One of the most difficult challenges facing analysts in organizations is effectively communicating the results of their work on a timely basis to their decision makers. This is important because analysis often underlies decisions, and decision makers cannot always wait for the analyst to complete their work. Also many of the decisions that are made about competitive business matters rely on data inputs that have a short shelf life. In other words, the intelligence generated about competitive actions is only useful to the enterprise for a short time period before it becomes out of date, at which point, it no longer has the ability to deliver competitive advantage. Analysts must place considerable attention on delivering their findings to, and gaining the attention, understanding, confidence, and ultimately trust, of their decision makers. Presenting results to decision-making clients is one of the vulnerable areas where intelligence and other strategy-related processes can fail.
Individuals new to the field or those who remain ignorant of the art and science of communication will do their best to avoid the challenge of this element of the analyst's task. It is important to realize that the analyst's job is not over when the formal analysis process itself is concluded. Delivery of the findings to the decision makers, gauging their understanding of the analyst's recommendations, making sure that no critical intelligence was lost in the exchange of ideas, and understanding how the analysis product will be used are among the analyst's key communication task responsibilities. Failures in these final stages of the analysis process can devalue the analyst's work and can ultimately be a prime contributor to bad decisions and inappropriate actions taken by an enterprise in the marketplace. Additionally, the communication stage is a vital feedback mechanism for the analyst to understand how well he has done the job in hand. It also provides pointers on how he might improve his performance on the next one.
Within each enterprise, there will be established procedures for communicating with decision-making clients, writing a report, and presenting results. Many of these are generic across business or management professions, while others will be more specific to an enterprise and its particular culture. A major responsibility of analysts is to learn these procedures, particularly those associated with demonstrated and proven communication performance, and to pay close attention to them when communicating their own findings and insights.
A common theme regarding the relationship between communication and audience satisfaction is that the more confidence that the audience (decision maker) has in the ability of the communicator (analyst), then the more satisfied they are likely to be with what is being communicated (analysis product). Distortion, ambiguity, and incongruence in communication can all act to increase a decision maker's discomfort or uncertainty. Analysts who are able to lessen the amount of distortion in their communication will reduce their client's levels of discomfort and uncertainty, and ceteris paribus, achieve higher levels of satisfaction, and receive better feedback. These communication results are all beneficial in achieving successful analytical outcomes over time.
We want to state, for the record, that you will have difficulty becoming an effective analyst in an enterprise unless you demonstrate effective communication skills, knowledge, and abilities. Resources spent in supporting analysis efforts are wasted if the analyst's recommendations are not used. This is even more serious if the reason for non- or misuse is that the decision makers did not understand what was being provided to them, that the conclusions were not clear, or that the analysis product was delivered in an incomprehensible or inappropriate manner. Ineffective communication of results will negate what might otherwise have been outstanding work in all the other phases of the analysis process.
Over the past 20 years or more, the form in which competitive analysis is delivered has been dramatically altered. In the 1980s, most analysts' outputs were communicated through either occasional written reports, regularly written reports, and in a passive manner by making the contents of files available in a centralized location or database on an as-needed basis to decision makers.1 Today, more active and regular delivery of results occurs through reporting, presenting, and pushing reports through electronic means to users.2 What used to be contained in manila folders in large filing cabinets has now been shifted over to internal electronic databases or custom-developed intranet portals. Intranets have become a common means for communicating intelligence in most large organizations.
How intelligence is presented and packaged affects the client's perception of its validity.3 One thing the analyst must always consider is the need to inform versus the need to protect critical information from being shared beyond the persons for whom it was originally intended. Some analysis results are delivered through automated electronic means, while others are offered in face-to-face group settings or in-person. Regardless of the manner in which the analysis product is delivered to decision makers, the analyst must also address trade-offs between depth, breadth, speed, security, and convenience.
Similar to most forms of communication, analysts must always consider how each output format is likely to create the conditions necessary to influence the client of the importance of their insights. Analysts must also be cognizant of their own predisposition to particular formats. Properly factoring in these two considerations on the analyst and decision maker's communication preferences and taking account of these before communication takes place will strengthen the likelihood that the client will accept their recommendations.
