11
Journalism History
Korea
ABSTRACT
Journalism in Korea has ancient roots in Confucian political ideas. Its modern version is tied to the Japanese colonial period and the US occupation in the mid-twentieth century. In post-independence South Korea, journalism's development has been influenced by its place within the military government and the limitations on freedom of the press that followed. In recent years, a handful of news organizations have dominated mainstream journalism. But strong political and social movements, along with the emergence of digital media and the Internet, have destabilized the journalism system. Korea's journalism is at a crossroads. Despite Korea's particular situation of national division and the authoritarianism of the government, it can be overcome by being faithful to journalistic norms and principles.
Journalism in Korea has ancient roots. Its modern version is tied to the Japanese colonial period and the US occupation in the mid-twentieth century. In post-independence South Korea, journalism's development has been influenced by its place within the military government and the limitations on freedom of the press that followed. In recent years, a handful of news organizations have dominated mainstream journalism. But strong political and social movements, along with the emergence of digital media and the Internet, have destabilized the journalism system.
Genealogy of Korean Journalism
Confucian political ideas in the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897) described public opinion as the vitality of a nation, although common people had little input. Public opinion was regarded as a critical factor in the management of the nation, and common people were said to be represented by the privileged class yangban, or Confucian literati. Local communities of yangban were supposed to form public opinion and deliver it to the king; this system might be called the “local public sphere.”
Organs of “expostulation,” or advice to one's superiors, were also established. I would call this system the “Royal Court public sphere.” Officers in the Royal Court discussed policies and administration and prompted disciplinary measures. These officers for expostulation played the leading role of shaping public opinion in order to check the abuse of the king's power. Criticism was delivered through three governmental organs: Saheonbu (office of discipline, responsible for news coverage of oversight of government officials), Saganwon (office of expostulations, responsible for news of ordinary politics), and Hongmungwan (office of academy and publicity, responsible for record keeping and providing expert advice to the king). These officials were in principle free from any influence from the king, although this principle was often violated. Modern newspapers can be said to have inherited this spirit of criticism of Confucian literati of the Joseon dynasty.
The Birth of the Daily Newspaper: Chobo
If the core function of journalism is to transmit news to the public, Chobo (literally, “morning paper”) was definitely an early form of newspaper in the Joseon dynasty. It was the official gazette transcribed by hand at the office in charge of royal commands every morning. It was published in two forms: one for the public in the capital, the other for the provinces. The readers of both were mainly of the yangban class. Most of the content was royal decrees. Chobo also delivered Confucian lessons, the ruling ideology of the dynasty, news of natural disasters, foreign relations, and extraordinary events, very similar to the content of modern newspapers.
In August 1577, the Royal Court allowed civilians to copy Chobo every day to sell to the public. The civilian Chobo, printed in type, was distributed to people without access to the official Chobo for a subscription fee. When the king was informed a few months later, he prohibited it out of fear of leaking national information to foreign countries. The officials involved in permitting the publication were condemned to exile. Some claim that Chobo was the first printed newspaper in the world, as it came before seventeenth-century European journals and 56 years before the 1633 Chinese Gazette. Chobo changed its title to Kwanbo (“official paper”) in 1894.
Origins of the Modern Newspaper
The first modern newspaper in Korea was the Hanseong Sunbo in 1883. Initially it was issued every ten days in Chinese characters only; later it came out weekly in a mix of Chinese characters and Korean alphabetic text, or Hangeul.1 In 1896, Dongnip Shinmun (The Independent), virtually the first private newspaper in Korea, in its inaugural editorial, announced that “we will not discriminate against people according to their social status [. . .] We will not serve only those living in Seoul but all Koreans living in Korea.” This statement aimed at the disintegration of the feudal and closed public sphere of the yangban class and heralded the birth of an open and democratic public sphere. With a view to supporting such a public sphere, Dongnip Shinmun was issued only in Korean characters so that it could reach more people, regardless of gender and social status. It also published an English-language edition. Several other newspapers followed suit. These newspapers played a significant role in the transition from Confucian traditions to Westernized modernization.
The Long Road to Press Freedom: State Intervention in Journalism
Political power has historically been the most significant influence in the history of journalism in Korea. I shall first trace government policies on journalism and discuss the process of democratization; then I will describe the development of the media as a business or industry in which the Korean government has continued to play an enormously important role.
The development of the press took place within the context of political history. Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) replaced the Joseon dynasty, ending a period in which foreign powers – including Russia, China, the United States, England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands – had competed for influence. Japanese colonialism tried to eradicate Korean identity. The Korean language was strictly prohibited and even names had to be changed into the Japanese style. The US military government ended Japanese rule and governed Korea for three years. The US occupation banned periodicals supporting the Soviet Union or North Korea.
