategic Impact Worksheets

Strategic impact worksheets are closely related to competitor profiles and are used to identify specific events that may potentially impact the enterprise. They are usually targeted at those individuals in the enterprise who will be most affected by the events, possibly including Strategic Business Unit or functional managers. Ordinarily issued on a regular basis, they are usually of moderate value to decision makers. However, if the analyst uses these with competitor profiles to develop an early-warning system, then they can take on increased value. Anything that helps the organization to avoid being surprised by competitor action, market shifts, or hitherto unforeseen events, can only be of great value.

Intelligence Briefings

Usually issued on a regular basis, in a highly condensed manner, these are reports to senior and other managers about strategic news. They are rarely used to address specific issues, but they do ensure that all concerned are kept as "aware" as possible of the shifting competitive landscape.

Intelligence briefings are increasingly offered electronically in broadcast formats over secure intranets, in webinar formats, or via secure video-teleconferencing facilities. They are typically of moderate value to the analyst's clients.

Situation Analysis

These are one of the more unique products produced by analysts on an as-needed or as-requested basis for key decision makers. The situation analysis report summarizes emerging and rising strategic issues. They usually provide background in the form of the detailed thinking and synthesis actually performed to generate the recommendations. Relative to other products, their shelf lives are short.

Special Intelligence Summaries

Special intelligence summaries are usually brief in length, not much more than one or two pages, and most frequently generated on an as-requested basis. They identify situations, summarize the key supporting analyses, and offer recommendations on desired actions to senior decision makers. They are among the most valuable outputs regularly generated by analysts and are often the most visible influencers of an enterprise's decisions.

Creating the Report

When creating reports, analysts should emphasize the following items:12

  • Strategic versus tactical or operational information
  • Decision-oriented information
  • Inclusion of only relevant supporting data
  • Distribution of reports to clients on a timely, need-to-know basis
  • Multiple reports versus one large report for lower to middle levels of management

Analysts can enhance their decision makers' receptivity by using a variety of analysis outputs.

M. Dugal developed the idea of an analyst's portfolio, which comprised 10 key products. Each of these "products" differ in terms of shelf life, intended audience, processes used to generate them, sources underlying their development, analytical tools most commonly applied to generating them, their modes of dissemination, and the resources required to produce them.

  1. Current Intelligence provides clients with the first identification of developments in the organization's competitive arena. This is typically light on analytical manipulation and, in cases where it is warranted, will later be assessed more thoroughly.
  2. Basic Intelligence reports on analytical research that provides the up-to-date, systematic facts and understanding about the organization's environment, industry, and competitors.
  3. Technical Intelligence helps the decision maker understand developments in both the scientific and technical areas that affect, or may potentially impact, their organization's competitive environment.
  4. Early Warning Intelligence provides advanced warning of potential marketplace disruptions and environmental opportunities and threats.
  5. Estimated Intelligence provides forecasts, scenarios, and likely developments relative to competitor's products, markets, customers, processes, and/or industry composition.
  6. Work Group Intelligence is used in support of internal projects and teams especially those relative to possible merger and acquisition candidates, patent purchases, or acquisition of specialist expertise.
  7. Targeted Intelligence offers one-time intelligence that targets narrow, specific, and focused needs of an intelligence client.
  8. Crisis Intelligence is designed to assist the organization in managing its way through crisis events.
  9. Foreign Intelligence focuses on competitors, industries, and companies that operate outside the nation-state domicile of the organization.
  10. Counterintelligence assists the organization in addressing the intelligence threats posed by competitors.

Communication Difficulties Faced by Analysts

Despite the increased use of technology in communication between analysts and their decision-making clients,13 the analyst's communication of their findings continues to be a trouble spot for decision support. Why is the effective communication of analysis results so difficult?

In our experiences, and through observation and surveys of hundreds of business and competitive analysts, their work context, and their organizations, we have identified a number of reasons that can be frequently associated with lower levels of analytical effectiveness.