Analysts who develop recognized levels of communication effectiveness are more likely to present results that
By what methods does the analyst deliver these results? It should be reiterated here that the method(s) used should be mainly based on the decision maker's needs.5 That premise does suggest, though, that the decision makers actually know what they need to know, and as previously mentioned in this book, that is not always the case. It is in these situations that the analyst has an even greater responsibility, not only to meet the decision maker's perceived needs, but to produce a back-up set of additional analysis product, recommendations, and/or communication channels. This added-value back-up set is where the analyst's communication skills, knowledge, and abilities become highly visible as it will address what the decision maker might have asked for, if only they had known what to ask for. It is in this role that the analyst acts more proactively, as a subject expert or an internal consultant, rather than as a reactive employee simply completing a task. At the end of every reporting event, the decision maker should always ask three questions of the analyst:
The appropriate communication packaging of analytical outputs is essential. Analysts typically provide their outputs to decision-making clients in the following forms.6
One of the most effective two-way models of communication, face-to-face briefings allow the analyst to physically and orally present their findings to a client. This not only encourages discussion and exchange of understanding to take place in real-time, but it minimizes second-hand distortion or the effects that a time lag can have on the acquired understanding.
Printed outputs are a cost-effective way of distributing results. Some executives still prefer to read items from the printed page rather than from a screen, particularly if a screen is not readily available or inconvenient (i.e., the decision maker is traveling on an airplane or his e-mail networks are not easily accessible). A problem with this form of communication is that there are many more pages of materials printed than are ever read, and much of the information that is read is not fully understood by its readers. It is not unknown, quite common even, for the readers of paper-based intelligence reports to be overlooked. Additionally, the report itself has the potential to fall into the hands of an unintended audience and can create undesirable vulnerabilities.
These are a very effective way to deliver results to a group of decision makers and are a good way of gaining a group's attention. The main advantage in this format is that it provides opportunities for the analysts to discuss their findings in real-time, not only with those who may have initiated the task in the first place, but also more importantly with those individuals to whom it was designed to inform. It is important that the appropriate decision makers are available to observe and interact with the presenter, and this scheduling aspect is often an overlooked part of the analysis communication process.
One criticism of this method is that many times, analysts prepare PowerPoint slide decks whereby the aesthetics of their slides, the fanciness of their presentations, or the structure of their slide organization overpowers the important content or message, which then gets lost or missed because of the high reliance on the presenting technology.7 Analysts need to be wary of spending too much time thinking about how snazzily they can present reports, at the expense of worrying about the robustness of content.
Seminars and workshops are two other forms of presentation-based communication. They can allow the analysts to present their ideas more formally while still allowing for the collective benefits of quality question and answer time. This encourages discussion among the collected group of executives in an audience and aids the exploration of solutions to competitive and strategic problems.
Digital communication is probably the most commonly used means for analysts to communicate with their decision-making clients. The major benefit of this format is the almost immediate attention and quick replies. E-mail and instant messaging are good ways to disseminate "alerts," regularly published newsletters, and other forms of analytical results that need to be acted upon in a quick manner. A drawback of this form of communication is that it makes it difficult to communicate the "richness" of the recommendation context and can limit the format of the results to mostly, if not entirely, text.
Customized systems offered by specialized competitive intelligence vendors, or systems tailored for analytical use within the larger corporate communication system, are becoming more commonplace. These allow analysts' clients to either see their findings in refined and finished formats, which can include digital links to other materials, and/or in their original input such as documents, interview notes, articles, and so forth. Such systems nearly always allow for selective access and viewing by clients on a need-to-know basis, or they can be designed to send out various forms of information in the form of e-mails, instant messages, or fax to a selected numbers of recipients. The drawback to these systems is that they can be cumbersome, costly, complex, and do not always allow for two-way communication to take place.