In 1948, the first government of the Republic of Korea was launched under President Rhee Syngman. Becoming increasingly authoritarian during and after the Korean War (1950–1953), President Rhee Syngman hung on to political power until forced to resign by popular mass demonstrations in 1960. Launched with a cabinet system instead of the presidential system, the second republic (1960–1961) allowed a considerable amount of freedom in politics as well as in the press, but failed to steward the economy and fell to a coup led by General Park Chung-Hee in 1961. Park held the presidency until he was assassinated in 1979. Chun Doo-Hwan (1980–1988), another military general, took political power by coup; his successor Roh Tae-Woo (1988–1993) was a co-conspirator.
Table 11.1 Modern political history of the Republic of Korea
| 1910–1945 | Japanese occupation |
| 1945–1960 | Independence, division, Korean War, and the establishment of the first republic |
| 1960 | 4.19 (April 19) revolution and overthrow of Rhee Syngman's dictatorship; the second republic under Prime Minister Chang Myoun |
| 1961 | 5.16 (May 16) military coup d'état and establishment of military regime by Park Chung-Hee |
| 1961–1978 | The third and fourth republic of Korea under Park Chung-Hee; people's rights and press freedom extremely limited during dictatorship and industrialization |
| 1979–1980 | Assassination of Park, subsequent coup by Chun Doo-Hwan, nationwide resistance against military control and Kwangju Peoples' Uprising |
| 1980–1987 | The fifth republic of Korea under Chun Doo-Hwan, the president's term in office amended to seven years and re-election prohibited |
| 1987 | 10 June Popular Struggle and direct presidential election system |
| 1988–1992 | The sixth republic of Korea under Roh Tae-Woo, the president's term in office amended to five years |
| 1991 | The three-party merger of one ruling and two opposition parties; Kim Young-Sam, opposition leader for 30 years, becomes leader of the ruling party after the merger |
| 1993–1997 | The “Civilian Government,” the first elected civilian government under Kim Young-Sam |
| 1998–2002 | The “People's Government,” the first elected opposition government of Kim Dae-Jung, 32 years' opposition leader in a keen rivalry with Kim Young-Sam |
| 2003–2007 | The “Participatory Government”; President Roh Moo-Hyun, successor to the previous president, Kim Dae-Jung |
| 2008– | The “Lee Myung-Bak Government” or “Practical Government”; President Lee Myung-Bak, a conservative politician, former mayor of Seoul |
The year 1987 is regarded as a turning point in Korea's political history. Popular mass demonstrations in June forced a constitutional amendment to direct election of the presidency. Korea entered a stage of democratization, even though there was still a long way to go, especially regarding press freedom.
The constitutions of all the republics in Korea, including the most repressive fourth and fifth republics, have endorsed press freedom in principle, if not in practice. Article 21 of the Korean Constitution protects press freedom as a right of citizens: “All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association” (Article 21, Clause 1). It also prohibits press censorship, providing that “Licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association shall not be recognized” (Clause 2). Further, the Constitution stipulates legislation governing the facilities of news services and broadcast media (Clause 3). Balancing freedom of speech and the press with individual rights to reputation, it states: “Neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom” (Clause 4). However, there is often a gulf between these constitutional guarantees and lived reality. The dictatorships did not allow the people or the press to enjoy freedom of speech.
The first republic (1948–1960) forbade seven news-related behaviors in September 1948: violating the national policies of the Republic of Korea; plotting against the government; approving and/or supporting the Communist Party and the so-called puppet government of North Korea; artificial fabrication and agitating others; obstructing diplomatic relations with friendly nations and damaging national prestige; exerting a bad influence upon public sentiment, not to speak of disturbing and exciting it; leaking the nation's secret information (Song, 1990, pp. 78–79).
The National Security Law promulgated in 1948 was used effectively to regulate the press. The government forced three newspaper companies to discontinue immediately and arrested a large number of journalists, continuing the behavior of the US occupation (Song, 1990, p. 80). Over time, control over the progressive press extended to the conservative press. Dong-a Ilbo was discontinued in 1955 and Kyunghyang Shinmun cancelled in 1959 (Song, 1990, pp. 118–119). The press was harassed in other ways as well.
The second republic (1960–1962) relaxed the licensing system in the Registration Law of Newspapers and Political Parties in July 1960. A great number of new magazines and news agencies besides newspapers cropped up competitively throughout the country. The number of dailies rose from 41 to 112; weeklies and magazines doubled or tripled (Song, 1990, p. 127).