Although we were tempted to prioritize these items, either by the frequency in which they occur or by their relative importance to the analysis process, we do not have access to systematic research in this field that would allow us to achieve this. We think that further examination and research of these reasons is warranted, and we usually suggest to managers that they audit their own operations to assess the prevalence of these problems in their context. In no particular order, we have observed that most analysts

  • Don't understand or think through basic communication transmission models that impact their daily work.
    A basic model developed by C.E. Shannon and W. Weaver looked like this:

    image

    Figure 4.1 Communication transmission model

    Shannon and Weaver argued that there were three levels of problems in communication:

    1. The technical problem: How accurately can the message be transmitted?
    2. The semantic problem: How precisely is the meaning "conveyed"?
    3. The effectiveness problem: How effectively does the received meaning affect behavior?

    Subsequent research in human communication, most notably by Harold Lasswell,14 was closely allied to behaviorist approaches, and this resulted in a verbal version of the former Source-Message-Channel-Receiver transmission model that essentially asked, "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?" Most analysts do not ask these questions of their communication products, and because of this, often misfire on achieving their aims of influencing the decision maker.

    Although these models are far too simplistic to accurately reflect communication reality in today's complex world, having a communication model in mind such as these, at least provides an initial basis from which to think through the communication challenge. A widely known notion in physics that analysts should know about suggests that chaos or randomness always increases with time. This results in communication being increasingly distorted the more times it is passed along and through a channel. It would be seen as added noise or complexity and can occur at any stage or at multiple stages of the analysis process.

  • Have not received training and development in becoming effective communicators.
    You cannot be an analyst and be a poor communicator, and you cannot be a successful analyst unless you are also an effective communicator. Unfortunately, reporting and presentation skills are not a focus of most business professionals' formal education or training.15 Yes, companies will send graduate trainees on an "Introduction to Public Speaking" or "How to Use PowerPoint" type training course in their first year of employment, and in that respect, they can be useful. Functional managers and analysts at all other levels are generally assumed to have attained highly developed communication skills through some form of osmosis. The evidence contradicts this. Good analysts and good managers can sometimes be spectacularly bad at making presentations and delivering information, so much so, that the audience feels distinctly embarrassed and uncomfortable at their performance. This does not assist in the communication process and is an element that is entirely correctable.
    Analysts use communication skills to negotiate with their clients for choices, time to decide, time to act, understanding, and to agree on how each can help to achieve better decisions. Analysts actually accomplish their jobs indirectly through the communication that is exchanged between the analyst and their clients.
    What is important for the analyst to know is that communication can be exercised and improved. It can be broken down into its component parts and practiced. Analysts also need to know how and when to keep quiet. This is a highly developed talent used during information acquisition and most effectively by skilled negotiators.
    Far from being seen as a one-off introductory type course for newcomers, advanced communication skills training should be a mandatory and ongoing requirement for all employees. Communication is a complex business, and it really is much more than talking.
  • Rely upon the communication techniques that they are experienced and comfortable with, not necessarily those that are appropriate for a particular client and/or situation.
    Analysts, who were trained to write reports in their earlier career responsibilities, will ordinarily continue to write them until someone suggests they stop. It is human nature for the analyst to fall back on what they know, but often what they need to know can be far more vital to them in achieving successful outcomes. This will require many analysts to undergo additional training, to learn new skills, to practice them, and to continuously develop their capabilities. Much of this will require an organizational and personal investment in time and money but will typically reap rewards in the form of more appropriate and effective delivery of the analysis product.
    Many professionals, such as surgeons, pilots, engineers, and scientists, embrace the philosophy that they will never know all there is to know about their jobs. They also recognize that new developments are occurring every day. As such, they are legally required to learn about these and demonstrate their continued competence in order to remain employable. While not suggesting that this should be the case for analysts and their decision makers, it is perhaps a little strange that those involved in vital decisions about the future of an enterprise should be deemed as the "finished product" from day one in their job.
  • Have not learned to pick up "silent cues" in communication.
    Most analysts rely far too heavily on written data and information and discount or downplay other forms of inputs, including conversations, observations, and behavioral cues. This can be a critical skill for analysts since they need not only to communicate with the eventual recipients of their work, but also the gatherers of the data and information they are using. Much of this work will require the analyst to make judgments about the credibility of sources, the clarity of the gathered data, and/or the possible motivations of those involved. Better analysts will use not only the so-called obvious, published cues to conduct their work, but will also be cognizant of the informal, behavioral cues that are given off by individuals during communication.
  • Lack a clear understanding of their client's (or sometimes their own) expectations and requirements.
    Many analysts operate with a fuzzy understanding of how their clients will use their outputs and recommendations. A major problem is that many analysts work without an organized KIT/KIQ process and fail to do systematic debriefs and assessments with their decision makers.16 If the analyst does not recognize when and why a client is dissatisfied with their work, they will have difficulties in identifying the means by which to improve it.
    One means for avoiding this problem is to utilize the previously discussed KIT/KIQ process, supplemented by a "statement of work." D.S. Mockus has suggested that a statement of work should encompass, at a minimum, the following elements:
    • Prioritized list of deliverables
    • Primary contact and distribution list
    • Anticipated timeframe of final report
    • Format of final results
      i. Written (paper copy, digital, e-mail, instant message)
      ii. Verbal (face to face, over the phone, in meeting format)
    • Anticipated frequency of status reports/updates
    • Format of status reports/updates
      i. Written (hard copy, digital, e-mail)
      ii. Verbal (in person, over the phone)
    • Anticipated audience (titles, positions)