Many analytical tools require two-way interaction between analysts and their decision-making clients. Some of the tools in this book are best practiced in this way, including techniques such as war gaming (see Chapter 23, "War Gaming"), scenario analysis,8 or shadowing (see Chapter 13, "Shadowing"). These frequently involve the analyst or designated individuals playing the role of one or more competitors. These techniques require a vast amount of data before anything is attempted and can be conducted in a one-off session, over an extended period of time in a person-to-person format, or can be conducted in teams in tightly planned and scheduled sessions aided by expert facilitators.9
Analysts ordinarily generate outputs in a variety of forms for use by their decision-making clients. Each of these has a typical audience, for which they are designed, are produced on a particular frequency, and are viewed to hold a certain level of perceived value in the eyes of the report recipients. They should always be tailored for the known and unique needs of the decision makers.
The most common types of analyst reports are given next and are discussed in greater detail with respect to their relative advantages and disadvantages.
Targeted most frequently to field sales personnel, marketing, managers, sales managers, or other decision makers, these analysis outputs contain largely tactical and/or operational information and utilize data gathered from all sources. They can include both publicly available and internally available information. They frequently focus on current or immediate past events. They are rarely oriented toward the future.
Newsletters are typically of lower strategic value relative to other types of outputs.10 Although these items may be seen as less valuable than other products in a comparative sense, their cumulative value can be higher and strategic in nature. This can be especially true if they raise the level of competitive awareness over time in the enterprise. When done well, newsletters and news bulletins can be catalysts for not only conversations and discussions between analysts, analyst groups, and their clients, but encourage new questions to be asked of the analyst group. One way of achieving this catalyzing effect is to ensure that newsletters do indeed include analysts' interpretations and insight, along with the informative "news" aspects of the bulletins.11
These are fairly brief and regularly generated products that look at particular business decisions, providing an assessment of the current situation facing the decision maker, identifying the critical success factors associated with the situation, and suggesting likely outcomes in terms of probabilities. The content can range from a very general overview of broad issues to detailed answers to highly specific questions.
Competitor profiles are produced as needed but are constantly updated and contain general information about the enterprise's competitors in the marketplace. They are valuable for field sales personnel, marketing, and sales managers, as well as other functional decision makers who not only benefit from their existence, but contribute to their augmentation and evolution. Seldom actionable in their own right, they are of lower strategic value relative to other types of analytic outputs, but can be combined with other types of outputs that have higher overall decision-making value.
Done well, competitor profiling is carried out at many different layers of the enterprise, addressing the competitive landscape and associated activities right across the value chain. Passive competitor profiles are simple historical commentaries, compiled from publicly available documents and as such, carry little or no analytical value or originality. Active competitor profiles are future driven, contain identification and assessments of critical success factors, deconstruction of published financial reports, qualitative and quantitative judgments on current/future capabilities, probabilities of competitor action taking place, and recommendations on how best to react to each and every one should it occur.
Strategic impact worksheets are closely related to competitor profiles and are used to identify specific events that may potentially impact the enterprise. They are usually targeted at those individuals in the enterprise who will be most affected by the events, possibly including Strategic Business Unit or functional managers. Ordinarily issued on a regular basis, they are usually of moderate value to decision makers. However, if the analyst uses these with competitor profiles to develop an early-warning system, then they can take on increased value. Anything that helps the organization to avoid being surprised by competitor action, market shifts, or hitherto unforeseen events, can only be of great value.
Usually issued on a regular basis, in a highly condensed manner, these are reports to senior and other managers about strategic news. They are rarely used to address specific issues, but they do ensure that all concerned are kept as "aware" as possible of the shifting competitive landscape.
Intelligence briefings are increasingly offered electronically in broadcast formats over secure intranets, in webinar formats, or via secure video-teleconferencing facilities. They are typically of moderate value to the analyst's clients.
These are one of the more unique products produced by analysts on an as-needed or as-requested basis for key decision makers. The situation analysis report summarizes emerging and rising strategic issues. They usually provide background in the form of the detailed thinking and synthesis actually performed to generate the recommendations. Relative to other products, their shelf lives are short.
Special intelligence summaries are usually brief in length, not much more than one or two pages, and most frequently generated on an as-requested basis. They identify situations, summarize the key supporting analyses, and offer recommendations on desired actions to senior decision makers. They are among the most valuable outputs regularly generated by analysts and are often the most visible influencers of an enterprise's decisions.