The military government that followed (1962–1971) immediately proclaimed martial law and began inspecting all publications. It canceled the registration of newspapers and news agencies that had no facilities of their own in the name of “the purification of quasi-journalists and journalistic organs,” and announced that no additional licenses would be authorized. The Ministry of Public Information issued standards that resulted in the revoking of licenses for 91% of periodicals and even restricted the number of newspaper pages to 36 per week (Kim, H.-S., 1994, p. 130).
Even as it suppressed press criticism, the government promoted industrialization for media companies and enabled them to accumulate large capital. Policy included material improvement of newspapers, newsprint allocation, frequency allocation, and all sorts of licensing systems and preferential loans to lure newspaper owners. Korean media began their transition to capitalist enterprises by colluding with the political regime, as the dictator needed the media to secure his legitimacy.
In October 1972, the Revitalizing Reform began. The proclamation of emergency martial law included censorship. The Revitalizing Reform Constitution included protections of free speech, press, assembly, and petition in Article 18. However, Articles 32 and 54 (clause 2) allowed laws to restrict the people's rights and freedoms in the interests of national security and the maintenance of social/national order (Kim, H.-S., 1994, p. 608). Government control was reinforced and criticism in the media was strictly prohibited, but commercial expansion continued. The difference in treatment between owners and reporters rendered Korean journalism obedient to the regime.
The media policy of the fifth republic (1980–1987) was the typical carrot-and-stick: strong intervention in management as well as in reports combined with support for commercialism. The new military government established the Basic Law of the Media, dismissed around 1,000 media workers, restructured media companies, and tightened censorship. The media companies that survived prospered throughout the 1980s. Media workers were exempted from income tax and enjoyed overseas study and training.
Media Policies After Democratization
Press freedom was regarded as an urgent prerequisite for democracy in Korea, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Struggles for press freedom were the driving force for democratization together with the student movement. But the established press was tame to the point of functioning as propaganda. Reporters who did not agree to play that role experienced hardships and punishments such as dismissal and imprisonment.
Even after democratization, every government and president tried to control the press. Kim Young-Sam (1993–1997) and Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2002) preferred to control the press by conducting tax audits on selected “unfavorable” news media. Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2007), a former human rights lawyer, encouraged prosecutions to the point where critics called it a war against the conservative press. The number of journalists – reporters and anchors – entering politics increased steadily. The intervention of the government in the appointment of the chair of KBS, MBC, and YTN became increasingly visible. Journalists' self-censorship remained. Freedom of the press in Korea continued to be threatened
However, after 1987 media policy embraced “deregulation.” President Roh Tae-Woo tried to present himself as a “normal (not elitist) and legal (duly elected)” president, different from previous presidents. Meanwhile, strong foreign pressure to open the doors of the domestic media industry promoted the idea of the free market (Kim, N.-S., 1994, pp. 176–178). Media grew rapidly in numbers and profitability during this period, taking advantage of monopolistic or oligopolistic status. Many chaebol launched into the media industry (chaebol-media), and the other media enterprises developed into large business groups just like chaebol (media-chaebol). Broadcasting shifted from a public system to a public-private system with the establishment of a new broadcasting company, the Seoul Broadcasting Station, in 1990.
Owing to deregulation, the capitalist market has become another powerful element in Korean media. Movements both within media by media workers and outside the media by civil organizations became essential to keep the media as a public sphere from the influence of the capitalist market, as well as political power, in this new media environment.
The Media Policy of Kim Young-Sam (1993–1997)
Kim Young-Sam's government embraced media reform immediately after his inauguration, emphasizing the social responsibility of the media. The national tax service inspected several media companies and, for the first time, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the unfair transactions within the newspaper market (Chu, Kim, & Park, 1997, pp. 278–279). Keen competition in the newspaper market, nurtured by Roh Tae-Woo's government, now entered a new phase. Kim Young-Sam also tried to introduce the Audit Bureau of Circulations system, public disclosure of personal assets of chief executives of major newspapers, the abolition of tax exemptions for media companies' value-added tax and tax benefits to journalists, and restructuring broadcasting companies through the revision of broadcasting law. These reforms were ineffective (Joo-Eon Kim, 2008, pp. 531–532). The tax audit is the most doubtful point. The national tax service inspected several newspaper companies and KBS and MBC, but the results of these audits were not made public, leading people to criticize them as attempts to intimidate journalism (Lee, 1998). Regulation designed to protect small newspapers and promote competition, as well as letting the FTC, the nation's antitrust agency, penalize the newspaper companies, was also controversial. Critics accused the government of trying to suppress the media.