    Analysts also need to understand their own communication styles, tendencies, and biases. For example, many analysts will filter the results of their analyses by manipulating information in ways that they perceive it will be seen more favorably by the receiver. For analysts who have not rigorously determined their client's needs or requirements, this is likely to get them into trouble. The client may realize what has happened, and as a consequence, not believe, or trust, the recommendations offered.
    Because intelligence is communicated via language, analysts need to recognize how important their choice of words, visuals, or voice will be, particularly if their decision-making clients are from different nationalities, cultures, genders, or experiential backgrounds. Words mean different things to different people. Cultural or social nuances need to be known and properly addressed. To one analyst's client, a "threat" may mean something imminent and urgent, while to another it may be viewed as something that is long-term, long distance, and unlikely to be problematic.

  • Do not develop a plan or strategy for communication or think through the choice of communication vehicles with the same level of rigor that they may think through the choice of analytical tools and techniques.
    In far too many enterprises that we have advised, communication is treated as an afterthought. Strangely enough, executives frequently point to the communication process as being both important and yet a frequent source of organizational difficulties or failures. These facts point to the importance for analysts to consider communication as rigorously as they would any other key facet of their work. A facilitator of this is the development of communication plans and communication audits/reviews on a regular basis. These can then be linked to the overall strategic plan, group's analysis plans, or individuals' project plans.
    Just like the analysis techniques we describe in this book, communication vehicles or modes all have different attributes. It is imperative that analysts think these matters through early in the process so that they can integrate the development of the final products into the intended delivery method. Communication, like most of the rest of the processes described in this book, can and should be planned, managed, measured, and improved.
  • Do not make their recommendations "actionable."
    By "actionable," the analyst's recommendations must relate directly and obviously to the KIT/KIQ of the decision maker, the enterprise's relevant strategic, tactical, and/or operational plans, as well as the decision-making process itself. Actionable means that the analyst has made recommendations that walk the client through not only the decision itself but the likely organizational and competitive manifestations (i.e., contingencies) that would occur as a result of it being acted upon. Last but not least, actionable analysis usually includes an implementation plan, which can be scoped out in the form of a timeline, GANTT chart, project plan, or the like.
  • Need to develop the synthesis skills to take volumes of complex data and information and convert them into brief and easy-to-understand outputs.
    A common reason many analysts fail is that they do not know how to summarize their thoughts and communicate them succinctly. One reason this occurs is that analysts may lack a deep understanding of the analytical techniques they are using. This book is intended to help put that situation right. Many decision makers have neither the time, patience, or desire to read through lengthy tomes or book-length backgrounders about a topic. This is one reason why we think the "Occam's Razor" rule17 should always be applied to communication. This suggests that the analyst should communicate using the simplest and most parsimonious explanation that can fit the facts. All else being equal, it is better to communicate findings using simple and shorter formats as opposed to longer and more complex ways.
    Another related communication error made by analysts is not "cutting to the chase" or knowing how to differentiate between the "must have" and the "nice to have" intelligence. As one expert in the competitive intelligence field stated, "effective analysts learn not to summarize but rather to synthesize."18 It is far too easy to produce volume, whereas synthesizing analytical findings down to their essential core messages is a skill that will always be valued by today's harried decision makers.
  • Have not thoroughly examined the communication expectations, channel, and format needs/preferences of their decision makers.
    Some decision makers prefer to receive their intelligence via particular channels or in specific formats. Some will prefer to hear results in a private face-to-face, in-person manner; some will prefer a formal presentation; some will prefer to receive e-mails or access a special web area designed for the purposes; and some will prefer to receive written reports sent via the internal mail.
    It is common for analysis clients to exhibit selective hearing based on their own needs, motivations, experience, background, and other personal characteristics. Analysts should take account of and be sensitive to a client's work habits, personality, and schedule. If the client has an extremely busy day, it would be futile to try and arrange a 90 minute in-depth briefing for something that can wait until tomorrow. If an analyst really does have to demand a client's attention, then the subject matter and scenario had better be of sufficient gravity to warrant such an intrusion.
    Part of "managing a client's expectations" also compels analysts to profile themselves and their clients. D.J. Kalinowski suggests that clients have one of four basic communication styles—the first as a primary style and another exhibited less frequently as a secondary style, each of which indicates that the analyst should do specific things. This notion is expanded next.