When creating reports, analysts should emphasize the following items:12
Analysts can enhance their decision makers' receptivity by using a variety of analysis outputs.
M. Dugal developed the idea of an analyst's portfolio, which comprised 10 key products. Each of these "products" differ in terms of shelf life, intended audience, processes used to generate them, sources underlying their development, analytical tools most commonly applied to generating them, their modes of dissemination, and the resources required to produce them.
Despite the increased use of technology in communication between analysts and their decision-making clients,13 the analyst's communication of their findings continues to be a trouble spot for decision support. Why is the effective communication of analysis results so difficult?
In our experiences, and through observation and surveys of hundreds of business and competitive analysts, their work context, and their organizations, we have identified a number of reasons that can be frequently associated with lower levels of analytical effectiveness.
Although we were tempted to prioritize these items, either by the frequency in which they occur or by their relative importance to the analysis process, we do not have access to systematic research in this field that would allow us to achieve this. We think that further examination and research of these reasons is warranted, and we usually suggest to managers that they audit their own operations to assess the prevalence of these problems in their context. In no particular order, we have observed that most analysts
Figure 4.1 Communication transmission model
Shannon and Weaver argued that there were three levels of problems in communication:
Subsequent research in human communication, most notably by Harold Lasswell,14 was closely allied to behaviorist approaches, and this resulted in a verbal version of the former Source-Message-Channel-Receiver transmission model that essentially asked, "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?" Most analysts do not ask these questions of their communication products, and because of this, often misfire on achieving their aims of influencing the decision maker.
Although these models are far too simplistic to accurately reflect communication reality in today's complex world, having a communication model in mind such as these, at least provides an initial basis from which to think through the communication challenge. A widely known notion in physics that analysts should know about suggests that chaos or randomness always increases with time. This results in communication being increasingly distorted the more times it is passed along and through a channel. It would be seen as added noise or complexity and can occur at any stage or at multiple stages of the analysis process.
Analysts also need to understand their own communication styles, tendencies, and biases. For example, many analysts will filter the results of their analyses by manipulating information in ways that they perceive it will be seen more favorably by the receiver. For analysts who have not rigorously determined their client's needs or requirements, this is likely to get them into trouble. The client may realize what has happened, and as a consequence, not believe, or trust, the recommendations offered.
Because intelligence is communicated via language, analysts need to recognize how important their choice of words, visuals, or voice will be, particularly if their decision-making clients are from different nationalities, cultures, genders, or experiential backgrounds. Words mean different things to different people. Cultural or social nuances need to be known and properly addressed. To one analyst's client, a "threat" may mean something imminent and urgent, while to another it may be viewed as something that is long-term, long distance, and unlikely to be problematic.
Style 1: Analytical
Problem solvers, organized, logical, somewhat impersonal, typically cautious, and nearly always consistent. As such, it is important for the analyst to have done their homework. They should strive to communicate as accurately as possible, providing the level of background detail the client needs to gain confidence in the rigor and logic of their recommendations.
Style 2: Driver
Goal-driven, action-oriented, competitive, serious, strong-willed, controlling, and self-reliant. Analysts communicating with these clients must be efficient in their communication, cutting confidently and quickly "to the chase" and not providing much "fluff" or side-tracking in the presentation of their findings. It is important to stress the "bottom-line" implications of the findings, make clear recommendations, and answer these clients' questions quickly and directly.
Style 3: Amiable
Sympathetic, nurturing, cooperative, personal, adaptable, tolerant, patient, good listeners, and thoughtful. Analysts delivering their findings to these clients try and involve them in the communication, keep an open mind, are agreeable, and are willing to explore the many options they went through before coming to their actionable insight. Last but not least, they should be clear about the multiple types of benefits that can be generated from the recommendation.
Style 4: Expressive
Enthusiastic, intuitive, creative, inspirational, spontaneous, motivators, friendly, group-oriented, and energetic. Analysts delivering their findings to expressive clients should communicate with them often, be engaging, use multi-media, and be able to weave a captivating "story" together.