The government also exerted influence through a growing apparatus of public information officers and through intervention in the selection of the leadership of news organizations. It also filed defamation suits against media reports, a clever and intricate strategy of media control (Chung, 1998, pp. 91–94).
The most important agency of press control was the market. The labor movement in the media industries was defeated by competition among media enterprises and journalists' individualism and devotion to press freedom. Meanwhile, the civic media movement began to promote government support, as private media reached the limits of manpower and financial resources (Chung, 2001, pp. 176–178).
Beginning in February 1998, just after the financial crisis in December 1997, Kim Dae-Jung wanted to differentiate his government from previous ones with the title of “People's Government,” born out of long struggles for democratization. Despite public hostility toward commercialization in the media, Kim Dae-Jung emphasized the role of the press as “critic with friendship rather than friend without criticism” in his address at the ceremony of “press day” on April 1, 1998, just two months after his inauguration. Making clear that there would be no trial of media control, he carried out his campaign promise to abolish the Bureau of Public Information. But in May 1999 he revived the Bureau under the name of the Government Information Agency and launched a tax probe of media companies. He also revived the newspaper regulation introduced in 1996 under the Kim Young-Sam government, which had been abolished since it was claimed to be against free market principles. In 2001, tax investigations culminated in the arrests of some newspaper owners, along with fines of about $4.9 million on 23 media companies. The largest fines were imposed on Chosun Ilbo, Joong-ang Ilbo, and Dong-a Ilbo, the leading conservative dailies, which comprised more than half of the total.
Kim Dae-Jung's media policy in later days was regarded as rather authoritative compared to that of earlier days when he stressed the autonomy of the media. He revised the Broadcasting Law so as to appoint the chairman of KBS (Joo-Eon Kim, 2008, p. 538), which led to controversies and serious conflicts over the appointment that continue to this day.
Setting up the relationship with the press to be a “sound and healthy tension,” the “participatory government” of Roh Moo-Hyun tried to break the traditional collusion between politics and the media. The government introduced an open briefing system and revised newspaper regulation to give more support for minor newspapers. Until then, report rooms, from Cheongwadae, the Blue House, to local police stations, were exclusively for registered major media companies (most of which were conservative). Minor newspapers and newly launched online media (most of which were progressive), therefore, could not attend briefings. These measures brought about the furious resistance of major media.
The conflict between the government and conservative press was obvious in Roh's presidency. Roh Moo-Hyun paid his first visit to Hankyoreh after the presidential election and expressed thanks for supporting him during the election. He also gave the first interview with the online site OhmyNews, which was very unusual. He even excluded Chosun Ilbo from the list of presidential interviews, the biggest and most powerful conservative newspaper. He considered Chosun Ilbo a symbol of the ancien régime of Korean society and “a representative anti-democratic privileged group” (Rhyu, 2002, p. 95). Roh's declaration of war with Chosun Ilbo was followed by an “anti-Chosun movement” of various civil organizations, which soon developed into a nationwide boycott among Roh's supporters.
Diversity of public opinion was the core theme for President Roh Moo-Hyun's media reform. For this, a Special Act on Supporting the Local Press was enacted in 2004 to boost local papers2 and the Newspaper Act in 2005 to reform the structure of the newspaper market. According to the Act, the circulation of the top three newspapers must not exceed 60% of market share and the Newspapers Distribution Center was established to provide a nationwide joint distribution system for minor newspapers. The aim of these acts was to lessen the social and political influence of the top three conservative newspapers. However, it was controversial and lapsed with the change of administration.
Commercialization of Journalism
The history of Korean media as a capitalist enterprise goes back to the 1960s under the third republic. With the resumption of Korea–Japan diplomacy in 1965, the government allowed media to use Japanese capital as credit to enlarge their operations with more personnel and new facilities, and their own buildings, and to invest in transportation, which accelerated their development. In 1965, Joong-ang Ilbo, by Samsung (the first business group, chaebol, in Korea), launched, which meant that newspaper enterprises met the conditions for capitalist development even without direct government subsidy. Advertising in the late 1960s and 1970s became the main source of profit for Korean media.