    Style 1: Analytical
    Problem solvers, organized, logical, somewhat impersonal, typically cautious, and nearly always consistent. As such, it is important for the analyst to have done their homework. They should strive to communicate as accurately as possible, providing the level of background detail the client needs to gain confidence in the rigor and logic of their recommendations.
    Style 2: Driver
    Goal-driven, action-oriented, competitive, serious, strong-willed, controlling, and self-reliant. Analysts communicating with these clients must be efficient in their communication, cutting confidently and quickly "to the chase" and not providing much "fluff" or side-tracking in the presentation of their findings. It is important to stress the "bottom-line" implications of the findings, make clear recommendations, and answer these clients' questions quickly and directly.
    Style 3: Amiable
    Sympathetic, nurturing, cooperative, personal, adaptable, tolerant, patient, good listeners, and thoughtful. Analysts delivering their findings to these clients try and involve them in the communication, keep an open mind, are agreeable, and are willing to explore the many options they went through before coming to their actionable insight. Last but not least, they should be clear about the multiple types of benefits that can be generated from the recommendation.
    Style 4: Expressive
    Enthusiastic, intuitive, creative, inspirational, spontaneous, motivators, friendly, group-oriented, and energetic. Analysts delivering their findings to expressive clients should communicate with them often, be engaging, use multi-media, and be able to weave a captivating "story" together.

    In a similar fashion, analysts need to look inwardly at their own personality and preferences to make sure that they are operating optimally in the communication process. Effective analysts recognize the different preferences and personalities and align them between the communicating parties.
  • Do not even know whether the right people are getting communicated to with the right results.
    A surprising waste of analysis resources is common in those enterprises where analysts produce reports, develop web-sites, write briefings or newsletters, and distribute these items to readers who may never even know, or care, about receiving these items. We are aware of a great many firms where briefings would sit for weeks or months at a time before being read by the recipient, often rendering the content useless.
    We find this communication error is made most commonly where analysts do not have regular, active meetings with their decision makers and become too heavily reliant on one-way methods such as newsletters, web-sites, intranet portals, or even bulletin boards. It is highly dangerous to assume that material disseminated in this fashion will actually be absorbed at all, let alone shortly after dispatch. Such a "scatter-gun" approach to communicating results ensures that little cross-fertilization of knowledge takes place—a vital ingredient in the rich mix of an analyst's appreciation of how information can impact in many ways, on more than one activity at any one time.