Analysts should also be competent in answering their client's questions and manage Q&A sessions effectively. One of the best things the analyst can do is to establish, up front, the guidelines and deadlines under which their presentation will operate. Some other tips analysts should demonstrate mastery of are the following:
An element of most communication processes that is commonly overlooked is the gathering of feedback and subsequent measurement of the communication and client engagement process. Whenever possible, the analyst should take the opportunity to gain feedback from the audience, as close as possible to the event. Informal questions that can be asked might be:
It is essential, though, that this does not come across as the actions of a less than confident analyst, engaging in "approval-seeking" or "compliment-fishing" behavior that normally delivers only platitudes and not a truthful opinion on an individual's performance.
One thing that is often valuable to competitive analysts is to maintain a rolling audit of their outputs, their effectiveness in communicating these to their audience, and an account of any actions taken as a consequence. This will help them shape the overall process and enable all parties to identify any deficiencies.
There are a variety of considerations that should always be taken into account when communicating across cultures or geographies.19 This topic has received considerable treatment from many authors, but as a means of re-sensitizing analysts to the whole issue of cultural awareness and sensitivities when communicating, we offer a brief summary of the key points to consider in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Key Considerations When Communicating Across Cultures and Countries20
Just as analysts try to reduce the surprises experienced by their decision-making clients, they also need to apply the same principle to their own communication of results. M. Sperger put it succinctly when he said: "How can we communicate intelligence so that it does indeed make a difference? We have to begin with a commitment: We will deliver intelligence at the right time, in the right form, with a message that compels action."
Analysts should have ongoing communication with their clients while they are engaged in the analysis process. This doesn't require them to report every small event, but it does require them to keep their clients informed of their progress, or equally importantly, lack of progress. Maintaining open lines of communication and being able to give the client a "preview" of your findings before they are formally offered can minimize any adverse surprises. This also allows the decision maker to raise potential issues that the analyst may not have thought of and still has time to address before the analysis process and project is brought to its conclusion.
Knowing when to begin the formal communication of results is also a delicate balancing act that the analyst must master. Releasing results prematurely, possibly before the analyst achieves a high enough degree of confidence in their findings, can result in poor decisions. Communicating one's results too late, possibly because the analyst wanted to be very certain of their insights, may render the findings obsolete and useless if the actions that needed to be taken were delayed unnecessarily by the analyst's reluctance to finish.21
Last, but certainly not least, in order to develop and keep their clients' trust, analysts must constantly acquire and enhance an in-depth understanding of their enterprise's business, industry, and markets. Additionally, they must always relate their key conclusions and recommendations back to what is important to their business. If they do not, they will have little ability to persuade their customers, build their influence, or impact business decisions.
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Parker, D.A. (2003). Confident Communication: Speaking Tips for Educators. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, Inc.
Sawka, K. (2000). The analyst's corner: Keep your messages short and sweet," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 3(1), Jan–Mar, pp. 54–55.
Severin, W., and J. Tankard (1997). Communication Theories. 4th ed. New York, NY: Longman.
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Shannon, C.E., and W. Weaver (1949). A Mathematical Model of Communication. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Sperger, M. (2005). "Managing the message: Communicating intelligence that makes a difference," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 8(1), pp. 12–17.
Stanat, R. (1998). Global Gold: Panning for Profits in Foreign Markets. New York, NY: AMACOM.
Tyson, K.W.M. (2002). The Complete Guide to Competitive Intelligence. 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: Leading Edge Publications.
Waters Jr., T. (2001). "Special delivery: High impact presentation tactics for CI professionals," Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 4(6), Nov–Dec pp. 13–17.
5 Thanks to Melanie Wing for raising the importance of this premise in the communication of intelligence.
6 See McGonagle and Vella, 2002; Tyson, 2002.
8 See Chapter 18 in Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2003.
11 A special note of thanks to Timothy Kindler for reminding us of the cumulative importance of communicating with decision makers.
19 Sperger, 2005; Stanat, 1998.
20 These factors were adapted from the cultural awareness data presented in Communicaid (www.communicaid.com), Sperger, 2005; Stanat, 1998; and www.WorldBiz.com.
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