In the 1980s, media enterprises enhanced their capitalist character as a subsystem of the political system that still lacked legitimacy and therefore needed media to maintain it. Media restructuring in 1980 resulted in monopolistic tendencies and the continued growth of advertising revenue. Media enterprises could modernize their facilities thanks to governmental assistance and increased profits. They launched more varied magazines, and expanded their business fields as cultural enterprises to diversify the sources of profit. Korean media became regimented and aimed to defend and promote the prevailing political powers and policies as well as to pursue the maximization of profits. Their gross sales also increased dramatically. The vigorous advance into the magazine and periodical market in the search for more profits using existing facilities showed the typical attribute of capitalist enterprises. The media enterprises turned out to be a highly profitable business in the 1980s thanks to the various policies of the fifth republic. During the fifth republic from 1980 to 1987, the gross sales of the five major national daily newspaper enterprises increased 3.4 times.3
The revenue composition of the newspaper enterprises has changed drastically during the period under consideration. The percentage ratio of advertisement revenue increased to 60.2% in the 1980s. The non-competitive structure of the media controlled by political power allowed media enterprises to achieve stunning growth in advertising revenue (Kim, 1996, p. 248). Broadcasting and newspapers both grew faster than other manufacturing industries.
Newspaper enterprises owed much of their commercial success to the cartel on subscription fees maintained since the 1960s with the government's connivance. Journalists, too, enjoyed many privileges. The salary level of newspaper reporters, however, was considerably lower compared to the large business enterprises. More than 70% of newspaper reporters received less than the minimum living wage. Some of them had to supplement their salary with support from their news sources in business, public institutes, and politics. News sources volunteered to give money, called chonji, to reporters when asking them to conceal their mistakes or to report in favor of them. If these “voluntary offerings” were not sufficient, some reporters threatened to report their faults or mistakes, something which has been considered as one of the most serious pathologies in Korean society.
Journalists began to organize vigorously in the 1970s. A commitment to democratization of the media and society has been substituted for individualism and loyalty to their own companies. Newspapers increased the number of pages competitively and needed more sensational and entertaining items to attract more readers. When the commercial broadcaster SBS commenced in 1993, all broadcasters competed with more enjoyable and exciting programs to win audiences. Excessive competition for circulation and ratings necessarily resulted in deterioration of news/program quality.
Changing Journalists, Changing Audience
Reporters, struggling in the 1970s for freedom from both government and media ownership, turned to the labor union movement. Conflicts between publishers and reporters were getting as serious as those between the government and the media. In 1974, Dong-a Ilbo reporters organized a labor union for the first time among media organizations; ownership responded with mass dismissals of more than 100 participants under the guise of the “rationalization of management.” Reporters at Chosun Ilbo protested against the paper's support of the dictatorship in 1975 and the publisher dismissed the active participants. The dismissed journalists organized protest committees and played a significant role in the free press movement that followed. One of the most important outcomes of their effort was the foundation of Hankyoreh (literally, “Korean people,” “one nation,” or “one race”) in 1988, the first legal opposition newspaper in Korea since Minjok Ilbo, which shut down after its publisher was executed under martial law in 1961.
Hankyoreh aimed to promote a free and responsible journalism for the restoration of democratic order and reunification. At the advent of Hankyoreh, Korean news media were clearly split into conservative and progressive groups. As a progressive newspaper, the reports and opinions of Hankyoreh were more critical of political and economic power groups and more protective of social minorities. Hankyoreh had a large base among intellectuals and university students, although its circulation was small.
Kim Dae-Jung, elected as president in December 2001, had a long relationship with Hankyoreh. Along with the shift in power, conflicts among the media became more complicated and more intertwined with regional conflict between Kyoungsang province and Cholla province, the seedbeds of conservative and progressive political groups, respectively.4 The media then became embroiled in partisanship and even factionalism. Alliances among political forces and the media were made and these alliances affected journalism. The top three dailies, Chosun Ilbo, Joong-ang Ilbo, and Dong-a Ilbo, have been organs for the conservative Grand National Party, while Hankyoreh and two public broadcasters, KBS and MBC, have been agents for the progressive Democratic Party.
Conflict between public broadcasters and the giant newspapers emerged noticeably in Roh Moo-Hyun's administration. Contention between giant papers and two public broadcasters and between the giant papers and the progressive newspaper Hankyoreh helped lead to the impeachment of President Roh in 2004. Korean journalism has lost public trust by fighting a proxy war for politicians. As a result the public sphere fails to operate properly by seeking a consensus on issues and balancing contradictory opinions.
Demystification of Watchdog Journalism: Journalists Running for Political Power
In the era of media politics, journalists have become more influential. Political parties eagerly recruit journalists in election seasons. The term applied to these “politician/journalists” is polinalist. In a literal sense, the first president, Rhee Syngman, was also the first polinalist. During the Japanese occupation, many journalists supported the independence movement, and might also be called polinalists.