Effective Listening and Answering the Questions of Decision Makers

Analysts should also be competent in answering their client's questions and manage Q&A sessions effectively. One of the best things the analyst can do is to establish, up front, the guidelines and deadlines under which their presentation will operate. Some other tips analysts should demonstrate mastery of are the following:

  • Never get into a debate, argue with, or criticize a questioner.
    Analysts who view every question as an attack on the integrity of their work or their personal integrity typically respond in defensive ways to questions. They will then attack the questioner, and this is unlikely to help them to become a trusted ally of the decision maker. Although some decision makers will commonly be argumentative with analysts, it will be important for the analyst to identify something the two parties can agree on, thank the arguer for their input, and move on to other facets of their dialogue.
  • Answer questions succinctly.
    Most executives will quickly lose patience with an analyst who drones on and on about things without bothering to take a breath and assessing whether the client is still interested. Long-winded answers usually raise more questions than they answer. Short, concise, and "to the point" responses are generally favored by decision makers, and it is these that the analyst should aim to provide.
  • Being able to admit they don't know something.
    Analysts cannot be afraid to say, "I don't know." It is surprising just how many people simply cannot say those three words when their client asks them a question. There is no way that you can have pre-empted and prepared for all the likely questions that can come from so many different perspectives. What they don't want to hear, though, after a dynamic presentation, is 30 seconds of mindless drivel while you try to make up a good answer to an unexpected question. Offer to find out the answer and get back to them by the end of the day. If you haven't found the answer by then, tell them so and keep looking unless, or until, you're told to stop.
  • Start and end any meetings on time.
    Decision-making executives are well paid, and their time is highly valuable. One of the worst things an analyst can do in a communication activity is to either start a meeting after the appointed time or to end it late. Analysts should not let their poor attention to time management be the main thing their decision makers remember about their performance.

Conduct Communication Follow-Up and Gather Feedback

An element of most communication processes that is commonly overlooked is the gathering of feedback and subsequent measurement of the communication and client engagement process. Whenever possible, the analyst should take the opportunity to gain feedback from the audience, as close as possible to the event. Informal questions that can be asked might be:

  • "Was that useful?"
  • "Was there anything you'd like me to clarify or elaborate upon?"
  • "Did I miss anything you would like me to have covered?"
  • "Did you get what you needed?"
  • "Was this information valuable?"
  • "Did you feel confident about acting on my recommendations?"
  • "Was there anything you'd suggest I do differently next time?"

It is essential, though, that this does not come across as the actions of a less than confident analyst, engaging in "approval-seeking" or "compliment-fishing" behavior that normally delivers only platitudes and not a truthful opinion on an individual's performance.

One thing that is often valuable to competitive analysts is to maintain a rolling audit of their outputs, their effectiveness in communicating these to their audience, and an account of any actions taken as a consequence. This will help them shape the overall process and enable all parties to identify any deficiencies.

Pragmatic Considerations

There are a variety of considerations that should always be taken into account when communicating across cultures or geographies.19 This topic has received considerable treatment from many authors, but as a means of re-sensitizing analysts to the whole issue of cultural awareness and sensitivities when communicating, we offer a brief summary of the key points to consider in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1
Key Considerations When Communicating Across Cultures and Countries20

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Summary

Just as analysts try to reduce the surprises experienced by their decision-making clients, they also need to apply the same principle to their own communication of results. M. Sperger put it succinctly when he said: "How can we communicate intelligence so that it does indeed make a difference? We have to begin with a commitment: We will deliver intelligence at the right time, in the right form, with a message that compels action."

Analysts should have ongoing communication with their clients while they are engaged in the analysis process. This doesn't require them to report every small event, but it does require them to keep their clients informed of their progress, or equally importantly, lack of progress. Maintaining open lines of communication and being able to give the client a "preview" of your findings before they are formally offered can minimize any adverse surprises. This also allows the decision maker to raise potential issues that the analyst may not have thought of and still has time to address before the analysis process and project is brought to its conclusion.