The mobilization of journalists for publicity began in the military government. To help promote the legitimacy of the government, many journalists were granted the status of National Assembly members and ministers. But it was the “civilian government” of Kim Young-Sam in the early 1990s that brought this practice to its highest level. During his rule, 71 National Assembly members (60 in the ruling party and 11 in the opposition parties), 23 ministers, 5 vice-ministers, and 35 Presidential Officers were former journalists. Since then, the percentages of former journalists in National Assemblies have remained around 10–15%. During the presidential election in 2007, more than 40 journalists joined the election campaign of Lee Myung-Bak5 and another 40 applied for nomination by the Grand National Party for the National Assembly.
One could ask whether polinalists could have ever worked fairly and impartially as journalists before running for office. If the answer is no, the profession of journalism for them might be nothing but a stepping stone to political power. Regardless of whether that is true or not, Koreans have come to think of journalists as power-seekers and distrust the media as a result.
Changes of Audience: Decline of Newspaper Readership and Evaluation
Newspaper readership is eroding. The nationwide survey of media audiences in 2010 (KPF, 2010b) revealed a critical situation. Only 52.6% of respondents read newspapers once or more in a week and the time spent reading newspapers had dropped to 16.1 minutes from 24 minutes in 2008.6 Only 29.0% subscribed to newspapers.7 The top three newspapers claimed 65.8% of all subscribers: Chosun Ilbo 30%, Joong-ang Ilbo 20%, and Dong-a Ilbo 15.8%.
A steady erosion of trust suggests that newspaper journalism has failed to meet its audience's needs and expectations in a changing environment. The most urgent problems to be corrected in journalism, according to one survey, were collusion with political power (54.3%), irresponsible reporting (44.2%), reporting for the company's own interest (34.3%), and protective reporting for advertisers (25.7%) (KPF, 2010b, p. 28).
Journalism in Digitization: Where to Go?
The power of Internet media became clear when OhmyNews, one of the most popular and influential Internet media in Korea, influenced the 2002 presidential election. Launched in 1999 with the slogan “every citizen is a reporter,” it invited “all news guerrillas to join us in this grand experiment in globalization.” Its news selection and interpretation were completely different from conventional media. “Citizen reporters” with occupations from homeless to professor covered news in their everyday lives not dealt with by conventional journalism, without objectivity and impartiality, but full of factuality and sincerity. Ordinary people challenged collusive journalists through OhmyNews, pushed different political agendas, and helped elect Roh Moo-Hyun. As a token of gratitude, Roh Moo-Hyun had his first official interview as president with OhmyNews, Low-cost, interactive Internet media have come to compete with conventional journalism media.
The dominance of news services via Internet portals is unique to Korea. Internet portals such as Naver, Daum, and Nate became giants in distribution of news and information, even though they started their news services only in 2003. Portals passed conventional newspapers in trustworthiness in a nationwide audience survey in 2008, with Naver and Daum ranked at third and fourth as most influential, after only KBS and MBC (KPF, 2008). However, these portals clearly do not perform the same role in the public sphere as legacy media. They do not discriminate among news sources, and much of their content comes from other news organizations; readers selecting an item are portaled into the originating organization's site. Internet news also encourages sensational headlines to grab reader attention.
The new Newspaper Act, passed by the ruling party in July 2009, includes Internet portals as news services. It also abolishes restrictions on cross-ownership and crossoperation of different media, making it easier for a chaebol to own and control news organizations (KPF, 2010a, pp. 99–100). The new Act has been divisive, especially in relaxing cross-ownership and cross-operation regulation. Those in favor argued that deregulation was needed for news organizations to survive globalization and digitization; those opposed thought that it would increase the influence of the conservative newspapers at the expense of diversity of public opinion. Around the same time, the Korean Communications Committee (KCC) picked four consortia, led respectively by Chosun Ilbo, Joong-ang Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, and Maeil Kyoungje (the largest economic daily in Korea), all leading pro-government conservative newspapers, to the strong criticism of the opposition.
History of Journalism Studies in Korea
The Joseon Institute for Journalism Education opened in 1947, two years after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule. The institutionalization of communication studies in Korea began when Hongik University became the first Korean university to open a communication department in 1954. It merged in 1962 with the second communication department in Chung-ang University (founded in 1958) (Yang, 2009b, p. 71). Communication departments and research institutes mushroomed in the 1960s. Seoul National University founded its Institute of Journalism Research in 1963 and opened a Graduate School of Journalism. Journalism, and especially print journalism, dominated Korea's communication research (Yang, 2009b, p. 71).