Knowing when to begin the formal communication of results is also a delicate balancing act that the analyst must master. Releasing results prematurely, possibly before the analyst achieves a high enough degree of confidence in their findings, can result in poor decisions. Communicating one's results too late, possibly because the analyst wanted to be very certain of their insights, may render the findings obsolete and useless if the actions that needed to be taken were delayed unnecessarily by the analyst's reluctance to finish.21

Last, but certainly not least, in order to develop and keep their clients' trust, analysts must constantly acquire and enhance an in-depth understanding of their enterprise's business, industry, and markets. Additionally, they must always relate their key conclusions and recommendations back to what is important to their business. If they do not, they will have little ability to persuade their customers, build their influence, or impact business decisions.

References

Buchwitz, L. (1998). "Monitoring Competitive Intelligence Using Internet Push Technology," available from http://home.eol.ca/~lillyb/CI_paper.html.

Clark, R.M. (2004). Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

DeSouza, K. (2001). "The communication of intelligence: Three lessons," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 6(5), pp. 42–44.

Dugal, M. (1998). "CI product line: A tool for enhancing user acceptance of CI," Competitive Intelligence Review, 9(2), pp. 17–25.

Fehringer, D. (2001). "Hot off the wires: Improve the effectiveness of your CI Newsletter," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 4(3), May–June, pp. 11, 14.

Herring, J.P. (1999). "Key intelligence topics: A process to identify and define intelligence needs," Competitive Intelligence Review, 10(4), pp. 10–19.

Kalinowski, D.J. (2003). "Managing expectations: Will clients ever fully understand?," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 6(6), pp. 25–29.

Kopec, J.A. (1982). "The communication audit," Public Relations Journal, 38(5), May, p. 24.

Laalo, A.T. (2000). "Intranets and competitive intelligence: Creating access to knowledge," Competitive Intelligence Review, 9(4), pp. 63–72.

McGonagle, J.J., and C.M. Vella (2002). Bottom Line Competitive Intelligence. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.

Mockus, D.S. (2001). "Avoid the intelligence disconnect," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 2001, 4(6), pp. 9–12.

Parker, D.A. (2003). Confident Communication: Speaking Tips for Educators. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, Inc.

Sawka, K. (2000). The analyst's corner: Keep your messages short and sweet," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 3(1), Jan–Mar, pp. 54–55.

Severin, W., and J. Tankard (1997). Communication Theories. 4th ed. New York, NY: Longman.

Shaker, M., and S. Gembicki (1999). The WarRoom Guide to Competitive Intelligence. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Shannon, C.E., and W. Weaver (1949). A Mathematical Model of Communication. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Sperger, M. (2005). "Managing the message: Communicating intelligence that makes a difference," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 8(1), pp. 12–17.

Stanat, R. (1998). Global Gold: Panning for Profits in Foreign Markets. New York, NY: AMACOM.

Tyson, K.W.M. (2002). The Complete Guide to Competitive Intelligence. 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: Leading Edge Publications.

Waters Jr., T. (2001). "Special delivery: High impact presentation tactics for CI professionals," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 4(6), Nov–Dec pp. 13–17.

Endnotes

1 McGonagle and Vella, 2002.

2 Buchwitz, 1998.

3 DeSouza, 2001.

4 Clark, 2004.

5 Thanks to Melanie Wing for raising the importance of this premise in the communication of intelligence.

6 See McGonagle and Vella, 2002; Tyson, 2002.

7 Sawka, 2000.

8 See Chapter 18 in Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2003.

9 Shaker and Gembicki, 1999.

10 Fehringer, 2001.

11 A special note of thanks to Timothy Kindler for reminding us of the cumulative importance of communicating with decision makers.

12 Tyson, 2002.

13 Laalo, 2000.

14 Severin and Tankard, 1997.

15 Waters, 2001.

16 Herring, 1999.

17 Parker, 2003.

18 Tyson, 2002.

19 Sperger, 2005; Stanat, 1998.

20 These factors were adapted from the cultural awareness data presented in Communicaid (www.communicaid.com), Sperger, 2005; Stanat, 1998; and www.WorldBiz.com.

21 De Souza, 2001.

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