As the new generation of professors who studied in the United States began to teach at Korean universities from the late 1960s onward, the emphasis shifted from normative journalism studies to communication research as a social science. In 1973, 67% of the professors teaching in communication departments had studied in the United States, and most of them accepted the empirical paradigm. In top universities the figure was 89% (Yang, 2005). Communication studies spread to major provincial universities in the 1980s. Growth continued in the 1990s, as the number of departments increased from 15 in the early 1980s to 126 in 2009 (Yang, 2009b, p. 72). This number is second only to the United States.
Academic societies and journals also appeared. The Korean Society for Journalism Studies (KSJS) was established in 1959. KSJS aimed to “promote researches on journalism, collaboration and friendship among the members,” and added “mass communication” to its name in 1969. Finally, it changed “mass communication” to “communication” in 1977. A host of more specialized societies appeared in the 1980s and 1990s. The number of KSJCS members grew from 30 in 1959 to more than 1,000 at present (Yang, 2009b, p. 73) and KSJCS has 20 research divisions including journalism.
KSJS published its official journal, the Korean Journal of Journalism Studies, in 1960 (though it didn't publish its second issue until 1969). It changed its title to the Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies in 1992 and has steadily increased its publication frequency to six issues per year (Cha & Lee, 2009, pp. 321, 322, 328). In quantity, Korean journalism studies rivals those of other countries; in quality, it has successfully followed the path established by the United States (Yang, 2009b; Im, 2009, p. 437).
US-trained scholars imported the style of communication studies into journalism schools, especially empirical methods (Yang, 2009b; Im, 2009, p. 438). Content analysis was the most popular research method in Korea's early journalism studies. Nearly half of MA theses at Seoul National University in the 1970s used content analysis. A few others used survey, experimental, or Q methodologies on news audience and news production. But there was little methodological reflection or innovation in these studies, and there were hardly any mid-scale or large-scale theories (Im, 2009, pp. 437–441).
The advent of critical communication studies in Korea was directly related to the political situation of the 1980s. After the June Uprisings in 1987, radical ideologies and social movements spread and affected journalism studies. The basic idea of the critical macroscopic approach in that period came from the recognition that journalism as a social institution is deeply intertwined with other social systems. Critical studies and its challenge to functionalism reflected the anti-US sentiment which swept the universities in the 1980s. Im (2009, pp. 444–445) points to reflective research into the relation between news and reality, critical normative studies, and the deployment of concepts like ideology, representation, myth, discourse, and articulation. More attention was paid to the political character of news and its role in maintaining the status quo. Under the influence of political economy and British cultural studies, the political purpose and ideological effect of news were discussed in Korea's historical and social context. In the late 1980s, a fierce theoretical and ideological confrontation between empirical mainstream research and critical studies in Korea's communication circles produced what Yang (2009b, p. 76) calls a “paradigm dialogue” marking the birth of diversity or pluralism in the field. However, as Im (2009) regretfully acknowledges, critical journalism studies can be criticized for lacking theoretical precision and arbitrary use of terms. But, I argue, the most important problem of critical journalism studies since the 1980s is its alignment with factional journalism, whether conservative or progressive.
Pluralism is the key word to describe journalism studies since the 1990s (Yang, 2009a; Im, 2009). New and old research tendencies coexisted, competed, and developed with various research issues, approaches, and methodologies. Im (2009, p. 446) describes those changes as follows: content analysis and audience research were still major areas in journalism studies; news production research was augmented with qualitative methodologies such as participant observation; traditional empirical approaches were also enlarged from content analysis and survey to advanced statistics such as network analysis; qualitative methodologies such as discourse analysis, participant observation, and semiology became frequently used in journalism studies.
The number of journal articles increased steadily thanks to the evaluation system of the universities focusing simply on the quantity of publication. Nonetheless, Korean journalism studies is still struggling for its identity. Systematic theoretical work remains a weak point (Im, 2009, pp. 447–449). Yang's (2009b, p. 77) content analysis of the research paradigms of articles published in three major journals shows the number of critical studies increasing significantly in the 1990s, but still well behind the empirical paradigm (see also Yang, 2009a, p. 1031).
Key Issues in Journalism Studies in the 2000s
On March 12, 2004, the opposition-led National Assembly passed the impeachment of President Roh Moo-Hyun to suspend his presidency. The impeachment of President Roh, who was thought of as progressive, was a shocking event to almost every Korean, and was the focus of news coverage across the political spectrum. Controversy arose over the impartiality of coverage by the broadcast networks, and pressure was brought to bear on them by the conservative opposition. In response, the KCC turned to the academy for an assessment, asking the Korean Society for Journalism and Communication Studies to study the matter. They assembled a team of six professors, who did a multi-method content analysis using empirical content analysis, frame analysis, and discourse analysis (KSJCS, 2004, p. 7). They found that “The entire frame (of the programs) was formed by portraying the forces opposing the impeachment as the weaker group and those supporting the impeachment as the stronger and unjust ones” and concluded that “those programs can hardly be seen as fair and impartial, no matter how loosely principles are applied” (KSJCS, 2004, p. 166). This conclusion, in turn, provoked another sharp dispute on the “fairness” of the KSJCS report itself. Conservative media and scholars welcomed the report, while progressive media and scholars criticized the report, the research team, and the executives of the KSJCS. The KSJCS remains divided on this issue.
The sociology of news remains underdeveloped in Korea, partly due to the resistance of the tight-knit circle of Korean journalists. They do not welcome researchers, on the pretext of being busy. They express an authoritarian elitism with deep roots in the Confucian tradition. Indeed, the examination for journalists to work for major newspapers and broadcasters is getting so difficult to pass that it is compared to the bar exam. Aspiring journalists normally have to spend several years after graduation passing these exams. Fear of disclosure of errors and wrongdoing to the public is also an obstacle for researchers. Therefore, any issues related to journalists' professionalism and ethics remain difficult to explore.
Rethinking Press Freedom in Korea
According to KPF's biennial survey, Korean journalists have evaluated the degree of freedom in selecting and writing news as “somewhat free,” except for 1995 when President Kim Young-Sam pushed the tax probe investigation (KPF, 2009, p. 198). For the last ten years, the most frequent answer for the factor most limiting press freedom was advertiser pressure. The perceived influence of publishers and of editors has also increased. From 1999 to 2003, governmental/political power was next to advertisers and publishers. However, the influence of editors passed governmental/political power in 2003. In 2009 governmental/political power surpassed the editorial office and the owner/publisher (KPF, 2009, pp. 199–200).
Similarly, Korea's press freedom seen from outside Korea is decreasing. The Reporters Sans Frontières' annual Press Freedom Index (PFI: http://en.rsf.org/, shows that the situation has been getting worse since 2007, the last year of Roh Moo-Hyun's administration, and into Lee Myung-Bak's government. Freedom House downgraded Korea from “free” to “partly free,” ranking it 70th among 196 countries (http://freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2011/F0TP2011GlobalRegionalTables.pdf/). Increased censorship and attempts to exert official influence over the management of broadcast outlets led to a decline (Karlekar, 2011, p. 2).
Korea's journalism is at a crossroads. Some say that it is unavoidable because of Korea's particular situation of national division. However, I would argue that it springs from the Confucian tradition embedded in the authoritarianism of the government. It can be overcome by being faithful to journalistic norms and principles.
NOTES
Some parts of this chapter are based on the author's PhD thesis, Communication, Culture and the Korean Public Sphere (2001, University of Sussex, UK).
1 Through the newspaper, Hangeul, which had been used mainly in private letters exchanged between women and in storybooks read by women in their inner rooms, was used to treat important public affairs of the nation for the first time since the fifteenth century Newspapers as modern commercial media were critical agents of social change.
2 The Korean newspaper market is dominated by national dailies, especially by the top three dailies. The newspaper market share in 2010 was: national dailies 63.5%, local dailies 9.9%, and financial dailies 20.6%. The combined share of the top three national dailies is 43%: 16.7% (Chosun Ilbo), 13.6% (Joong-ang Ilbo), and 12.7% (Dong-a Ilbo), respectively. Source: http://www.media21.or.kr/solution/bbs/smBoard.asp?bGroup=2&bid=da01&mode=view&idx=157
3 The circulation income of Chosun Ilbo in 1979 was less than 10,000 million Won, which increased to 52,600 million Won in 1986. Capitalization of Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, and Seoul Shinmun increased nearly seven times from 1980 to 1987, whilst the capital of manufacturing industry increased by 38.2% in the same period (Media Oneul, February 7, 1996).
4 All the presidents since the 1960s, Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam, were from Kyoungsang province, while Kim Dae-Jung was from Cholla province.
5 These polinalists were appointed after the election as the chairmen of media companies under governmental influence and media-related institutions.
6 The daily amount of time for using news and current affairs was 86.9 minutes, including television (41.2 mins.), radio (5.4 mins.), and the Internet (13.9 mins.), which was 28.8% of total media use (301.4 mins.) (KPF, 2010b, p. 15).
7 Newspaper subscription rates have dropped continuously: 36.8% in 2008, 40% in 2006, 48.3% in 2004, 52.9% in 2002, 59.8% in 2000, 64.5% in 1998, and 69.3% in 1996 (KPF, 2010b, p. 19).
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